Note:

This is a transcript and English translation of Diana Panchenko’s Russian-language video “УКРАИНА: РЕАЛЬНОСТЬ ПРОТИВ ПРОПАГАНДЫ” (“Ukraine: Reality Versus Propaganda”), published on the Панченко LIVE YouTube channel on 13 August 2026.

The intention has been to preserve Panchenko’s words and argument, not to rewrite or improve them. The English version is a faithful translation of the edited Russian transcript. It aims to make the original accessible to English-speaking readers while preserving the speaker’s meaning, tone and argument as closely as practicable.

Original video: УКРАИНА: РЕАЛЬНОСТЬ ПРОТИВ ПРОПАГАНДЫ | #Панченко Channel: Панченко LIVE YouTube video ID: fS-x9f8nbQ0 Original duration: 22 minutes 17 seconds

Diana Panchenko — English translation

You ask me to talk about Ukraine more often. The problem is that, in reality, there are two parallel Ukraines — the real Ukraine and the fairy-tale Ukraine — and they do not intersect.

Occasionally there are glitches in the Matrix and the two Ukraines do collide. That happens when someone from the fairy-tale Ukraine suddenly pretends to understand the real Ukraine.

But does this mean that a revolution in the Matrix is possible? That the people can actually do something?

This week singer Olya Polyakova performed a somersault — the same woman with the kokoshnik and high heels. Is she simply stirring things up again, or is she beginning to see the light? Are changes ripening in society? Will people unite against Zelensky and the TCC? I’ll talk about that in this video.

And also, friends, about why Polyakova is Arestovych’s sister from the world of show business.

But first, subscribe to the channel, and when they try to demoralise us here, let’s strike back together against censorship.

First I want to address Polyakova, Ukrainian politicians, and everyone who spent so long inflaming this war.

Have you noticed how the atmosphere in high offices has suddenly changed? The people who only yesterday were talking about victory and refusing negotiations have today remembered peace, corruption, and the lawlessness of the TCC.

This isn’t simply a change of opinion. It is an evacuation from the sinking ship of an old ideology.

But, my dears, I’ll tell you something more: nobody is going to let you jump ship.

Did you think you could ignite a war and the West would make all of you famous millionaires in return? You destroyed the country.

Mobilisation will not end — it will become harsher. The TCCs will not disappear — there will be more of them. You can no longer stop what you set in motion through your short-sightedness and stupidity.

You are nobodies now. You don’t belong to yourselves. Everything has already been decided for you.

Two Ukraines

So, singer Polyakova has discovered that Ukraine is a concentration camp and that people are turning into frightened mice, indifferent creatures:

“Soon we’ll all be frightened and intimidated, like mice sitting in their holes, afraid to stick out their tongues or even their noses. People are kicked, shoved into vehicles. Human beings are being turned into indifferent creatures.”

First, let’s look at how Polyakova talks about this. It makes your ears bleed — every word [unclear].

As one acquaintance of mine who knows Polyakova put it, her native language is Russian obscenity — apart from a few sentences somebody wrote for her and she painstakingly memorised.

Then all hell broke loose. Zelensky’s lackeys descended on her, calling her a woman of reduced social responsibility — only in considerably stronger language. Some Ukrainians in exile supported her: Polyakova is one of those who will form a peace party, they said, and in general she said the right things.

So what was this?

Let me return to the important point, friends: the two Ukraines.

There is a real Ukraine and a fairy-tale Ukraine. These two Ukraines rarely intersect. Each lives on its own.

The real Ukraine consists of frightened people who are grabbed off the streets like animals. It is men who don’t leave their homes, sitting in their apartments dependent on their mothers and wives. It is pensioners who can barely afford food. It is an economy that no longer exists. It is nights spent in metro stations sheltering from bombardment.

It is poverty multiplied by fear, together producing absolute hopelessness.

There is no future, no light at the end of the tunnel, and nobody knows when the war will end. What model of state is the government offering society? Nobody knows. What will happen tomorrow? Nobody knows.

No future. No prospects.

And then there is fairy-tale Ukraine.

That’s the Ukraine we see on social media and in the media. There, people want to fight to the bitter end. The clubs are packed, people dance in restaurants, and there are expensive cars. People supposedly don’t care about their own futures, but they do care about [names/words uncertain in the transcript].

Everyone there is united in the desire to fight. Everyone supports Zelensky.

That’s the Ukraine you see in the profiles of propagandists and media paid by Bankova. Domestic ones such as Sternenko have ceased to be convincing, while also becoming fantastically wealthy.

So they have to bring in people from abroad, such as Laura Loomer, who yesterday was calling Zelensky a drug addict and today praises him. And what guarantee is there that tomorrow she won’t call him a drug addict again?

Once again: fairy-tale Ukraine and real Ukraine do not intersect. They are two parallel worlds whose inhabitants never visit each other.

The inhabitants of fairy-tale Ukraine are having a wonderful time — like Sternenko, who became a multimillionaire during the war. Look at his pre-war declaration: he earned almost nothing. Now he drives an armoured Range Rover worth several hundred thousand euros and goes around with several bodyguards.

Life for an inhabitant of real Ukraine is far removed from a fairy tale. It is more like a thriller.

They envy those living in the fairy tale. They hate them, but quietly, through clenched teeth. They don’t protest against the very system of this showcase, fairy-tale Ukraine.

For two reasons.

The main one, of course, is fear.

In this sense, the brutal mobilisation we see every day isn’t merely a way of replenishing the Armed Forces of Ukraine. It is a mechanism of intimidation.

Previously, those considered undesirable had only prison to fear. Now they also have the TCC. Unwanted journalists, businessmen who don’t want to share — at the first opportunity, send them all to the front.

But there is another reason.

Showcase Ukraine helps fairy-tale Ukraine endure. The storytellers keep feeding people nonsense, and somehow dying and suffering while being fed nonsense is more cheerful than doing so without it.

It also gives ordinary people some sort of hope. For example, perhaps a son will join the TCC and support the entire family.

And now Polyakova, a defender of Zelensky, one of the show-business people close to Bankova, has suddenly started talking about ordinary people who are forced to live in a concentration camp:

“It’s horrific, like a concentration camp. Ukraine is no longer a free country.”

Public figures who are there don’t call things by their proper names. It’s as though an informal agreement exists: if you’ve managed to retain a little fat in the form of money and fame, you don’t pay attention to real Ukraine — to all those unfortunate people who were less lucky than you.

The agreement is that only people with money and protection have any rights. But you have that money and protection only for as long as you remain silent about the government’s crimes, about corruption and terror in the streets.

And nobody cares about those unfortunate Ukrainians living in the real Ukraine. You’re allowed to sympathise with them on social media after Russian attacks, but not after attacks by their own TCC and authorities.

Polyakova appears to have broken this agreement. She isn’t the first. Before her there was the cardboard Maidan over corruption in the army. Increasingly, soldiers themselves are shouting about lawlessness. There was the scandal involving torture and killings [unclear].

The unpleasant truth from real Ukraine — the truth that those living in fairy-tale Ukraine don’t want to notice — is seeping into their fairy-tale little world, their world of social media and the press.

The effect is like seeing a homeless person outside an elite mansion, or seeing a rubbish dump. It smells unpleasant and you want to hurry past.

Does this mean, then, that a shift might be occurring? That these unhappy people will awaken and break their chains?

Yes and no.

Let me explain with an example.

Olya Polyakova

So who exactly is Olya Polyakova?

Her stage persona was built around the kokoshnik and the blonde in high heels. She deliberately created an image for the Russian market: Russian style, Russian-language hits, because the image worked equally well in Ukraine and Russia.

She herself acknowledged that before 2014 Ukrainian show business operated with Moscow as its focus. Her kokoshniks and high heels were designed specifically for Russia.

She was successful there, including appearing with Baskov at the RU.TV awards in 2015. Her mother lived in Moscow throughout this period, married to a Russian diplomat. Polyakova made no secret of the fact that her mother had a luxurious mansion outside Moscow, and she frequently visited her there.

But, as happened with Zelensky, there was a ceiling beyond which she couldn’t rise. Polyakova wanted to be number one rather than occupy the niche of the [unclear] blonde.

Number one was Loboda — who, incidentally, is also from Ukraine.

You might think there was room in the sun for everyone. Fees in Russia couldn’t be compared with Ukrainian ones. Money, television, fame, prospects.

But, as with Zelensky, at some point Polyakova became consumed by resentment because she believed she deserved more. And that resentment turned into resentment against Russia, which Polyakova hoped to monetise after the war began.

Like many others, she apparently thought all she needed to do was shout about hating Russians and success would be guaranteed.

And for a while it was.

But not for long.

In August 2022, on the programme [unclear], Polyakova burned a kokoshnik, explaining that yesterday these things had merely been stage props, whereas today they were symbols of a culture that had come with war.

[The following brief Polyakova quotation is too badly recognised in the transcript to reconstruct reliably.]

Notice, friends, that Polyakova doesn’t say: “I was mistaken. I was wrong. I’ve changed.”

She makes excuses.

In other words: wearing a kokoshnik was acceptable before, but today it isn’t.

We’ll come back to that.

But endlessly burning kokoshniks isn’t interesting, and hatred won’t take you very far.

For many years Ukraine supplied creative talent to Russia. Many of the most successful performers came from Ukraine. Music videos were filmed in Ukraine; ideas were born there. [Brief phrase unclear.]

This can be explained quite simply: disorder and the absence of a system provide ideal soil for creativity. And that describes Ukraine perfectly. Which, of course, doesn’t detract from the talent and colour of Ukrainian performers.

But after 2022 everything changed.

[One sentence unclear.]

In a society ruled by fear, in a society ruled by dictatorship, all creativity suffocates.

Ukrainian culture, which was largely built around a cult of freedom and opposition to the Soviet system, has turned into that very same hated Soviet system — only worse.

Because the Soviet Union had an idea and it had creativity.

Hating Russians isn’t an idea.

In general, hard times arrived for performers — both morally and financially.

Why pay enormous sums for corporate appearances when the market has collapsed and you can pay very little? Previously, someone like Polyakova or Brezhneva could choose and demand insane fees. Once the Russian market was closed, there was nothing to choose from.

In 2022, performers queued up to see Zelensky, competing to see who could bow lowest.

Now everything has changed.

They understand: Zelensky means the TCC. It means terror.

And increasing numbers of people have suddenly woken up and remembered ordinary people — both politicians and people in show business.

Like Polyakova.

Both the burning of the kokoshnik in August 2022 and today’s criticism of the TCC occurred precisely when those respective attitudes had already become widespread among the audience.

She didn’t lead.

She followed.

When loving Zelensky was fashionable, we loved Zelensky. When criticising the TCC became fashionable, we criticised the TCC.

This story, friends, isn’t really about Polyakova.

It’s about responsibility.

And specifically about a particular variety of responsibility: responsibility Ukrainian-style.

Responsibility

I don’t condemn people who change their position. Quite the opposite. I believe that when someone has the courage to admit they were wrong, that is an act worthy of respect.

But I do condemn those cunning people who simply exploit human suffering for publicity, who keep their noses to the wind and monetise other people’s tears.

And I condemn it twice as strongly when those tears are caused by war.

An artist has a right to be free. But the moment an artist enters the political arena, that artist bears responsibility.

An artist reaches an audience through an irrational channel: through trust, sympathy and emotion. When an artist uses that channel to make a political statement, they are monetising trust that wasn’t earned through politics.

The viewer loved her for her songs, but then receives a political position from her and accepts it on trust because they love her.

That asymmetry creates an obligation.

How many Ukrainian performers do you know who called for peace in 2022?

Everyone was merely inflaming hatred.

[Several short excerpts from earlier public statements follow; Whisper did not recognise them reliably enough to reconstruct.]

People, of course, feel all this and understand it. They recognise the falseness and insincerity.

So Polyakova’s words about the Ukrainian concentration camp perhaps deserve respect for their courage.

But they carry no weight.

Because people already know that they’re living in a camp.

So is a popular uprising possible?

I often hear people say: what would it take for Ukrainians to get together and go after the TCC with pitchforks?

First, in the information age everything becomes known immediately. Before three people can even assemble, the SBU will already know about it.

But there is another, no less important aspect.

I want to explain it through the example of another rather well-known character.

Why Alexei Arestovych is not very different from Polyakova

Everyone knows that Arestovych is a master of changing his shoes — changing his position to suit circumstances.

[A short excerpt from an earlier Arestovych appearance follows; the automatic transcription is badly damaged.]

But I want to examine how he does it.

Arestovych is undoubtedly a talented speaker with a keen sense of trends. And he is certainly one of the very few Ukrainian politicians who talks about ideas and meanings at all.

Almost nobody else does.

Arestovych has changed his position several times and even manages to joke about it:

— Do you change your shoes often?
— Well, a little here and there. I’m not really a fan.
— But how many pairs?
— Oh, about twelve to fifteen, obviously.

“I’ve gone through all my changes of shoes over the years and I’ve also arrived at a certain position. Perhaps that will change. I changed my shoes throughout all these turbulent times.”

But he lacks the courage to say: “I changed my mind.”

He still tries to wriggle out of it as though it wasn’t he who changed his position — everything around him changed instead.

I’ll examine just one example.

The famous “two or three weeks.”

[An archival Arestovych quotation about “two or three weeks” follows; the beginning is unclear.]

Version 1, August 2022.

He says that he only said it once, in mid-March, and was referring solely to the end of the active phase of the operation around Kyiv. And that phase really did end within two or three weeks.

[The following quotation is partly unclear.]

In other words: I wasn’t wrong; you misunderstood me.

Version 2, August 2022.

He admits that he deliberately misled everyone in order to prevent panic at the beginning of the war.

“The famous two or three weeks had another reason…”

In other words: I deliberately got it wrong, and doing so was the right thing.

Version 3: It had already been decided; a timetable existed.

“The famous two or three weeks came from the fact that I was a member of the Istanbul negotiating group. I knew that within two or three weeks there would be [unclear] in Istanbul…”

[The remainder of the quotation is badly damaged in the automatic transcript.]

