Как долго Украина сможет держать фронт? – Щелин
Ш!УМ ВЛАСТИ
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wpqoSOpmdw0
A conversation between Alexander Shelest and Pavel Shchelin. 20 march 2026
Full Translation
You commented on this — it’s a very interesting process. And on the one hand, yes, there are voices of various “professionals,” so to speak — this kind of “craft” [dismissive term implying low-level or unserious work] — people who record little video clips and criticize Putin. And everyone says: “This must be some kind of special operation, what is this?” And then the person ends up in a mental institution [likely sarcastic or hyperbolic, not necessarily literal].
But look at what an interesting pattern there is. Those who criticize Putin, in the big picture, are essentially the same as in Ukraine. Those who are able to criticize Zelensky say: “You are fighting the war incorrectly.” That is, “we would have conducted mobilization better, we would have been more effective, we wouldn’t have stolen money” — that’s what these Ukrainian politicians say, again from the position of war.
In Russia, they say the same thing: that Putin is weak, that this is unacceptable, that harsher decisions must be taken. So this is the kind of criticism we hear. Neither there nor here do we see anything that could take shape as something that would satisfy this demand for peace. And the demand exists. Sociology — one can treat it in different ways, not believe any of it — but it shows that this demand exists.
There is, of course, a demand for peace. Now, I personally don’t trust sociology — we know how sociology is done everywhere — but still, the demand exists, yet there is no willingness to pay for it. Everyone is for peace. The question is: who will pay for it? That’s the whole story.
Russia, since 2022, has been for peace. Russia’s terms for establishing this peace are known, public, and have not changed since then. So let’s speak plainly: peace is good, but capitulation under the slogan of peace is bad. And therefore in Russia, for example, the main accusation is not just “peace,” but a “shameful peace” [“похабный мир” — meaning degrading, humiliating, indecent peace]. From the Ukrainian side, this is called capitulation. In my view, that is actually a more honest language. Let’s simply distinguish things clearly: peace is good.
What rational person would not be for peace? But let me give you the most unpleasant conclusion. If you truly want peace, and peace is genuinely your highest value — then capitulate. The war will end immediately. Logically speaking — forgive me, this is a philosophical point — the shortest path to peace, if peace is truly above everything else, is to capitulate when you are attacked. That is a logical statement.
Trump, by the way, was counting on this. Journalists ask him live: “Why didn’t you tell your partners you were going to attack Iran?” — “We wanted to make it a surprise,” he says. A cheerful guy, so to speak [ironic tone]. Well, that’s a separate topic.
He said something else yesterday that I liked even more. “This is unfair. We already sank their entire fleet, and they closed the strait. That’s unfair.” That’s really a brilliant phrase [clearly sarcastic]. But let’s return to our topic.
Let’s look at it differently. If you want peace — capitulate. Okay, then let’s do it fairly: Ukraine capitulates and Russia capitulates. Everything is fair.
— No, why Russia?
— No, no. There cannot be two capitulations. In war there are winners and losers. Woe to the defeated. It’s very simple.
Look, the tragedy of the current situation is that even if — taking your forecast as a basis — the Russian army were to begin advancing rapidly… There are competent military experts. I’m not saying when this might happen — maybe in three years, I don’t know — but let’s model the situation. Suppose there is a breakthrough, with advances of, say, 50 km, maybe several such advances if supply holds.
Even if they reach the Dnieper, what remains of Ukraine will still be Ukraine. And voices in Russia will still say: “What is this? They can still attack.” Which means the war will continue until there are no people left in Ukraine capable of launching drones.
If you stop the war, say, along the Dnieper, it will be interpreted as capitulation — both of Ukraine and of Russia.
Let me emphasize something important. Russia cannot stop the war while Ukrainian territory remains a potential threat. That is the tragedy — from the Russian leadership’s point of view. They did not want this. They sincerely thought that some “reasonable” people would come to power there, and agreements could be reached so that Ukrainian territory would not pose a threat.