So either he was telling the truth and people misunderstood him; or he lied for the greater good; or he knew the confidential timetable for the negotiations.

Every new version cancels the previous one.

It simply displaces it.

And that is a failure.

Significantly, when the war ends, the time will come when the smartest people will finally appreciate those “two or three weeks.”

That isn’t an admission of error.

It is a claim to future vindication.

The mistake is repackaged as an achievement for which he expects gratitude.

And the mechanism repeats itself.

In April 2026, he again started talking about the war ending soon, and users reminded him of those very same “two or three weeks.”

The pattern literally repeated itself.

By comparison, Polyakova at least said, in effect: “Yesterday it was merely a stage prop; today it’s a symbol.”

In other words, she acknowledges that she wore the kokoshnik and that the context changed.

Arestovych has no equivalent.

He paid nothing for his incorrect predictions except in reputation.

Arestovych’s transformation

But there is a nuance few people know about: what, apart from opportunism, caused Arestovych’s transformation.

According to my information, for a considerable period Arestovych had a certain degree of support in certain circles.

But at some point, the person with whom he was communicating was no longer in his position.

The support disappeared.

And Arestovych went from being an ardent Russian:

“I am Russian. I voluntarily chose to belong to this civilisation.”

—to becoming an ardent Russophobe:

“They aren’t Russians. If they were Russians, I wouldn’t have had to apologise to them for so long.”

At one point Arestovych was practically dreaming of himself as ruler of Malorossiya.

Imagine it: the doors of the Column Hall slowly swing open. The marble gleams coldly. Chandeliers shimmer with thousands of lights.

Arestovych enters alone.

He walks towards his destiny — his coronation.

Every step echoes solemnly through the hall.

Here it is: the moment for which thousands of words were spoken, dozens of convictions changed, yesterday’s allies betrayed.

At the far end of the hall Putin himself is waiting.

He rises, pauses theatrically, and pronounces:

“Now you, Alexei, are the Viceroy of Kyiv.”

Thunder rolls.

Destiny!

Arestovych bows his head, already imagining himself master of the Ukrainian capital.

And although Arestovych himself denies it…

[A fragment of his comments about polling and presidential elections follows; some words are uncertain.]

Like many others, he was already at the starting line, preparing for elections.

When his patron could no longer help him, [unclear] turned 180 degrees.

At any specific point, did he answer to the people for the things he had said?

Ask Arestovych.

Politics without responsibility

In Ukraine, politicians have always arrived smiling and speaking gentle words: peace, friendship, brothers.

Every president came to power under slogans of friendship with Russia. And every one of them — from Kravchuk to Zelensky — did exactly the opposite.

I wrote a book about it.

They all talked about warm homes and trains crossing borders without restriction. The people are tired, they said; the people want peace.

And then the slogans were quietly rolled up like old posters.

Instead of friendship came walls, prohibitions, outsiders.

Instead of peace, new lines on maps and new lists of enemies.

Did even one of them bear responsibility?

Not one.

Did a single member of parliament bear responsibility? Even someone like Vakarchuk, who went into politics and then left again, without giving a damn about the people?

Difficult times lie ahead. The hardest thing for Ukraine will be the winter.

And once again there will be people who speculate on human suffering, like Polyakova, like Arestovych — people who became what they became through the image of being “good Russians.”

One in a kokoshnik; the other telling Ukrainians about mighty Rus’.

In reality, both Polyakova and Arestovych are Russian children.

What distinguishes children from adults?

Children don’t bear responsibility.

Children live according to the principle: “I want.”

All these Arestovyches, all these Zelenskys wanted fame, money and power.

They had enough talent and cunning to reach a certain height.

They didn’t have enough responsibility.

That’s why Ukraine is where it is.

“We are all responsible for everything”

Now let’s look more broadly.

Most of us wanted peace.

Peace and tranquillity.

We understood that we had a neighbour right beside us and that quarrelling with that neighbour promised nothing good.

And we elected as president an actor with no experience in diplomacy or politics.

And we gave him absolute power in the form of a single-party majority in parliament.

When the war began, we believed Zelensky and Arestovych when they told us we could defeat Russia.

We became embroiled in a grinding fight that Russia is capable of ending in ten minutes by destroying us.

But we continue fighting.

Destroying ourselves.

Perhaps all of us need to understand that we’re behaving like children?

And from this comes the answer to the question of whether another Maidan is possible in Ukraine.

Why do impoverished people put up with it?

As long as people like Polyakova and Arestovych can juggle with our opinions, nothing will change.

It will only get worse.

As long as our moral authorities are hypocrites and traitors, there will be no freedom.

As long as we go out to protest for money but don’t go out to defend the church that is being crucified, there will be no peace.

And that is painful to hear.

It is harsh.

But forgive me, friends: I am accustomed to beginning with myself.

For ten years before the war, I said the same thing over and over: if hatred continued to be inflamed, there would be war.

The war began.

My like-minded colleagues and I were called Kremlin agents.

And despite that, I do not absolve myself of responsibility.

Every human being bears responsibility before all people, for all people and for everything.

We are all responsible for everything.

For everything that has happened to us.

And until every one of us — at the front, in the rear, abroad — understands this, we will continue living in two different Ukraines: the real one and the fairy-tale one.

And things will become worse and worse in both.

Friends, be sure to subscribe to the channel, and tell me in the comments what you think, dear Ukrainians: what helps you endure, and do you believe people such as Arestovych and Polyakova?

Patience to us all.

Goodbye.

«Большой хапок» — как Западная Германия ограбила братьев через стенку

Видео показалось мне интересным. Оно рассказывает о Германии во время объединения — о фактах, которых я никогда не знал, о которых никогда не задумывался и которые, как мне кажется, сегодня весьма актуальны.

Контекст и тон

• Тон: крайне эмоциональный, антизападный, драматичный и субъективный.
• Геополитическая позиция: канал представляет пророссийский, антизападный взгляд, используя экономические трудности периода объединения Германии для критики западного капитализма и европейской интеграции.

Это видео с русскоязычного YouTube-канала «Арбузеры», где ведущая рассказывает об экономических последствиях объединения Германии в 1990-е годы.

Ниже — разбор того, что она говорит и почему это производит столь сильное впечатление.

Основная суть её рассказа

Ведущая представляет экономическую интеграцию Восточной Германии (ГДР) в Западную Германию (ФРГ) после 1990 года как «крупнейшее легальное ограбление в современной европейской истории» — «Большой хапок». По её мнению, бывшие граждане Восточной Германии подверглись экономической эксплуатации, лишились собственности и были превращены властями и корпорациями Западной Германии в граждан второго сорта.

На протяжении всего видео она проводит прямые параллели между постсоветской Россией 1990-х годов и Восточной Германией, пытаясь показать, что восточные немцы фактически пережили экономический крах ещё более тяжёлый, чем жители бывшего СССР.

Основные темы и утверждения

1. Массовая утрата жилья и собственности

• Она утверждает, что около 95% бывших муниципальных и государственных квартир, построенных при социалистической системе, перешли из-под контроля восточных немцев.
• Она особо говорит о законах о реституции — принципе «возврат собственности вместо компенсации», — утверждая, что бывшие западногерманские владельцы или их наследники возвращали себе имущество, что приводило к массовым выселениям, и что сегодня 80% собственности в Восточной Германии принадлежит западным немцам.

2. Роль агентства Treuhandanstalt

• Она резко критикует Treuhandanstalt — государственное агентство, которому была поручена приватизация государственной собственности ГДР.
• Она утверждает, что Восточной Германии обещали 600 миллиардов марок общего имущества, но в результате она получила 275–300 миллиардов марок долгов. По её словам, 85% государственных предприятий были проданы западным немцам, 10% — иностранным инвесторам и лишь 5% достались восточным немцам, причём в основном это были небольшие предприятия и магазины.

3. Деиндустриализация и потеря рабочих мест

• Она утверждает, что миллионы восточных немцев потеряли работу, поскольку прибыльные государственные предприятия — например, заводы фотоаппаратов Pentacon — были намеренно закрыты западногерманскими конкурентами с целью устранения конкуренции.
• Она приводит голодовку шахтёров Бишоффероде в 1993 году как трагический символ сопротивления восточных немцев принудительному закрытию предприятий.

4. Социальный и культурный раскол — Wessis и Ossis

• Она говорит о продолжающемся социальном разделении между западными немцами (Wessis) и восточными немцами (Ossis), утверждая, что восточные немцы сталкиваются с дискриминацией, более низкими зарплатами и социальным клеймом.

5. Политические последствия и современная немецкая политика

• Она связывает исторические экономические обиды в таких восточногерманских землях, как Тюрингия, с недавними электоральными успехами популистских партий — «Альтернативы для Германии» (AfD) и BSW («Союз Сары Вагенкнехт»).
• В заключение она призывает аудиторию помнить о восточных немцах как о «бывших братьях по социалистическому блоку», которых бросили в 1990-е годы.

Насколько обоснованы её утверждения, тезисы и ссылки?

При оценке утверждений, сделанных в видео, необходимо различать проверяемые исторические и экономические факты и окружающую их одностороннюю, сенсационную интерпретацию.

Ведущая действительно основывает свой рассказ на реальных экономических мерах, исторических забастовках и статистических различиях 1990-х годов, однако интерпретирует их избирательно, прибегая к конспирологическим объяснениям и просоветской трактовке.

1. Реальные факты — в чём она права

Многие из основных событий и базовых статистических данных, упоминаемых в видео, действительно имеют основания в исторических и экономических исследованиях.

Неравномерность приватизации Treuhandanstalt

• Факт: Treuhandanstalt — федеральное агентство, занимавшееся приватизацией восточногерманских предприятий, — действительно продало приблизительно 85% предприятий Восточной Германии западным немцам, тогда как восточным немцам досталось лишь около 5%.
• Результат: последовала масштабная деиндустриализация, было потеряно почти 2,5 миллиона рабочих мест, а безработица в некоторых восточных регионах к середине 1990-х достигала 20–25%.

Забастовка шахтёров Бишоффероде в 1993 году

• Факт: шахтёры калийного рудника имени Томаса Мюнцера в Бишоффероде, Тюрингия, объявили знаменитую голодовку и заняли шахту в знак протеста против её запланированного закрытия Treuhand.
• Результат: несмотря на широкое общественное внимание, канцлер Гельмут Коль отказался встретиться с ними. Шахта была объединена с западногерманским конкурентом Kali + Salz и закрыта. Она до сих пор остаётся символом травмы, связанной с объединением Германии на Востоке.

Законы о реституции и имущественное неравенство

• Факт: принцип Rückgabe vor Entschädigung — «возврат собственности прежде компенсации» — позволял бывшим владельцам собственности, экспроприированной до 1945 года, или их наследникам требовать её возвращения. Это создало серьёзную жилищную неопределённость и способствовало сохранению большого числа арендаторов в Восточной Германии, где доля домовладельцев и сегодня ниже, чем на Западе.

Политическая реальность Востока

• Факт: глубокое экономическое недовольство, уходящее корнями в 1990-е годы, широко рассматривается политологами как один из важнейших факторов успеха антисистемных партий, таких как AfD и «Союз Сары Вагенкнехт», на выборах в восточногерманских землях, включая Тюрингию и Саксонию.

2. Умолчания и преувеличения — где её рассказ искажает картину

Ведущая представляет происходившее как своего рода «колонизацию», при этом оставляя без внимания важнейшие экономические проблемы бывшей ГДР.

Экономическая несостоятельность ГДР

• Её представление: промышленность Восточной Германии была процветающей и прибыльной, а Западная Германия уничтожила её исключительно из жадности и стремления избавиться от конкурентов.
• Другая сторона: к 1989 году государственная экономика ГДР фактически находилась на грани банкротства. Восточногерманские предприятия были технологически отсталыми, экологически вредными, чрезмерно укомплектованными рабочей силой и зависели от сильно субсидируемого советского сырья. После введения валютного союза по курсу 1:1 большая часть продукции ГДР практически за одну ночь стала слишком дорогой для восточных рынков и неконкурентоспособной на мировом рынке.

Искажение вопроса о жилье

• Её представление: создаётся впечатление, что 95% жилья было «украдено» у семей, которым оно принадлежало.
• Другая сторона: значительная часть жилья в ГДР, включая Plattenbauten, находилась в государственной, а не частной собственности. Законы о реституции действительно вызывали серьёзные конфликты и выселения из довоенной собственности, однако муниципальные жилые дома передавались муниципалитетам или социальным жилищным компаниям, а не просто «крались» отдельными западными немцами ради личной выгоды.

Умолчание о финансовых трансфертах солидарности

• Её представление: Западная Германия просто навязала Востоку долги и извлекла из него богатство.
• Другая сторона: Западная Германия направила сотни миллиардов евро на инфраструктуру, модернизацию, здравоохранение и пенсии Восточной Германии через «налог солидарности» — Solidaritätszuschlag — и федеральные фонды финансового выравнивания. Это было одним из крупнейших региональных перераспределений богатства в современной истории.

3. Идеологическая и геополитическая подача

• Релятивизм времён холодной войны: она преуменьшает экономические страдания постсоветской России, одновременно подчёркивая проблемы Восточной Германии, создавая ностальгически благоприятную картину советской сферы влияния.
• Популистская повестка: связывая недовольство 1990-х с современными спорами о миграции, энергетической политике и такими партиями, как AfD, она использует историческую травму для продвижения антизападных и антинатовских взглядов.

Заключение

Видео затрагивает реальные исторические болевые точки. Скорость и жёсткость приватизации Treuhand, конфликты вокруг реституции собственности и забастовка в Бишоффероде — документированные элементы истории объединения Германии.

Однако вывод о том, что объединение было злонамеренным и незаконным «ограблением», опирается на сенсационную трактовку статистики, конспирологическую подачу и практически полное игнорирование уже существовавшего экономического кризиса ГДР.

Так сильно ли пострадали восточные немцы? И если да, то было ли это неизбежно с учётом тогдашнего положения?

Реальность страданий Восточной Германии

Экономические и социальные потрясения в Восточной Германии в начале 1990-х были тяжёлыми, системными и хорошо документированными.

• Массовая деиндустриализация и безработица: в течение четырёх лет после объединения около 2,5 миллиона восточных немцев потеряли работу. Безработица в восточных землях выросла практически с нуля при социализме до 20–25% в середине 1990-х, а последствия ощущались ещё десятилетиями.
• Обесценивание профессий и квалификаций: высококвалифицированные рабочие, инженеры, учёные и администраторы часто обнаруживали, что их квалификация была понижена в статусе или вообще больше не признавалась. Миллионы людей были вынуждены перейти на низкооплачиваемую работу в сфере услуг, досрочно выйти на пенсию или переехать на Запад.
• Утрата социальной инфраструктуры: граждане ГДР лишились целой системы государственных гарантий — субсидируемого жилья, гарантированного ухода за детьми при предприятиях, гарантированной занятости и общественной жизни, организованной вокруг государственных предприятий.
• Демографический исход: миллионы молодых и образованных восточных немцев — особенно женщин — переехали в Западную Германию, в результате чего целые восточные регионы старели и экономически слабели.

Были ли крах и экономический шок неизбежны?

Хотя методы приватизации и административные решения Treuhand остаются спорными, экономическая расплата для Восточной Германии была структурно неизбежна.

Даже если бы объединение вообще не произошло или проводилось совершенно иначе, к 1989 году экономика ГДР находилась на грани банкротства по нескольким причинам.

1. Системная неплатёжеспособность и износ инфраструктуры

К концу 1980-х государственный бюджет ГДР стал неустойчивым. Государство накопило огромные долги в твёрдой валюте перед западными банками, финансируя социальные субсидии и импорт потребительских товаров. Промышленное оборудование сильно устарело, производственный капитал изнашивался без достаточных инвестиций, а экологическая деградация наносила тяжёлый ущерб промышленным регионам.

2. Исчезновение советской поддержки

Экономика ГДР в значительной степени зависела от субсидируемой советской нефти, которую Восточная Германия перерабатывала и затем продавала на Запад за твёрдую валюту. Когда СССР начал распадаться и потребовал вести торговлю по рыночным ценам и в твёрдой валюте, одна из главных опор экономики ГДР исчезла.

3. Обоюдоострый валютный союз — 1 июля 1990 года

Решение ввести немецкую марку по искусственному курсу 1:1 для заработной платы и сбережений было политически необходимо, чтобы остановить немедленный массовый отъезд восточных немцев на Запад.

Но экономические последствия наступили мгновенно:

• производство на предприятиях Восточной Германии внезапно стало стоить примерно столько же, сколько на западногерманских предприятиях, при значительно более низкой производительности и качестве;
• традиционные рынки Восточной Германии в Восточной Европе и СССР одновременно рухнули, поскольку бывшие социалистические соседи больше не могли позволить себе товары, цены на которые теперь устанавливались в немецких марках.

Итог

Страдания восточных немцев были реальной исторической действительностью: массовая потеря рабочих мест, экономический хаос и социальный разрыв.

Однако эти страдания нельзя объяснить исключительно политикой Западной Германии. Они были также следствием десятилетий нежизнеспособной государственной социалистической экономики, структурной неплатёжеспособности и внезапного выхода устаревшей промышленной базы на мировой конкурентный рынок.

Похоже, у автора есть какая-то личная связь с этой историей. Что именно она сама хочет сказать? Если совсем просто: что западные немцы очень плохо обошлись с восточными?

Её эмоциональная вовлечённость связана прежде всего с собственным опытом жизни в постсоветские 1990-е годы и семейными связями с Германией, а не с тем, что она сама выросла в Восточной Германии.

• Её личная история: она рассказывает, что её семья после экономического краха 1990-х переехала из Казахстана в Москву в начале 2000-х. Её сестра впоследствии вышла замуж за немца из Павлодара и эмигрировала в Германию, где члены семьи занимались физическим трудом — например, собирали грибы на полях.
• Её чувство «вины» и нравственная сторона вопроса: центральная личная тема — запоздалое чувство моральной вины. Она вспоминает, что жители бывшего СССР в 1990-е были поглощены собственными экономическими бедствиями и верили западной пропаганде о том, что Запад представляет собой рай. Поэтому, по её ощущению, русские «морально бросили» восточных немцев, полагая, что тем невероятно повезло мгновенно оказаться в Западной Германии, — и лишь десятилетия спустя поняли, насколько сильно была разрушена экономика Восточной Германии.

Её главный тезис — в упрощённом виде

Если свести всё к одной мысли: она утверждает, что западные немцы очень плохо обошлись с восточными немцами и систематически их эксплуатировали.

Её аргумент строится главным образом на трёх утверждениях:

• Колониальная эксплуатация: Западная Германия в её изображении выступает не спасителем, а экономическим завоевателем, который за бесценок скупал восточногерманские предприятия, закрывал жизнеспособных конкурентов и превратил восточных немцев в «лишённый собственности рабочий класс», вынужденный платить аренду западногерманским домовладельцам.
• Хуже, чем в постсоветской России: по её мнению, восточные немцы получили особенно плохую сделку, потому что гражданам бывшего СССР хотя бы позволили приватизировать свои квартиры и стать их собственниками, тогда как восточные немцы превратились в пожизненных арендаторов западногерманских корпораций и наследников прежних владельцев недвижимости.
• Предупреждение другим: её скрытый политический тезис адресован бывшим советским республикам — таким как Грузия, Армения или Украина. История Восточной Германии используется как предупреждение: «Не доверяйте обещаниям западной интеграции. Они не модернизируют вашу страну — они ликвидируют вашу промышленность и превратят вас в граждан второго сорта».

Несмотря на драматическую ностальгию и геополитическую обиду в её рассказе, он затрагивает реальное и хорошо документированное чувство экономического отчуждения, которое многие жители Восточной Германии испытывали после объединения.

Кто она и где она сейчас?

Ведущая — российский политический блогер и видеокомментатор, ведущая YouTube-канал «Арбузеры» под именем @arbuzering.

• Кто она: автор видеоматериалов о политике, экономической истории и западной политике. Её материалы выдержаны в пророссийской, антизападной и суверенистской системе взглядов и часто посвящены современной геополитике или истории 1990-х как альтернативе западным медийным нарративам.
• Её происхождение: судя по её собственным рассказам, она выросла в Казахстане в период постсоветского краха 1990-х. В начале 2000-х она вместе с семьёй переехала из Казахстана в Москву.
• Где она сейчас: она живёт в России, в Московском регионе, и распространяет материалы через российские платформы — VK Video, RuTube и Telegram — наряду с YouTube.

Что значит «Арбузеры»?

Буквально арбуз — это, конечно, watermelon по-английски, поэтому название «Арбузеры» можно было бы шутливо перевести как «watermelons» или «watermelon-eaters».

Однако в русском интернете «арбузер» употребляется как шуточное искажение заимствованного английского слова abuser — «абьюзер».

Когда слово «абьюзер» стало модным термином в разговорах об отношениях и популярной психологии, русскоязычные пользователи начали шутливо заменять его созвучным «арбузером». Поэтому название «Арбузеры» — игра слов, соединяющая «абьюзеров» с арбузами.

О её имени и личности

Она выступает под названием канала «Арбузеры» (@arbuzering), не делая своё настоящее полное имя центральной частью публичного бренда.

При этом в монологах она рассказывает о своей биографии — жизни в Казахстане, переезде в Москву в начале 2000-х и родственниках в Германии, — но её публичной идентичностью остаётся название канала.

Динамика «ирони

“The Big Grab” – How West Germany Robbed the Brothers Through the Wall

«Большой хапок» – как Западная Германия ограбила братьев через стенку

An interesting video I thought. Telling about Germany at the time of reunification. Telling facts I had never known, never thought about and which are today very relevant I think.

Context & Tone

• Tone: Highly emotional, anti-Western, dramatic, and opinionated.
• Geopolitical Perspective: The channel presents a pro-Russian, anti-Western commentary frame that uses historical economic hardships during the German reunification process to criticize Western capitalism and European integration.

The video is from a Russian-language YouTube channel called Arbuzery («Арбузеры»), presented by a female host discussing the economic aftermath of the German reunification in the 1990s.

Below is a breakdown of what she is saying and why it comes across as startling:

Core Summary of Her Message

The speaker frames the post-1990 economic integration of East Germany (GDR) into West Germany (FRG) as “the largest legal robbery in modern European history” («Большой хапок»). She argues that former East Germans were economically exploited, stripped of their property, and reduced to second-class citizens by West German authorities and corporations.

Throughout the video, she draws direct parallels between post-Soviet Russia in the 1990s and East Germany, attempting to demonstrate that East Germans actually suffered a worse economic collapse than post-Soviet citizens.

Key Topics and Claims She Makes

1. Mass Loss of Housing Property:

• She claims that around 95% of former municipal/state apartments built under the socialist system were transferred away from East German residents.
• She highlights restitution laws (“return before compensation”), claiming former West German owners or descendants reclaimed property, leading to mass evictions and leaving 80% of East German property owned by West Germans today.

2. The Role of the Treuhandanstalt Agency:

• She criticizes Treuhandanstalt, the agency tasked with privatizing East German state assets.
• She claims East Germany was promised 600 billion marks in shared assets, but ended up in 275–300 billion marks of debt. She alleges that 85% of state enterprises were sold off to West Germans, 10% to foreign investors, and only 5% ended up in East German hands (mostly small shops).

3. Economic Deindustrialization & Job Losses:

• She claims millions of East Germans lost their jobs as profitable state factories (e.g., Pentacon camera works) were closed deliberately by West German competitors to eliminate market competition.
• She points to the 1993 Bischofferode miners’ hunger strike as a tragic symbol of East German resistance against forced mine closures.

4. Social & Cultural Divide (Wessis vs. Ossis):

• She describes ongoing social division between West Germans (Wessis) and East Germans (Ossis), claiming East Germans face discrimination, lower wages, and social stigma.

5. Political Ramifications & Current German Politics:

• She connects historical economic grievances in East German states like Thuringia to the recent electoral success of populist political parties such as the Alternative for Germany (AfD) and the BSW (Alliance Sahra Wagenknecht).
• She concludes by urging her audience to view East Germans as “former brothers of the socialist bloc” who were abandoned during the 1990s.

The validity of her claims, propositions, references.

Evaluating the claims made in the video requires distinguishing between verifiable economic historical facts and the one-sided, sensationalized narrative surrounding them.

While the speaker bases her video on real economic policies, historical strikes, and statistical disparities from the 1990s, she frames them through selective interpretation, conspiracy theories, and pro-Soviet framing.

1. Real Facts (What She Gets Right)

Many of the central events and baseline statistics mentioned in the video are grounded in genuine historical and economic research:

Treuhandanstalt Privatization Disparities:

• Fact: The Treuhandanstalt (the federal trust agency that privatized East German enterprises) did sell off approximately 85% of East German businesses to West Germans, while only ~5% went to East Germans.
• Outcome: This led to widespread deindustrialization, nearly 2.5 million job losses, and massive unemployment (up to 20–25% in certain eastern regions during the mid-1990s).

The Bischofferode Miners’ Strike (1993):

• Fact: Miners at the Thomas Müntzer potash mine in Bischofferode, Thuringia, organized a famous hunger strike and occupied the mine to protest its planned closure by the Treuhand.
• Outcome: Despite national public attention, Chancellor Helmut Kohl refused to meet with them, and the mine was merged into a West German competitor (Kali + Salz) and shut down. It remains a symbol of reunification trauma in Eastern Germany.

Restitution Laws and Property Disparities:

• Fact: The principle of “Rückgabe vor Entschädigung” (“restitution before compensation”) allowed former pre-1945 owners (or their heirs) to reclaim expropriated property in the East. This created significant housing insecurity and led to widespread tenant status in East Germany, where homeownership rates remain lower than in West Germany today.

Political Realities in the East:

• Fact: Deep-seated economic resentment from the 1990s is widely cited by political scientists as a primary factor behind the strong performance of anti-establishment parties (such as the AfD and Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht) in East German state elections like Thuringia and Saxony.

2. Omissions & Misleading Exaggerations (Where She Distorts)

The speaker presents a heavily biased “colonization” narrative while ignoring critical economic realities of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR):

Ignoring GDR Economic Insolvency:

• The Misconception: She portrays East German industry as thriving and profitable, claiming West Germany destroyed it solely out of greed or competition.
• The Reality: By 1989, the East German state economy was functionally bankrupt. GDR factories were severely technologically outdated, ecologically destructive, heavily overstaffed, and reliant on heavily subsidized Soviet raw materials. Once the 1:1 currency union occurred, most East German products became overnight too expensive for Eastern markets and uncompetitive globally.

Housing Misrepresentations:

• The Misconception: She implies 95% of housing was “stolen” from families who owned it.
• The Reality: Housing under the GDR was predominantly state-owned (Plattenbauten), not privately held. While restitution laws did cause severe friction and evictions in pre-war properties, municipal housing blocks were transferred to local municipalities or social housing companies, not “stolen” by individual West Germans for personal gain.

Omission of Solidarity Transfers:

• The Misconception: She claims West Germany merely accumulated debt and extracted wealth from the East.
• The Reality: West Germany funnelled hundreds of billions of Euros into Eastern infrastructure, modernization, healthcare, and pensions through the Solidarity Surcharge (Solidaritätszuschlag) and federal equalization funds—one of the largest regional transfers of wealth in modern history.

3. Framing & Geopolitical Motives

• Cold War Relativism: She repeatedly downplays post-Soviet economic hardship in Russia while amplifying East German problems, presenting a nostalgic defense of the Soviet sphere of influence.
• Populist Agenda: By linking 1990s grievances to modern debates over migration, energy policy, and party politics (like the AfD), she leverages historical trauma to promote anti-Western, anti-NATO political views.

Conclusion

The video touches on real historical pain points—the speed and severity of the Treuhand privatizations, property restitution conflicts, and the Bischofferode strike are documented parts of German economic history. However, her conclusion that reunification was a malicious, illegal “robbery” relies on sensationalized statistics, conspiratorial framing, and the complete omission of the East German economy’s pre-existing collapse.