But reality, and the persistence of the Ukrainian political class, shows that the only way to ensure that drones do not fly from Ukrainian territory is to establish direct or indirect control over that territory. There is no other option for them. This is, unfortunately, a tragedy even for Russia. War creates its own logic.
The fundamental goal has not changed. Everything is framed in the language of security — sometimes sensibly, sometimes foolishly, but always in terms of security.
Why is Telegram banned? Because in wartime it is like having a network through which people can be recruited to carry out terrorist acts, including via Ukrainian intelligence services. From the state’s point of view, this is unsafe. You cannot explain to it that there are other considerations, like the media environment. The thinking is simple: safe or unsafe.
So the question is simple: can any government in Ukraine sincerely guarantee that there will be no threat from its territory to Russia? No — and there will not be such a government. Even the Ukrainian opposition speaks about how, during a ceasefire, they will rearm with the support of partners, become a “steel porcupine” [idiom: heavily armed defensive state], and then strike later.
Until this mindset changes — and, in my view, it can only change under conditions of capitulation — nothing will change.
You might say this could change due to resource exhaustion. But that is very difficult now. We are in a historical era where weapons of destruction have again become very cheap. Drones and missiles can be produced relatively cheaply. Even in economic crisis, it is always possible to supply hundreds of drones. They will fly and hit targets — factories, infrastructure.
So we are in a deadlock. That is the tragedy. For more than a year now, everyone says “peace, peace,” but there is no peace because everyone lies. They speak of peace but mean ceasefire; they speak of agreements but mean deception. There is no trust.
Take Iran. If your negotiating partners have deceived you multiple times and even killed negotiating teams [strong claim; presented rhetorically], how are you supposed to negotiate? The same logic applies elsewhere: agreements are not fulfilled, so no one trusts anyone.
As Iranian experts now say openly: paper guarantees mean nothing; only real changes on the ground matter. Russia thinks the same way.
On Ukraine’s internal situation: could leadership change stop the war? My answer: leadership change — yes; ending the war — no. Anyone who replaces Zelensky will not be able to sign capitulation. You cannot imagine figures like Zaluzhny or Budanov shooting themselves, so to speak [figurative: committing political suicide], by agreeing to that.
There are no politicians in Ukraine who would say: “our land is one, our faith is one, we are one people” [ideological framing]. Those who might have said this are either dead or gone.
Could the West impose such a leader? That would mean the West abandoning Ukraine as a tool of containment against Russia. Why would it do that? It has been building this for decades. For the West to do that, it would have to admit defeat — and no one will do that.
So we return to the core: negotiations are not about a ceasefire, but about a new security order. And until the fundamental positions change — which, in this view, requires defeat — the war continues.
Finally, can Ukraine hold the front?
Short answer: I don’t know. That depends on real internal data — mobilization capacity, losses, replenishment rates, and the changing nature of warfare, where even small forces can hold large areas using modern technology.
But we can infer something: forced mobilization is increasing, which means there are problems. However, they are not yet at the level where the front collapses. Only when there are physically not enough people to hold the line will something fundamentally change.
Synopsis
Core argument of the speaker:
- Public demand for peace exists in both Russia and Ukraine
→ but people are not willing to accept the cost - That “cost” is framed as capitulation
→ therefore real peace is politically impossible - Criticism in both countries is “pro-war” criticism
→ i.e. “fight better,” not “end the war” - Russia’s position (as presented):
- Security is the central concern
- Ukraine must stop being a threat
- This requires:
- neutrality
- demilitarization
- or control
- Negotiations fail due to lack of trust
→ agreements are seen as meaningless - Leadership change in Ukraine would not change outcome
→ any leader would continue the war - Conclusion:
→ War continues until one side is decisively weakened or defeated
→ not resolved through compromise - On the military situation:
→ Ukraine can still hold the front for now
→ but long-term sustainability is uncertain