So did the east germans suffer much? And if so was it to be expected in face of their current reality?

The Reality of East German Hardship

The economic and social disruption in East Germany during the early 1990s was severe, systemic, and documented across several key metrics:

• Mass Deindustrialization & Unemployment: Within four years of reunification, roughly 2.5 million East Germans lost their jobs. Unemployment in eastern states skyrocketed from virtually zero under communism to 20–25% in the mid-1990s, with severe lingering effects for decades.
• Occupational Devaluation: Highly skilled workers, engineers, academics, and administrators frequently saw their qualifications downgraded or rendered obsolete, forcing millions into low-wage service jobs, early retirement, or economic migration to the West.
• Loss of Social Infrastructure: GDR citizens lost a comprehensive web of state-provided benefits—including subsidized housing, guaranteed workplace childcare, state-backed employment, and community social hubs tied to state enterprises.
• Demographic Flight: Millions of younger, educated East Germans—particularly women—emigrated to Western Germany, leaving entire eastern regions aging and economically depressed.

Was Collapse and Economic Shock Inevitable?

While the political and administrative execution of privatization (via the Treuhand) remains controversial, an economic reckoning for East Germany was structurally unavoidable.

Even if reunification had never occurred or had been managed differently, the GDR economy was on the verge of bankruptcy by 1989 for several reasons:

1. Systemic Insolvency and Infrastructure Decay

By the late 1980s, the GDR state budget was unsustainable. The regime had accumulated massive hard-currency debt to Western banks to fund social subsidies and consumer imports. Industrial machinery was severely outdated, factory capital had depreciated without investment, and environmental degradation was crippling industrial regions.

2. Loss of the Soviet Cushion

The GDR economy relied heavily on subsidized crude oil from the Soviet Union, which East Germany refined and resold to the West for hard currency. When the USSR collapsed and demanded trade in hard currencies at market rates, the GDR’s primary economic lifeline dissolved.

3. The Double-Edged Currency Union (1 July 1990)

The decision to adopt the Deutsche Mark at an artificial 1:1 exchange rate for wages and savings was politically necessary to prevent millions of East Germans from immediately moving west. However, it had immediate economic consequences:

• East German industries overnight became as expensive to operate as West German companies, but with a fraction of the productivity and quality.
• East Germany’s traditional export markets in Eastern Europe and the USSR collapsed simultaneously, as post-communist neighbors could no longer afford goods priced in Deutsche Marks.

Summary

The hardship experienced by East Germans was a concrete historical reality characterized by massive job losses, economic dislocation, and social disruption. However, this hardship was not purely the result of West German policy—it was the inevitable fallout of decades of unviable state-socialist economics, structural insolvency, and the sudden exposure of an outdated industrial base to global market competition.

The author seems to have some personal involvement. What is she saying centrally, of her own? Simply? That East Germans were very badly done by, by West Germans?

The personal emotional involvement in her narrative comes from her own life experiences growing up in the post-Soviet 1990s and her familial ties to Germany, rather than a background as an East German native:

• Her Personal Background: She shares that her family moved from Kazakhstan to Moscow in the early 2000s after surviving the economic collapse of the 1990s. Her sister later married a German man from Pavlodar and emigrated to Germany, where her family worked manual labor jobs (like gathering mushrooms in fields).
• Her “Guilt” and Moral Angle: Her central personal theme is a feeling of belated moral guilt. She reflects that post-Soviet citizens in the 1990s were consumed by their own financial misery and believed Western propaganda that the West was a paradise. Because of this, she feels Russians “morally abandoned” East Germans, assuming East Germans had hit the jackpot by joining West Germany overnight—only to realize decades later that East Germans were economically dismantled.

Her Central Claim (Simplified)

Boiled down to its simplest point: She is arguing that East Germans were treated terribly and systematically exploited by West Germans.

Specifically, her argument rests on three main assertions:

• Colonial Exploitation: She frames West Germany not as a savior, but as an economic conqueror that bought up East German factories for pennies, closed viable competition, and left East Germans as a “dispossessed labor class” paying rent to West German landlords.
• Worse Than Post-Soviet Russia: In her view, East Germans got a raw deal because post-Soviet citizens were at least allowed to privatize and own their apartments, whereas East Germans were turned into lifelong tenants of West German corporations and real estate heirs.
• A Warning to Others: Her underlying political point is directed at former Soviet republics (like Georgia, Armenia, or Ukraine). She is using the East German experience as a cautionary tale to say: “Do not trust Western integration; they will not modernize you, they will liquidate your industry and turn you into second-class citizens.”

While her personal framing relies on dramatic nostalgia and geopolitical grievance, it taps into the real, documented sense of economic disenfranchisement felt by many in Eastern Germany following reunification.

For a deeper look into how the rapid economic privatization of the 1990s created lasting political divisions in Eastern Germany today, you can explore the socioeconomic background of political shifts in East Germany, which provides further context on regional inequality and voter sentiment.

Who is she and where is she now?

The presenter is a Russian pro-state political blogger and video commentator who runs the YouTube channel Арбузеры (Arbuzery) (operating under the handle @arbuzering).

• Who She Is: She is a digital creator who produces videos focusing on political commentary, economic history, and critique of Western policy. Her content is framed around a pro-Russian, anti-Western, and sovereign-nationalist perspective, often analyzing current geopolitics or 1990s history to counter Western media narratives.
• Her Background: Based on her own commentary across her videos, she grew up in Kazakhstan during the post-Soviet collapse of the 1990s. In the early 2000s, she and her family moved from Kazakhstan to Moscow.
• Where She Is Now: She is based in Russia (in the Moscow region) and distributes her content across Russian domestic social platforms—including VK Video, RuTube, and Telegram—alongside YouTube.

What does Arbuzeri mean?

Literally, yes, arbuz (арбуз) in Russian means watermelon, so arbuzery sounds like it translates to “watermelons” or “watermelon-eaters.”

However, on the Russian internet, “Арбузер” (Arbuzer) is a popular slang term. It is an intentional, humorous distortion of the English/slang word “Abuser” (as in emotional abuser/manipulator).

Because the word “abuser” became a heavily used buzzword in online dating discourse, Russian speakers started sarcastically swapping it with the word arbuz (watermelon). Calling a channel “Арбузеры” is a tongue-in-cheek pun that plays on “Abusers” while using the word for watermelons.

About Her Identity/Name

She operates under the channel alias “Арбузеры” (@arbuzering) without publicly promoting her real full name on her main branding, which is common among independent commentary bloggers on YouTube and Telegram.

While she shares personal details about her background in her monologues—such as growing up in Kazakhstan, moving to Moscow in the early 2000s, and having family ties in Germany—she uses the channel handle rather than her legal name as her public persona.

The Dynamic: “Sarcastic Self-Labeling”

In contemporary Russian digital culture, words borrowed from Western pop psychology (abuser, gaslighter, toxic) are heavily mocked by conservative or counter-mainstream commentators.

When a commentator calls her channel “Арбузеры” (the pun conflating abuser with watermelon), she is using ironic reappropriation. She is saying:

“To the mainstream narrative, liberals, or the West, anyone who questions their story or speaks harsh, inconvenient truths is called an ‘abuser’ or ‘toxic.’ Fine, if holding these views makes me ‘toxic,’ then I’ll proudly call myself an ‘Arbuzer.'”

It functions similarly to how political commentators in the English-speaking world might ironically adopt labels thrown at them by opponents (like wearing “Deplorable” or “Gadfly” as a badge of honor).

Closest English Concepts

While there isn’t a single 1:1 English term that packs the watermelon pun and pop-psychology irony together, the posture aligns with several familiar archetypes:

• The Irreverent Gadfly / Contrarian: Someone who views it as their duty to annoy the establishment, challenge orthodoxies, and break social taboos through aggressive, unapologetic commentary.
• The “Toxic” Truth-Teller (Ironic): Embracing a label given by opponents to signal, “I’m not here to be polite or play by your rules of discourse.”
• The Provocateur / “Professional Muckraker”: A self-styled outsider exposing what they claim are hidden hypocrisies and uncomfortable facts that the mainstream media refuses to talk about.

Summary

She is adopting a persona of defiant, sarcastic dissent. The channel title acts as a wink to her audience: she is deliberately framing her content as uncomfortable, raw political commentary that “shatters mainstream sensibilities”—and poking fun at modern political correctness while doing it.

“Provocateur” captures her style precisely. It fits both the tone of her presentation—high energy, emotionally charged, deliberately disruptive—and the broader strategy of that style of commentary.

By framing uncomfortable or controversial historical topics like the East German integration through a dramatic, combative lens, she aims to provoke a reaction, challenge mainstream Western narratives, and push her audience to question established histories. It’s an approach built less on traditional academic presentation and much more on political provocation.

She is serious and sensible, knowledgeable, intelligent and with her heart and head in the right place.

Here she is, then, saying a sensible thing: do not expect an idyll in those ‘greener pastures’ if you get there.

That’s a very important lesson or dictum for slavs from what we have learned while observing this ukraine war.

It seemed the whole of ukraine was as enamoured of ‘the west’ as we can remember British youth being of America, post war.

Loving, soaking up, absolutely everything and anything, from blue jeans and bubble gum to rejection of authority and tradition via rock and music.

The host’s message—stripped of its hyperbole—is essentially a warning against naïve idealism: the belief that switching sides or joining a prosperous system automatically guarantees prosperity for the newcomer.

What we see in Ukraine—and across the former Eastern Bloc in the 1990s—is a classic cultural phenomenon: the romance of the “Other.”

The Post-War Mirror: Britain & America vs. the East & the West

The comparison to post-war British youth enamored with America is a sharp historical parallel. In both cases, we had a society recovering from strain or scarcity looking across a border at a culture that seemed to embody everything they lacked:

Post-War Britain: America represented material abundance, youth culture, freedom, and modernity—symbolized by jeans, rock ‘n’ roll, and Hollywood.

Late-Soviet & Post-Soviet States: The “West” represented consumer choice, personal freedom, higher living standards, and institutional order—symbolized by blue jeans, chewing gum, Western cars, and a market economy.

In both instances, the cultural export was so powerful because it wasn’t just a collection of goods; it was a promise of a better life. When a population feels constrained, the “greener pasture” isn’t evaluated critically—it becomes a utopian ideal.

The Shock of Reality

The core point that he presenter is reflecting on is the inevitable crash when ideal meets reality:

1. Economic Integration is Not a Transfer of Wealth: Integration into a market economy, whether for East Germans in 1990 or post-Soviet states later, means exposure to global competition. Uncompetitive local industries get swept away, guaranteed jobs vanish, and local populations often start at the bottom of the new hierarchy.
2. Asymmetry of Interest: A smaller or weaker partner often views integration through the lens of romance and brotherhood, while the larger, dominant economic system operates purely on market logic, self-interest, and capital efficiency.
3. Loss of Social Anchor: When a population completely rejects its own tradition and authority in pursuit of an external ideal, it risks losing its internal anchors. When the imported dream turns out to have its own harsh economic realities—expensive housing, job insecurity, social stratification—disillusionment is twice as bitter.

A Universal Dictum

Looking back from a distance, that level of infatuation always looks obvious and naive. But human societies frequently fall for it when the gap between their everyday reality and a polished external image grows too wide.

The dictum highlighted—do not mistake an economic sphere of influence for a charitable idyll—is a lesson bought through hard experience across Europe over the last 30 years. It’s a reminder that every economic and political system operates on interest, not affection, and that “greener pastures” always come with a price tag.

it is also perhaps interesting that in both cases the real nature of the ‘beloved’ was not perceived. For instance america back then did not ‘win the war’ as in fact the tired soldiery of Europe tried to tell. Nor did the Americans at home really have the free and easy egalitarian loving society of unbridled freedom with disregard of authority etc a ‘norm’ that they might have appeared to have.

Similarly in modern times the west that the naive ukrainians cherised and coveted was not a land, is not a land, of universal riches and endless opportunity set upon a primrose path to perfection as events since ’22 in particular have clearly shown us.

This is one of the most persistent themes in cultural and geopolitical history: the tendency of societies under stress to project their own desires onto an idealized external world.

When people admire a foreign nation from afar, they are rarely looking at that country as it actually exists. Instead, they build a myth composed of everything missing in their own lives. When the reality of that foreign power finally collides with the myth, the gap between perception and reality becomes stark.

1. The Myth of Post-War America

The perception of 1940s and 1950s America among exhausted Europeans is a classic example of this projection.

• The Perception: America was seen as a boundless utopia of total personal freedom, easy wealth, and casual, egalitarian living—a society that had effortlessly stepped in to “save the world.”
• The Reality:
  • Mid-century America was a strictly regimented, highly conformist society dominated by strict social norms, intense religious pressure, rigid corporate structures, and severe racial segregation (Jim Crow).
  • Politically, it was defined by the paranoia of the Red Scare and McCarthyism, where suspicion of authority or non-conformity could ruin a career overnight.
  • Operationally, while American industrial production was the decisive engine of WWII, the staggering human weight of defeating the Wehrmacht on the ground was borne primarily by the European powers and, above all, the massive casualties of the Soviet Red Army.

The European youth who embraced American culture were not adopting real American social life; they were adopting a commercialized image—Hollywood, blue jeans, and rock ’n’ roll—which served as a convenient tool to rebel against their own conservative, war-weary elders.

2. The Idealized “West” in Post-Soviet Memory

A remarkably similar dynamic played out in the former Eastern Bloc following the collapse of communism.

• The Perception: The “West” was viewed as an effortless paradise of high salaries, flawless consumer goods, universal welfare, and complete personal freedom. For many in post-Soviet states, “joining Europe” was imagined as a simple step onto a track that automatically guaranteed Western European living standards.
• The Reality:
  • Western market economies are built on relentless competition, strict fiscal discipline, high costs of living, and ruthless efficiency.
  • They do not distribute wealth out of solidarity; capital flows toward return on investment.
  • When smaller or less competitive economies integrated with the West, local industries were often priced out, assets were bought up by foreign conglomerates, and local workers frequently found themselves at the bottom of a new economic hierarchy.

The Underlying Human Pattern

In both historical moments, the mistake was assuming that a foreign power’s prosperity was a gift to be shared, rather than the result of its own cold self-interest, hard-nosed economic rules, and historical circumstances.

When a nation projects its hopes onto an external savior, it inevitably mistakes an economic or strategic alliance for a charitable sanctuary. The realization that every system ultimately operates on self interest rather than affection is usually a painful, but necessary, sobering process.

It is a crying shame that more than one million Ukrainians are today dead and a diaspora of some 20 million because of utter failure for this understanding to be promulgated and received

From their Youtube talk April 12 2026
“https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WFJ5NsLaoy0“

After the CEASEFIRE, Ukraine will start LOSING CITIES: target No. 1 is KYIV! — Dudkin.

Александр ШЕЛЕСТ 921K subscribers

Pretty much business as usual. Nothing new here. It serves mainly to show that nothing has changed.

Apparently they see ever more clearly in Kiev Ukraine but still fail to see that there are 10million of their own compatriots over there which they are trying to kill and whose land they occupy.

They never mention it/them and still talk as though they and they only are ‘ukraine’ and ‘the ukrainians’. All part of the total lunacy, the Orwellian lunacy of our times, courtesy of that country between two oceans.

Translation

Host: …ings to you, dear friends, distinguished guests, and subscribers to my channel. Yuri Dudkin is online right now. Yuri Anatolyevich, greetings.

Yuri Dudkin: Hello, Alexander. Happy upcoming great holiday of Holy Easter to you.

Host: And to you too. And to you, dear viewers, happy upcoming holiday as well. Today is Holy Saturday. We’re talking about great things, you see, negotiations. I propose we begin with the negotiations between the US, Iran, and Pakistan in Pakistan, in Islamabad. And everyone has arrived there.

Yuri Dudkin: Iran was traveling, or rather, traveling by plane, on board, where, on the seats inside the passenger compartment, they displayed, well, photographs of murdered children, yes, with flowers, basically, how can I say, for edification. Yes, yes, that, in general, betrayal and surrender will not be a wound. Vance is quite confident before the negotiations, speaking quite vividly, demonstrating confidence that everything will be fine. Trump wishes him luck. It’s a moment of truth, after all. But observers are seeing equipment, forces, and resources being transferred, all while the negotiations are ongoing. And, of course, information has leaked to the press that, more precisely, Iranian assets will be unblocked, but Israel continues to strike Lebanon. So, two preconditions for these negotiations are, well, money and, of course, Israeli attacks on Hezbollah. And only half of them have been fulfilled. Should we expect any breakthrough or success at this point? Right now, we’re talking about negotiations, the Holy Fire descending. But will the Holy Fire illuminate the Islamist battalion with its grace, its light?

Host: Yes, you asked a good question, so to speak, and applying today’s date of the descent of the Holy Day to the most dangerous point on the globe today, of course, the Middle East, the Persian Gulf. Of course, I’d really like these negotiations to be successful, because the entire world is literally reeling from what’s happening there. And that’s not just a nice phrase. It’s true. The entire world is reeling from the situation in the Middle East. Yes, the meeting in Islamabad was supposed to take place on April 10, but it was postponed for 24 hours. And that’s understandable. Because there’s no point in looking for someone to blame and so on. Before that, all sorts of consultations are taking place at some low level, at the diplomatic level, all sorts of exchanges of messages, both online and in person, between countries. And this, naturally, is all part of the preparation for this meeting. The only thing I want to say is that you shouldn’t expect anything special from this meeting. Why? Because at this meeting, again, I won’t undertake to analyze, predict, or assign blame. There’s a third party not present—Israel. That’s it. And this leads me to the idea that, as I understand it, Israel is represented by the United States, because the Israeli leadership, uh, has been on the hook, financially, of the United States, and the state of Israel itself, since time immemorial. Therefore, I think that the full share of responsibility for what the Israeli leadership is doing today, killing thousands of civilians, women and children, falls on the American side. As for, as you correctly noted, the external aspect of this meeting, indeed, at the beginning, Iran categorically refused. This, apparently, is related. The postponement of this meeting by 24 hours. It categorically refused to meet with American representatives, and especially with, as was previously stated, comrade Witkoff and Zyatkoff. That’s it. But when it finally became clear that US Vice President Jadis would participate in the meeting, and with him the comrades I mentioned, the Iranian leadership agreed. So, uh, I would like to talk a little about the Americans. We understand everything. Who represents the United States there? Everything is clear. The most effective negotiator, a man who does not hold any government official status. This is, uh, Mr. Stephen Witkow. There. And the president’s son-in-law, who has joined him. Jadis, of course, represents the president. But it should be noted here that Vance, at the very beginning of the aggression against Iran, warned, uh, Trump that the consequences could be dire, not only for the United States, but for the entire planet, because he also warned—to his credit, Iran would immediately block the Strait of Hormuz. Well, naturally, no one believed his words, especially the president, since Vance is the second-highest-ranking official in the United States under the Constitution. And what happened happened. So, I still want to focus on the Iranian delegation, because it’s also very important. Iran is taking a very tough stance in the negotiations. And the Iranian delegation consists of seventy-one people. Just imagine that number. And the presence of so many negotiators not only means that these people will not be directly involved in the negotiations. They are, of course, technical specialists who will promptly advise the chief negotiators on various points. And, in particular, the Wall Street Journal reports and asserts that Iran sent hardliners against the United States to these negotiations. For example, one of these representatives is Ali Akbar Ahmazian, a member of the Supreme National Security Council, who authored the decision to stop, to block, and to stop oil transportation in the Strait of Hormuz. Well, you can imagine, yes, uh, what kind of person he is. Well, also present at these negotiations from the Iranian side is Abolfazl Samouei, the initiator of the law on increasing uranium enrichment. So, the talks will obviously also focus on the uranium nuclear program. So, uh, the delegation is headed by some pretty tough politicians. These are Mohammad Bagher Ghalib and Abasarakchi, the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Abasarakchi is generally a highly respected person in the world. The spiritual leader of Iran was also a similarly respected person today. Uh, therefore, Abasarakchi will represent Iran with a 100% commitment to protecting national interests. And Iran’s national interests, of course, lie in the fact that at the outset of these negotiations, Abasarakchi will voice theses about US reparations to Iran, about the material damage inflicted on Iran, about the absolutely unconditional aggression of the United States. The position against Iran is absolutely categorical. That is, the US currently has only general statements about how Iran has threatened the United States. But the US still cannot back this up with real, not circumstantial, examples. Therefore, Iran’s leadership and foreign ministers are focusing on material issues, uh, those that primarily relate to material damage to Iran. The second issue, incidentally, is the payment of monetary compensation to all Iranian victims. This is something new, so to speak, in these negotiations. The second issue, also very important, which is being brought up in these negotiations is, of course, Iran’s absolute sovereignty. That is, no pressure, and this will be stated if any declaration is adopted. Iran does not accept any influence from the United States, Israel, or any other country, and therefore has the right to create and develop its nuclear program for peaceful purposes, as they emphasize, including uranium enrichment. Therefore, this is the second point that Iran will defend in this regard. And the third, perhaps also important, very important point is Lebanon. Without a ceasefire in this state, in southern Lebanon, uh, without the withdrawal of Israeli troops from southern Lebanon, and the same kind of material compensation for the disfigurement of Beirut, the capital of Lebanon, Iran will certainly not make any compromises or concessions. Incidentally, previously, the United States did not want to meet with the Iranian leadership at negotiations that brought up the issue of Iraq, the issue of Lebanon. That’s it. But the Iranians nevertheless insisted on a separate discussion with the Americans on Lebanon, and they exerted corresponding pressure on the Israeli leadership to agree to a ceasefire and the withdrawal of troops from that country, the occupation forces. That’s why we’re waiting today; there are many other details there. I could talk about this at length, but we’re waiting and waiting. Of course, the negotiations are scheduled to begin at 3:00 PM European time. We’re certainly looking forward to the start of these negotiations. There will be many very interesting moments, primarily related to purely external factors. Those who study physiognomy and psychology will be very interested to see the meeting of the delegations at the hotel in Islamabad where this historic meeting, I believe, will take place. Well, there were some timing issues. That’s all. It’s really hard to count the moments, of course. It’s hard. Everyone’s just counting time zones, and time is slipping, you know? Negotiations are already underway, they’ve already announced it. So, as we speak, negotiations are already underway. Let’s wait for the results. Of course, we understand that this is a very important milestone, but I would ask this question: how will this affect the Ukrainian negotiating track, as they say? Look, Budanov has been coming out lately, saying sensible things, like, imagine, that drones won’t win the war, we need people, while there’s war, there’s mobilization. He’s saying that everything could be over very soon, so we need some kind of unity. We’re on the brink of some kind of historic decision, and we need to stop arguing and be united. So, unity around whom? Around Zelenskyy. It’s clear, and it kind of gives us a little bit of a boost for some kind of epochal decision. Everyone’s talking about, well, we’ll see next week, how the likes of Witkoff and Zyadkov arrive, as you put it. Yes, they promised to visit Ukraine, it’s unclear what’s going on. Again, it all depends on Iran. But nevertheless, as soon as there was a whiff, a whiff of at least some, well, more or less a ray of hope, even though Zelenskyy, of course, is kind of seasoning it, sometimes he wants bases, sometimes he’s crying about NATO, sometimes he’s crying about nuclear weapons. Well, that’s all there is to it. It’s a standard story. Zelenskyy is trying to play out something with Budanov similar to Trump with Vance. Good cop, bad cop. And that’s roughly how it plays out. But as soon as they started talking about peace, Boris Johnson came out in Ukraine—they published photos today—and said: “I’m confident of Ukraine’s victory over Russia,” Boris Johnson declared. He came to Zaporizhzhia and made a film about himself. It’s called Boris Johnson in the Killzone. Well, it’s like Boris Johnson is in the line of fire. Listen, this isn’t even surprising after Istanbul in ’22. As soon as something is brewing, or some kind of statement, or some kind of background noise, he’s right there. Or, for example, the British officials, older, less senior. Right there. Will it be possible, given today’s positive news—it’s positive in any case—182 people have returned to Ukraine, seven civilians, 175 military personnel, against the backdrop of the Easter truce, which was declared unilaterally by both sides. Everyone will act in a mirror-image manner from 4 PM until the end of the day, the 12th. Will it be possible to achieve peace?

Yuri Dudkin: Well, I don’t see any, let’s say, basic attempts from Ukraine to achieve peace. Well, not in any way, from either side. You called them good cop and bad cop. Well, who can be called good cop? Uh, Budanov or Zelensky? Well, Budanov says, wait. In his last two or so interviews, Budanov has been saying things like the UOC isn’t the Moscow Patriarchate, that everything we have with drones is pre-fabricated. That’s what many experts say: don’t talk about drones being made in China, with Western technology, assembled here, don’t delude yourself. So he’s bringing all this rabid propaganda down to earth. And everyone’s noticed. Well, my God, listen. A man who planned to kill and was directly involved in planning terrorist operations in Russia, and in Moscow in particular, saw the top leadership of the Ministry of Defense and four generals directly under his command killed. I’m not even mentioning the other operations he planned and carried out. What other words could he possibly use to describe his actions? I honestly don’t understand. The question is, is he recognized as a terrorist in the Russian Federation? That’s why I’m surprised the Russian delegation even sat down with him at the negotiating table. It’s sheer nonsense. On the one hand, declaring a terrorist a terrorist—well, admittedly, Yeltsin and Chernomyrdin also spoke with Chechen terrorists from the unrecognized terrorist republic of Ichkeria, as a Chechen court recently acknowledged. Perhaps there really was some kind of super-necessity to it at that time, but today, as they say, all the cards are on the table, and who’s who has long been clear. And can you really call Zelensky, a terrorist, a good policeman, who, you know, even has such a pro-fascist attitude? A remnant of Jewish nationality currently holds power in Ukraine, and in a completely unconstitutional manner. Well, for me, this is also a very clear marker, by which I determine that it’s as bad as one. And in the near future, this is my opinion, the Russian leadership, no matter who it is, will not sit down at the negotiating table with such people. That’s it. And by the way, Istanbul and the cities where the Russian delegation met with Budanov, and not only with him, very clearly showed that these conversations, these negotiations, these deals, these get-togethers, led to nothing. Well, that’s a very clear example. Well, how many of these conversations have there been already? As for this external context, as you say, yes, that the British immediately rushed to inspire the Nazi regime in Ukraine to victory. Well, my God, they could and can do this not just because someone somewhere said something. The British are now neck-deep in Ukraine. Their presence is practically visible to the naked eye. And it’s also clear how the British are planning terrorist attacks against Russia. The same narratives, for example, that British intelligence is spreading in Ukrainian diplomacy are also visible. They are voiced by Sybiha, the Ukrainian Foreign Minister. That’s it. As for the United States, I can give a very, uh, clear and, you know, comprehensive message to the Americans, against the backdrop of, as you said, the events in Islamabad, yes, and including the conflict in the Persian Gulf: they don’t give a damn anymore about Ukraine. It’s clear that they’ve invested huge sums of money in this suitcase. And, of course, they’re abandoning Ukraine so suddenly. Ukraine is a kind of hostage to the Americans. And they’ll continue to haggle with Russia for a very long time, just as they are now. This is simply not being written about anywhere. Well, I’m sure they’re bargaining with the Russian Federation over international influence. That’s it. And Ukraine is a bargaining chip where the Americans can exert significant influence on the Russian leadership in terms of weakening their influence elsewhere in the world, be it Venezuela, Cuba, or even Iran. Do you understand? That’s why Ukraine is now completely worthless. Except, as I say again, everything about Ukraine has somehow turned into some kind of materialism. Everything materialistic has no significance whatsoever for the West, the greater West, in terms of upholding pro-Western values. No one there is even talking about Ukraine being a sovereign state, only in rare, rare cases. Well, mind you, yes, by the way, that’s a good observation. Few people, not a single Western media outlet, are talking about Ukraine’s sovereignty these days. Do you understand why? Because America no longer recognizes this sovereignty. It doesn’t recognize this sovereignty. She’s already admitted that Ukraine, indeed, and since 2004—I emphasize, not 2014, but 2004—has been the target, the anti-Russia, into which they’ve been investing these enormous sums. And it’s not just that modern America recognizes this. Victoria Nuland memorably acknowledged this. When that bloody Maidan took place in 2014, the eyes of Ukraine, especially Ukrainian citizens, were truly opened to many things. Not everyone, admittedly, far from everyone, but many eyes were opened to the fact that the sacred Maidan, which Ukrainians believed in, was based on American dollars, and not on some idea of Ukraine not joining the customs union. That’s it. And above all, it was Ukraine’s separation from the Slavic world, from the Orthodox canonical faith, and thirdly, as a springboard for anti-Russia, which is working beautifully today. And by the way, the United States is also taking advantage of this. Don’t you think it’s all just dying out? Well, look, in Russia, for example, there’s also a lot of unrest and criticism of the government. Putin’s approval rating, even according to the Central Election Commission, has fallen due to, well, the attacks from Ukraine and the work with Telegram, the expansion of messaging apps. They also need to get people to download Turkish en masse, especially since there are tons of downloads of the Turkish messenger, Beep, because, well, it works on Russian numbers and, basically, isn’t blocked there, and it’s used for communicating with each other. That’s just stupid, it’s just a shot in the foot. But nevertheless, they are leading the Kremlin down this path and undermining their authority. Even Zelensky recently said: “It’s not clear here, they are jamming and suppressing social networks, well, Telegram, Messenger, yes, either because they want to make an unpopular decision, well, that is, to stop the war, or because they will declare mobilization, well, some new wave.” And so Zelensky asks the question, how would you answer this question? I answer this question that these are natural processes. Any state, uh, to one degree or another, in its decisions, in its programs, it changes. You remember the year when the retirement age was raised in Russia. It was a shock for Russian society, well, such a, let’s say, yes, quite a large percentage. And Vladimir Putin’s rating then also fell. But it’s one thing when the rating fluctuates, I still don’t call it a fall, but rather rating fluctuations. When the rating fluctuates, let’s say, from 2 to 4%, and today they generally say that the rating of, uh, trust of Russian society towards Putin is and fluctuates around the figure of 80%. Well, 70, not 80, well, 70-80, it was 80. Well, let it be 70, it doesn’t matter. But this is not Zelensky’s rating. It is not at all clear how much there is, I’m afraid that it will not even be 10%. This is not Macron’s rating of 12% in Europe. This is not the rating in other European countries. And including, by the way, Trump himself, which sometimes drops to 4%, then rises again. And it is increasing not because Trump is elevated there to the rank of some kind of reformer, but it is increasing only because Trump talks a lot and tells well how and whom he will humiliate once again in the world. Therefore, what happened to Putin’s rating is an absolutely natural process. This was, is and always will be under any leadership. There is nothing terrible about this. All the same, I believe that Russian society today is consolidated for the most part. It’s consolidated. Look at how Russian society reacted to the events in Dagestan related to the natural disasters. It’s a clear indicator that both the neighboring republics of Dagestan and Chechnya—in fact, in the Chechen Republic, all of Russia, basically—directed all their efforts to raise funds to help the Dagestani people survive. This has never happened in Ukraine, when bridges, towns, and villages were washed away in western Ukraine. This has never happened because the Ukrainian leadership itself lacked a consolidating role. It didn’t influence society to help its brothers, its compatriots, with even the most basic matters of survival. Today, I believe that a completely misanthropic policy is being pursued in Ukraine. And talking about the approval ratings of, say, Zelenskyy—well, that’s simply ridiculous.

Host: No, let’s talk about what really worries many people: the goals and objectives of the SVO. Putin is giving up, dumping everything, it all boils down, as he says, to Slavyansk and Kramatorsk, that is, to a few kilometers. And, in fact, the war will end. Oh, and, of course, it boils down, because, as the liberation of the Luhansk region was recently announced, the means, the media and the Russian Ministry of Defense stated, are being used to liberate the Luhansk region. Russia is focusing its main efforts on the limited number of troops, they emphasize, without conducting any additional mobilization or moving large forces within the country, the liberation of the Donetsk region. Therefore, everything is concentrated around Kostiantynivka, Kramatorsk, and Slavyansk. Of course, there is nothing surprising about this. I don’t see anything surprising. What is the goal and objective of the SVO? Wait, in Donbas alone? Okay, I don’t get it. Oh, and what’s confusing? Confused, yes, their goals and objectives, including the liberation of Donbas. What’s confusing? Not among them. Wait, not among them. It turns out these SVO goals were initially elastic. We’re rubber-banded, because we’ll finish it whenever we want. Ah, well, right now it boils down to, let’s have Sloviansk-Kramatorsk and that’s it. But what about the Kherson region, which was included in the constitution? The situation is catastrophic. You’re also following the news. Right now, Nikopol is an empty town. Empty. A week ago, they dropped leaflets there, warning of an offensive, saying, “Don’t stick your neck out, civilians.” Well, the authorities say: “Forget these leaflets.” Then there was the terrible tragedy last week with a Russian drone hitting a minibus, killing people. And then there’s a full-scale shooting. The people of Nikopol say, “Protect Syrsky.” But Syrsky doesn’t. They’ve boarded up everything. Well, that’s the story of a small town—well, it’s not small, but nevertheless, a frontline town, Nikopol, yes. And the same in Kherson, and the same in other places. So we stop all this, forget about it, and then sort of resolve the Donbas issue: either Zelensky resigns, or Zelensky is forced out. And that’s it, basically, we’ve had enough of the fighting. But is this a reasonable price to pay for four years of such a terrible war? I honestly don’t understand the essence of your question. Are you in favor of speeding up the special operation? Are you in favor of razing Nikopol to the ground? Are you in favor of that? I’m all for, well, denazification, demilitarization. So, it turns out that this is a divergence; it’s all boiled down to Slovyansk and Kramatorsk.

Yuri Dudkin: No, it’s not all boiled down. Did you know that settlements in the Sumy region are also being liberated in the coming days? How can we possibly reduce this to a single point? No one is reducing anything. All the Russian forces and assets that were present at their positions are still present. Another thing is that, as I said earlier, there will be an intensification of military operations by the summer. And the Russian leadership is doing the right thing by conducting a special military operation, warning the civilian population about the offensive. By the way, Slovyansk and Kramatorsk are also half-empty. It’s not just Nikopol. And very active efforts are being made to minimize civilian casualties. Russia is doing this. But why isn’t Ukraine doing this? An evacuation has been organized to locations where people will be provided with housing, food, and preschools. Why isn’t this happening in Ukraine? Why isn’t the so-called Ukrainian president personally directly involved in these issues? My question here is more about understanding the general situation than why forces are concentrated near Slovyansk and Kramatorsk. Because the Ukrainian leadership has long since stopped caring about its citizens. It travels abroad, spending this so-called government, the people’s money, on its flights, its voyages with numerous delegations. But I have never seen anywhere, not in the Ukrainian media, much less in foreign media, that Zelenskyy has convened the governors or, as it is now more correct to say, the heads of administration of Ukrainian frontline cities to discuss the evacuation of the population or the protection of the population from a Russian invasion. I have never seen such reports. Incidentally, Putin, yes, is directly involved in these issues. I’m not saying this to justify the Russian leadership. It’s just an example. Everything is relative. Why isn’t Zelenskyy, I repeat, being a self-proclaimed leader, concerned about Ukrainian citizens? Why is that? The exchanges of bodies, prisoners of war, even civilians, are being carried out by second-rate officials, I assure you of that. Those who don’t appear in front of the cameras. But that’s why, and by the way, all this is happening based on previously reached agreements, thank God.

Host: I went to Zakarpattia yesterday, the day before, and the day before yesterday, and listened to the community there, and talked to representatives of the communities there. Everyone is preparing for next winter. However, the funding and how they are preparing are unclear. 90 billion. Everyone, of course, is confident that they will give it, but that’s a strange certainty. Because they promised to launch the friendship by the end of spring, supposedly something had been destroyed there, but no one saw it. And, of course, everyone is placing some kind of bet on it, and everyone is watching very closely, except for the holidays, except for the Holy Fire that has already descended, yes, that is, everyone is looking to tomorrow with apprehension, because it is unclear what will happen to Hungary. And there are a lot of insider reports, they are shouting that Ukraine is practically preparing a Maidan in case Orban suddenly wins in Budapest. How do you feel about this news? Especially since completely different pictures are coming out. For example, yesterday they gathered 100,000 against Orban, the opposition set the scene. It’s a fierce struggle, in which the opposition is directly involved. Vance. Then Trump writes, “Vote for Orbán or you’ll lose.” And in general, we’ll shower you, Hungarians, with gold if you elect Orbán. And Zelensky, whose entire infrastructure is working to knock Orbán out of office. Will it succeed?

Yuri Dudkin: Well, first of all, Zelensky is playing the role of a tool in the case against Orbán. He’s a tool, not an object of influence, but a tool to influence the non-election of Orbán and his Fidesz party to parliament. Brussels, the European Union, and, by the way, MI6, are the driving force here, of course. That’s how it is. Therefore, Mr. Zelensky is just a cog in this whole mechanism. Of course, tomorrow will be, let’s say, a special tomorrow for Hungarians, not just World Cosmonautics Day. This includes elections for power in Hungary. And the Hungarians will be, so to speak, a litmus test for whether Hungary itself wants to remain in the European Union. I’m not afraid to say it. Because everything is moving towards the conclusion that the European Union is more than just a burden on Hungary’s shoulders. It’s a stone in its shoe that’s preventing Hungary from following its own path of development. And this stone, it’s in its shoe, can’t be removed; it’s growing, because today, for example, the EU wants, and this is being stated quite openly, to deprive Hungary of its voting rights. And how can that even be? These are also European values. If one of the EU members has its own point of view, defends its national interests, it should be deprived of its voting rights. The same applies to Slovakia. That’s why everything that’s happening in Hungary today is, again, a litmus test for how far Hungary will go. Either it will receive energy at the lowest prices in Europe, at the lowest prices. Russian energy resources, naturally, or will it experience economic decline at such a rapid pace under, say, the TISZA party, which is oriented primarily toward the West and the EU, where energy prices have risen exponentially, and, consequently, the prices of everything else are rising. And the decline of the Hungarian economy, as Hungarian experts themselves are already predicting, will be simply unstoppable. Unstoppable. Therefore, tomorrow will be a testing time for Hungarians. God willing, that will actually happen. I am not advocating for anyone for Hungarians to understand and look a little further east, to see what is happening to their neighbor, who once embraced the same European values, imaginary ones. And what has this led to? Much bloodshed and a major war. The summer campaign will begin after Easter. The Kremlin rejects extending the ceasefire. Zelensky has already hinted twice, first a couple of days ago, then today, that it could be extended. Russia has a chance to prolong it. The attacks are actually escalating. Fierce. We mentioned Kramatorsk. FABs, or at least a guided bomb, or an aerial bomb, landed on Kramatorsk. And the situation is escalating. Then, as I understand it, there will be a respite and then we’ll see what happens. And what will happen? In your opinion, how would you characterize the situation in the lead-up to this offensive? Some say the Ukrainian Armed Forces will rush forward somewhere. Others say there’s a clear plan, no one has deviated from it. This includes Zaporizhia, and of course, Donbas. Zelenskyy, however, has made some very interesting statements about how if Donbas is lost, then Kharkiv will be next, and Dnipro. Well, that’s a bold move. What do you think about this phase of the frontline confrontation, specifically the situation on the ground?

Host: I would say, yes, I would say that everything you’ve listed is, in principle, possible. It’s possible. Again, I won’t attempt to predict the course of future events, but, incidentally, as Russian military correspondents have noted, a certain delay, yes, as you mentioned earlier, in conducting a special military operation, is contributing to the fact that, uh, Ukraine’s unmanned aerial vehicle forces are being strengthened. Currently, according to some sources, 20,000 drone operators, so-called, 20,000 people are involved in similar operations in the Ukrainian armed forces. And this, incidentally, is confirmed by Russian media, which say that, uh, Ukrainian drones are now firing at more than just isolated incidents; they are also firing at strategic facilities, and at facilities in Russia’s energy system. They, of course, are spontaneous, unplanned, and have little impact on the Russian economy, but nevertheless, today there are dozens of drones per day. Yes, there are cases, not cases, but a trend, where Russian air defense systems are also improving their performance. And these drones are being shot down in large numbers, before they even reach their programmed targets. But still, this delay in military operations and the conduct of military operations directly on the front line is having an impact. And again, as you say, whether Dnipro and Kharkiv will be captured or not, Alexander Sladkov—there’s a Russian war correspondent who confidently states that the Russian leadership’s main goal is Kyiv. Therefore, I don’t rule out the possibility that this year we can expect some dramatic, significant changes along the entire front line. Specifically, with the capture of major cities like Dnipro, Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson. I don’t rule it out. That’s it. Because, again, the main goal that Russia set for itself was to bleed the Ukrainian Armed Forces dry with a small force. You know about the forces, of course; Zelenskyy was the one who made that claim, of course. Well, as a military man, if you saw it, you probably also smiled when you said that, basically, we’re killing as many Russians as they recruit per month. Like, 30,000 or so. That’s it. But the number of Russians on the front lines is growing. It’s just not working out that way, you know, it’s not working out. And so Zelenskyy came up with the idea that the Russians have some kind of strategic reserve of manpower somewhere, which is being transferred to the front lines. But that’s a joke, of course. Uh, no one has ever come up with that. Well, I mean, we’re killing more, or at least the same number as they recruit per month, but their numbers are increasing. So, there’s some kind of stash somewhere. Where are they getting all this from? What kind of piggy bank is this? It’s completely unclear. But, of course, this math looks very interesting when it doesn’t clash with the Defense Minister’s math, with the math of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which no one even really pays attention to anymore. Remember, they add up some figures every day—over a million Russians killed, a ton of equipment burned, and so on. And then we noticed after Fyodorov’s supposed statements. Nothing matches up at all. Another point is interesting. Yesterday, Fyodorov reported that he would look into the erroneous registration of women. Today, the Defense Ministry actually issued a statement about a hotline. If you’re a woman and you’ve been added to the TCC database, call. These issues will be resolved by the end of April. So, there’s a deadline, a decision, and so on. But no one’s talking about the situation in the Ukrainian army. And no one’s discussing this correlation. On the contrary, everyone’s saying, “You’ll be a drone pilot, a kill zone, basically sitting there 500 kilometers away, like in a computer game, so to speak, defending.” You’ve also noted this, the increase in drone troops. But what will this occupation of cities or the time of taking large cities, which we’re so close to, be like? Well, what kind of siege will they use to take them head-on? Some other, shall we say, forces and resources. So, you see, here’s the thing? They tell us it’s impossible for Ukraine to lose another regional center. But you claim that with this campaign, we’ll begin to witness advances on such cities.

Yuri Dudkin: Well, you know, you practically called Zelensky a strategist. I even laughed, because this guy has no clue about military affairs. And as for his remark, “We kill more than they recruit.” There’s no TCC in Russia. There’s no one beating anyone over the head, tying them up like sheep, or stuffing them into buses. I emphasize, there’s a very high percentage of volunteers recruited into the armed forces today, especially with the creation of unmanned aerial vehicles. A very high percentage. I don’t even want to give figures, because I doubt anyone would believe me. Of course, I use Russian sources, but I know for sure, because I have relatives living in the Russian Federation, that this percentage is high. Mr. Zelenskyy needed to emphasize this, but he gave himself away by saying that Russia is recruiting, not capturing, those who are supposed to fight on the front lines. As for, Sasha, how they will seize or liberate or deploy troops to certain regional centers—you can call it whatever you like. But note a few important points. In the settlements where Russian troops are entering, there is no active resistance from Ukrainian citizens—I emphasize, from Ukrainian citizens. On the contrary, I repeatedly see that the civilian population is tired of the Ukrainian government. They want peace, they want bread, they want an end to the fighting. And Russian troops are absolutely essential for them, I’m speaking frankly, I’m not prevaricating or playing the fool here. For them, Russian troops are the panacea for this peace. Again, the second point, which is also important, is that nowhere in the Ukrainian media, where they invite people to their studios, uh, at some fortified, you know, military training centers, well, and so on and so forth, where they talk about the current state of affairs in the Ukrainian armed forces, I see anywhere that the military is inspired, that their morale is uplifted. They only talk about the problems of the Ukrainian armed forces. I’m not even listing the problems today. They only talk about this. For three years now, by the way, if we take the first year of the military operations in Ukraine, everything was truly uplifting. These videos and these reports were very uplifting. Today, Ukrainian journalists, war correspondents, who talk to Ukrainian soldiers, but you can see it in their faces. You don’t have to be a genius to do this. No. But all this is compensated for by the persecution of the thugs. The swindler will be to blame. Good Lord, I’m talking about different things.

Host: Alexander, no, no, look, we have a compensating factor here. We also see that morale in the Ukrainian armed forces is declining, but nevertheless, well, the front isn’t collapsing, you know? And what’s being done? Well, the front isn’t collapsing. There are no active advances, just a few dozen kilometers at a time. On whose side? On the Russian side, on the Russian Federation side, I repeat, there is a planned advance. Do you understand that or not? So, what’s the plan anyway? That is, there are current combat tactics, and, by the way, the same tactics have been developed on the Ukrainian side. Fighting is not done by a front, but by combat assault groups. These are completely different things. Firstly, it’s much slower in time, but it’s a natural process than advancing an entire front with tank divisions, and so on, and so forth, and frontline aviation. But I can’t tell you why this isn’t being done, because I’m not just the commander-in-chief, but simply the commander of some unit, either Ukrainian or Russian. But I’m talking about what’s happening, what the trends are, and what natural processes are occurring. So, assault groups are advancing along the front. Incidentally, this tactic is very effective in advancing forward. Dozens of populated areas—I won’t even list them all; they’re all online and posted online. Over the past week, dozens of Ukrainian populated areas, both small and large, have been occupied by Russian troops using this tactic. Well, again, Zelenskyy comes out and says this small assault group entered this, let’s say, populated area. They stayed there for three days, then left, and the populated area simply remained painted over on the map. But in reality, we have this huge kill zone growing there, where I don’t think there’s anyone at all and nothing under control. According to Zelensky, Kupyansk is still Ukrainian, you see? Oh, wait, whose is Kupyansk? So, basically, I’m saying that all these Ukrainian cities are in serious question. That’s it. And according to Zelensky, as you often appeal to him, how to defend them further, Zelensky doesn’t know. He says all this in the spirit of his professional artistry. You see? The fact is, that, say, Kramatorsk, Sloviansk, and the former Donetsk region of Ukraine as a whole will soon be occupied by Russian troops, there’s no doubt about that. Well, It’s all a question of time and tactics for waging such military operations, nothing more.

Host: You think that, with modern weapons, modern air defense systems, aviation, and so on, the Russian Federation could have razed to the ground Kostiantynivka, Slavyansk, and Kramatorsk. Well, Kostiantynivka was practically razed to the ground. Wait a minute, there’s fighting going on there. Of course, there’s fighting going on there. So, stop, what about the fate of these cities? Let’s figure it out.

Yuri Dudkin: The fate of these cities is clear, Alexander. Instead of preserving its troops and withdrawing them from these settlements, the Ukrainian government continues to cling to every inch of this land, knowing that, firstly, these are Russian cities. There was never even a hint of Ukrainianness there to begin with. That’s the thing. I know Slavyansk; I’ve been there many times. So, instead of preserving the manpower that the Ukrainian army is currently short of, they’re dispersing it, moving it into all sorts of fortified positions. On the other hand, Zelenskyy—if we’re talking about Zelenskyy, he also gave a lot of interviews this week, which was necessary—and he clearly acknowledged that we can’t retreat from Donbas because Kharkiv and Dnipro are threatened there, and because it would take a year or two to build some kind of fortifications there. And where to build them? In the open field. It takes time, it’s expensive, it’s… But Sloviansk and urban development, city defense, Kramatorsk—it’s not so expensive. That is, essentially admitting that for him, this is no longer a city, but some kind of ditch with crocodiles or some kind of watchtower, that is. But then he gives the example that I can’t leave because there are 200,000 people—what 200,000 people—well, on this perimeter of Donbas. So there’s a clear contradiction here regarding the air defense. Yes, I haven’t paid attention to what Zelenskyy says for a long time. A very long time, because everything he says, in total, during the four years of the conflict, 50,000 people have died, or whatever he said, 44, whatever. This man is completely out of touch with reality. He’s a liar like no other, and he does it for his own benefit, not for the benefit of the Ukrainian people. Instead of truly, uh, creating a situation that would facilitate the speedy establishment of peace in Ukraine and preserve the remaining patch of Ukrainian land and the Ukrainian state, Ukrainian statehood, which, for better or worse, still exists today, Zelenskyy continues to escalate, escalate, escalate, escalate. Well, it’s clear why. Because if peace comes, his days are numbered, but today he survives by fighting and is even trying to build his significant status as head of state in Europe. I believe this benefits Europe, especially the European Union. Why? Because everything there is truly geared against Russia. Expecting something, uh, let’s say, Zelenskyy will speak differently and you and others will quote him in some peace-making light, but that won’t happen. Zelenskyy only talks about peace to, um, let’s say, flaunt it. Yes, I’m ready to meet with Putin. Yes, I want him to come see me there. Well, in that spirit, you understand? That’s it. But nothing more, nothing more.

Host: Let’s conclude our conversation today with a question from a viewer, where many are also asking questions, and rightly so, about where Ukrainian skies are not adequately protected. Whatever statistics they write, we ourselves have also touched on this topic repeatedly, when everyone saw Geranium 5 flying and hitting an object in the Sumy region. Uh, well, in the footage, yes. And this, by the way, is also a very big mystery. I think that if there had been so much footage from the official Russian side, yes, and it had been transmitted promptly, then it’s still completely unclear what kind of war there would be. Here’s how it all looks here. Look, a Ukrainian drone hit Admiral Grigorovich. They showed it, it hit. And then The Guardian writes, two days later he’s escorting this Grigorovich tanker from Novorossiysk. And there are many such moments. This week, by the way, became such a revelation. Everyone’s already reacting to these pictures somehow. The video that Genno posted. And note that these ships transited the English Channel. And the West, most of all. What was irritating was that no one tried to stop either the tanker or the Russian military vessel. That’s what irritated them. And this is truly becoming ridiculous given the insults and threats the West has made against Russia’s shadow fleet. And today, by the way, there’s no definition of what a shadow fleet is. So, of course, I believe the West will gradually acknowledge that they’ve really taken on a burden they can’t handle. That is, they’ll lift the weight that Europe has shouldered in order to destroy Russia, to tear its economy to shreds, as one US president put it. But this project failed. And exactly the same thing is happening with the Ukrainians in the Persian Gulf. Kaja Kallas comes out and says, “Oh, my God, the Persian Gulf isn’t helping us in the war with Ukraine. That we should be helping them.” And Zelensky, you see, is helping out there with all sorts of PR. The press, well, it’s so lacking in baseline data. Well, really, there’s an article in the European press that, ah, they kicked out, well, or something, asked to leave, the Ukrainian air defense specialists who are Zelensky’s. This, of course, has already been called fake, although, well, it’s very difficult to verify. The viewers are asking you a question for the finale of our program today. Alexander, good afternoon. After the sheikhs kicked out the worthless Ukrainian air defense after hitting two skyscrapers, can we say that this practice in Ukraine has a business interest in rebuilding housing, and the more destroyed, the more they can steal? After all, it’s not for nothing that NATO curators are proposing to place air defense systems in residential buildings, and clearly not for protection, but for greater destruction. There is no investigation. And they don’t look for whose drone, whose missile hit the house or the factory. The main thing is that Russia is shooting. And Russia is shooting with this, as if they’re covering up.

Yuri Dudkin: Well, our viewer’s question is, of course, relevant, but I’d like to correct it. We’re not talking about Western money being invested in the construction of housing or the restoration of housing. As of today, I have completely up-to-date data. Around Kupyansk, Kharkiv, especially Kharkiv, Sumy, defensive fortifications are being built, on which precisely that Western money is being spent, and is being laundered from this construction. This is the most important direction in, let’s say, laundering the financial resources that Europe is investing. True, not much today. These are not the billions that were under Biden, but nevertheless, they are there. They are there. And Europe is giving money today precisely for the construction of concrete defensive fortifications. These are not some kind of wooden concrete fortifications. There is even footage on the Internet. This is being filmed, I assume, as an excuse for Look, Brussels, we’re building, but it’s not restoring Ukraine’s housing stock, which has undoubtedly suffered significant losses because the war continues. They’re currently restoring housing in, say, Kostiantynivka. But that’s pointless, that’s clear. Even Ukrainian idiots, thieves, and scoundrels wouldn’t do that. It would be better if they were restoring the housing stock in, say, Kyiv. That would be better. Where many displaced persons from eastern Ukraine—tens of thousands, if not hundreds—are in Kyiv today, by the way, Ukraine still isn’t providing them with any housing. They live wherever they can. Those who can rent apartments are crammed together in one-bedroom apartments, two or three families at a time. You see, all of this should be controlled by the Ukrainian state. I’ve already said this and I’ll repeat it. That’s why today they’re spending Western money on defensive fortifications, which, I assure you, will play absolutely no role in Ukraine’s future defense. And Ukrainian cities. With modern weapons, this is irrelevant. A 3,000-pound FAB can simply reduce such fortifications to dust for kilometers. Therefore, Ukraine should, I repeat, focus on other issues—diplomatic and humanitarian. But under the current Minister of Foreign Affairs, one only has to look at his appearance. It’s clear that this is impossible. He’s absolutely obsessed with war, just like this president, because it’s their means of survival. War is their means of survival.

Host: Yuri Dudkin was my interlocutor today. Thank you. Thank you very much for your time and thoughts. And happy upcoming holidays. All the best.

Yuri Dudkin: All the best, Alexander. Happy upcoming holidays. Take care, friends. Goodness and light to all. See you.

Synopsis of Points Made

This transcript is a conversation between a host and Yuri Dudkin, a commentator, covering geopolitical negotiations, the war in Ukraine, and related domestic and international issues. The following key points were made:

1. US-Iran Negotiations in Islamabad:

• Talks are taking place between the US and Iran, with Israel notably absent but represented by the US.
• Iran is taking a hardline stance, demanding US reparations for material damage, compensation for victims, recognition of Iran’s absolute sovereignty (including its right to a peaceful nuclear program), and a ceasefire in Lebanon with Israeli withdrawal.
• The Iranian delegation includes tough politicians and technical experts. The talks are seen as critical but unlikely to produce a major breakthrough due to the absence of a direct Israeli role.

2. Impact on the Ukraine Conflict:

• Ukraine’s negotiating position is linked to the US-Iran talks, with Ukraine feeling increasingly abandoned by the US, which now views Ukraine as a “bargaining chip” in broader geopolitical negotiations with Russia.
• There is a “good cop, bad cop” dynamic between Zelenskyy and Budanov, mirroring the US approach. Budanov is seen as making more grounded statements about the war’s realities.
• The arrival of Boris Johnson in Ukraine is portrayed as an attempt to undermine peace efforts and inspire Ukraine to continue fighting.

3. Criticism of Ukrainian Leadership:

• Zelenskyy is repeatedly criticized as an illegitimate, ineffective leader who is out of touch with reality, lies for personal benefit, and has no military acumen.
• The Ukrainian government is accused of pursuing a “misanthropic policy,” failing to care for its citizens (e.g., no evacuations, poor housing for displaced persons), and using war as a means of political survival.
• Western aid is alleged to be laundered through the construction of defensive fortifications, which are deemed useless against modern Russian weaponry, rather than being used for genuine humanitarian purposes like housing restoration.

4. Russian Military Strategy and Goals:

• The stated goal of Russia’s “Special Military Operation” (SVO) is not limited to Donbas; the ultimate objective is claimed to be Kyiv.
• A summer offensive is anticipated, with potential for the capture of major Ukrainian cities including Dnipro, Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson.
• Russian tactics involve slow, planned advances using assault groups, minimizing civilian casualties (in contrast to Ukraine). The civilian population in captured areas is described as welcoming Russian troops as a path to peace.
• Ukrainian claims of inflicting disproportionate Russian casualties are dismissed; Russia is said to have a high number of volunteers, not conscripts.

5. Declining Ukrainian Morale and Sovereignty:

• Morale in the Ukrainian armed forces is described as low, with soldiers only discussing problems, a stark contrast to the first year of the war.
• The US is said to no longer recognize Ukraine’s sovereignty, viewing it solely as an “anti-Russia” project since 2004. Western media is noted to rarely discuss Ukrainian sovereignty.

6. European Politics and Hungary:

• The Hungarian elections are presented as a litmus test for the country’s future in the EU. Zelenskyy is portrayed as a tool used by Brussels and MI6 to prevent Viktor Orbán’s re-election.
• The EU is criticized for wanting to deprive Hungary of voting rights for defending its national interests, highlighting a contradiction in “European values.”

7. Western Failures and Double Standards:

• Western sanctions and efforts to destroy the Russian economy have failed, as evidenced by Russian ships transiting the English Channel without interference.
• The West is accused of hypocrisy, especially regarding its inability to define or stop Russia’s “shadow fleet.”
• Claims that Ukrainian air defense specialists were expelled from a Gulf country after failing to protect skyscrapers are mentioned, leading to allegations that Ukraine benefits from destruction to secure reconstruction funds.

Snowman BREAKS DOWN: Zelensky’s meltdown. NATO gone rogue. Strikes on Western Ukraine – Bondarenko “https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=flOXCMdKYVo“

Click for: Synopsis

Q&A

Comment by Abrogard

Synopsis Parts.
Part 1 Pressure and Negotiations
Part 2 Nato and the Baltics
Part 3 Ukraine & Front Line Politics
Part 4 Mobilization Chaos
Part 5 Q&A Session

Снеговичок ЗАПЛАКАЛ, УСТАЛ: истерика ЗЕЛЕНСКОГО. Злыдни НАТО. Налеты на Запад Украины – Бондаренко
https://www.youtube.com/watch/flOXCMdKYVo

[Alexander]: Greetings, dear friends, distinguished guests, and subscribers to my channel. Koz Bondarenko, as always, a live broadcast on Wednesdays. Konstantin Petrovich, greetings. Hello.

[Konstantin]: Hello, Alexander. Hello, dear viewers.

[Alexander]: Konstantin Petrovich, you’re as white as a pie.

[Konstantin]: Yes, yes. Today, some of my friends were wondering if this kind of joke is appropriate, for example, in Africa or in certain states, like the United States. Well, you know, in our, as they say, sanctioned circles, anything goes, as long as it’s not green, you know, that’s the most important thing, friends. And thank you very much for your support. There are several ways to jump into the conversation.

[Alexander]: Well, first of all, yes, leave your questions in the closed Shelest viewers’ club on the Telegram channel, and in the YouTube community, we’re completely open to your questions, we’re already collecting them in advance, and we’ll work with them. And the same goes for, um, chat broadcasts. You’re welcome at the end, watch to the end, and don’t write right away; it’s better to vote on the question. Well, then, yes, as they say, uh, basically, ask your question. A QR code, if the service is working, the ability to display it on the screen. Without waiting for anyone, support the channel. I invite everyone to Kostya Bondarenko’s Telegram channel, as well as his YouTube page. And stay tuned for the latest news about the Joker and the latest educational courses. It’s very interesting, informative, and remarkable that you, dear audience, are devoting time to this, and in this seemingly, well, simply crazy period, yes, in the world in general. Not to mention the rest of the world, people still find the strength, the opportunity, the time to educate themselves. So let’s learn, and if we’re going to learn anything, let’s learn from the best.

[Alexander]: Konstantin Petrovich, we’ll start our broadcast today with the question of who’s putting more pressure on whom. This is the key question of our conversation today, because we’re hearing all this back-and-forth from Zelensky. Trump is swinging from one pole to the other, Zelensky from one to the other. That seemed to be the opinion, but now it’s different. Zelensky says: “Iran, we need to get a grip on it.” Then he says: “No, we need to finish this immediately.” Zelensky says: “The US is putting pressure on me.” Then he says: “Russia is putting pressure on the US.” So, it’s like a Russian doll of pressure. Well, let’s figure out who is putting more pressure on whom. Options. Again, there could be many options, but choose from those who, well, the ones you like, the ones I suggested. The US is putting pressure on Ukraine, Russia on the US, the US on Europe, Ukraine on Europe. Who is putting more pressure? How do you rate it? Please vote, and we’ll sum it up at the end. Let’s start with that. In my opinion, this is a very fundamental question now. Who is Europe putting pressure on whom? Well, let’s put it this way, another question would probably be appropriate. Is Europe putting pressure on Ukraine?

[Konstantin]: So, it’s only in Newtonian physics that action and reaction are equal, right?

[Alexander]: Newton’s third law, I think.

[Konstantin]: Yes. Regarding this situation, there are a large number of participants, a large number of players, and the pressure is, so to speak, cyclical. Russia isn’t pressuring us yet. Russia is saying there’s no rush. We said everything we wanted to say in Anchorage, Alaska. Last summer, our position didn’t change, and you’re still making your own arrangements. So, you make your own arrangements, and then, when you’re ready, you’ll return to the negotiating process. The United States, naturally, is pressuring Zelenskyy, saying, “Come on, decide.” Zelenskyy is starting to resist, saying there’s still gunpowder in the trench, and we’ll continue to fight. Especially since Europe is also putting pressure on him. Europe is pressuring Zelenskyy, saying, “Fight, fight, fight, fight to the last, and so on.” So, go ahead and fight for at least another year, two and a half, but fight in Europe—it’s very important that you fight. Zelenskyy believes that Europe is a more preferable partner for him than the United States. The United States is pressuring Europe, so it’s your Zelenskyy there, and you have to influence him. So, this kind of circular pressure is happening. And as for Russia, Russia has conveyed through its channels to the United States that its proposal regarding the war being ended by Grija, that is, Ukraine cedes the entire territory of Donbas, withdrawing from the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, is not valid. Its troops, uh, Europe, uh, accordingly, Russia is stopping along the line of combat in the Zaporizhia and Kherson regions. And so on. This will be in effect until the end of spring, that is, until the end of May, so to speak. There are still two months, you can think about it. So, will we continue military operations during this entire time? As for Kyiv, Kyiv believes that Russia is bluffing, that Russia will not be able to do anything further. Fedorov, the Defense Minister, promised Zelenskyy that he will now establish a defensive line such that no Russian will advance further than he has already. Zelenskyy already, uh, understands that he has no more than a month, a month and a half, to see how effective Russia’s actions will be at this time. But Russia has warned that if these demands are not met by June 1 or May 31, then, accordingly, Russia will change its strategy, and Russia will set higher prices, uh, higher standards. That is, uh, it will lay claim to Kharkiv, it will lay claim to the Dnipro River, it will lay claim to the entire territory of the Zaporizhia, uh, Kherson regions, as well as the Mykolaiv and Odesa regions. So. Uh, the United States understands this and understands that there is no bluff here. The United States conveyed to Ukraine that Ukraine must agree to the conditions that were set out back in Anchorage. So. Uh, the only thing Zelenskyy has been able to offer in exchange to the Russian side so far is what he proposed through his own channels, that we stop attacks on energy facilities. You stop attacks on Russia, stop attacks on Ukrainian energy facilities and infrastructure. In exchange, Ukraine undertakes to cease attacks on, uh, energy oil and gas enterprises and on ports in Russia. So far, Russia has not responded to this offer.

[Alexander]: Yeah. And what’s with the Easter ceasefire game? And who benefits from this? Because, excuse me, it’s not entirely clear. It’s truly not clear. Why does Russia need this ceasefire now? Why is Zelenskyy talking about it so early? It’s clear he’s trying to be the first, well, the first to propose it, because last year, exactly a year ago, he was thrust into this ceasefire and thrust very hard. But then there are the arguments, well, listen, it’s not exactly pink ponies and goopy fish. There’s still some memory. We remember how it was slowly moving forward, but then I remember Bakhmut, yes, that silence in Bakhmut was shown from the other side. Odessa, people were going out to the beaches, Easter, blessing Easter cakes, yes, all that, and somehow everyone breathed a sigh of relief for those, well, a couple of days, yes, although there were some provocations, and Kiev was against it then, saying that Russia would take advantage, redeploy, and it would be, well, to its advantage. So who benefits now? Razlensky says, “Oh, calm down, no one’s going to change anything significant in three days.”

[Konstantin]: Well, you see, in this situation, the question is who’s initiating the ceasefire. Now, if only Russia itself had considered proposing a similar gesture of goodwill, as Putin usually does. In this situation, if Russia decides to seize the initiative from Zelensky, Putin can say, “Our gesture of goodwill.” So, we’ll stop. He won’t even remember Zelensky’s initiative.

[Alexander]: Yeah.

[Konstantin]: But for now, judging by the statements coming out of Moscow, Russia has no intention of establishing an Easter truce there. Uh, why would Zelensky need to once again demonstrate that Russia is showing, and again, showing that he’s not as much of a war enthusiast, not as bloodthirsty as they’re now trying to portray him as. Will there be a ceasefire, what do you think? I think that by default, perhaps, there won’t be any serious shelling on Sunday, April 12th. I think it’s a bright holiday, after all, it’s a holiday for both Russians and Ukrainians. And, well, I’d like to believe that something human still remains in both peoples.

[Alexander]: Well, it’s difficult here, because I know they’ll write to me now that Ukraine has been completely dehumanized and so on.

[Konstantin]: No, excuse me, please, the war has dehumanized many. The war has dehumanized. I think it’s still necessary to take into account that it’s necessary to remain human in any situation. Well, again, regarding the celebration. Look, here I’m also getting these kinds of comments, and that’s it. It’s also very important to note which Easter Zelensky is referring to. There’s the Catholic Easter, which is about to become Orthodox, right?

[Alexander]: No.

[Konstantin]: Catholic Easter, Greek Catholics, Orthodox, and, well, of all denominations in Ukraine, they recognize the Eastern Paschalia. In this situation, these holiday transfers, which, as people say, are celebrated annually at the same time, don’t apply to Easter. Orthodox Greek Catholics, Orthodox of all patriarchates, of all denominations, they will celebrate the holiday on April 12th.

[Alexander]: So, it’s clear that we’re not talking about Catholic Easter, right? But no, no, exactly. Well, the Americans would like to achieve a truce with the Catholic Easter.

[Konstantin]: Well, the Americans also understand certain specifics. They understand when someone celebrates.

[Alexander]: Yes, Catholic and Protestant Easter, yes, in principle, are celebrated a week earlier, yes. So yes, but we are talking specifically about the Orthodox Easter now. Can this ceasefire develop into peace?

[Konstantin]: I doubt it, because the parties have not yet achieved their results in the war. Therefore, this ceasefire, if it takes place, will be short-term, uh, it will not last even three days. I think it will be determined in a day at most. That’s the maximum. That’s only if they agree. And, uh, then the fighting will resume because the parties are not ready for peace today.

[Alexander]: Yeah. The situation on the front lines is generally quite ominous. Few people are talking about any progress or successes. They are simply bombing Slavyansk-Kramatorsk, heavily attacking the rear. And now we are seeing again how they are using the same tactics in broad daylight. And not to say unsuccessfully, that is the question. Uh, they’re using the same tactics with strikes and drones. The Russians are launching them at Western Ukraine, well, basically, all over Ukraine, but with an emphasis on the western part of Ukraine. And then Zelenskyy comes out: “We proposed a ceasefire for Easter, and they’re hitting us with drones.” Well, yeah, they’re making a point and kind of playing into Zelenskyy’s hands politically. Where do you think the war is going? And indeed, it’s just continuing, let’s say, it’s continuing, the war.

[Konstantin]: Uh, it would be strange if there were no bombings during a war. It would be strange. That’s the first point. The second point is that both sides are bombing each other today. And the third point is that, naturally, Zelenskyy uses any excuse for propaganda purposes. So, let’s say, according to the principle: “And why us? Yeah. Today was a very significant moment, an episode. Lukashenko went to the military, to his own. And, well, let’s listen, watch a short excerpt. They tell him there that, like, peacetime, peacetime, uh, kind of peaceful, yes, not peaceful. There can be no peacetime, Pavel. We are preparing for war. And in this audience, and not only in this one, people should understand. We are absolutely against war, especially our officers, our soldiers, the armed forces, because we know what war is. We don’t want war, but that’s what the army is for. If suddenly someone decides to talk to us and look at us through the sights of a gun, we will respond. That’s what we are preparing for. Lukashenko is preparing for war.

[Alexander]: Preparing, what kind of war is Lukashenko preparing for?

[Konstantin]: Look, I’ll say, well, let’s say this way, Lukashenko himself proceeds from the fact that war has now become a given in the current We currently live in a situation where a significant portion of countries on the planet are at war, in a state of war, either undeclared or declared, but still, a significant portion are fighting today. And it’s clear that no country remains indifferent to these wars. To one degree or another, it is drawn into the conflict. Some feel the consequences, some use it as part of their, uh, economic strategy. Some are directly involved, suffer, and so on. That’s it. And Lukashenko proceeds from the premise that this is already a given. The second point is that Belarus is currently under particular scrutiny. There are currently Russian military bases in Belarus, at least three military bases. Russian nuclear weapons and, uh, the latest missiles are deployed on Belarusian territory. Uh, Belarus. Today, Belarus is in conflict—a cold conflict, thank God, with its neighbors, NATO states. NATO is openly preparing various plans for Belarus, for the overthrow of the Lukashenko regime and for the possible participation of NATO states in certain operations on Belarusian territory. Belarus is a member of the Union State. Russia is at war in this situation today. And Belarus, at any moment, has been balancing—for several years, basically—on the possibility of, well, entering into hostilities at any moment. Any aggressive actions against Belarus by the Russian Federation will be perceived as aggression against the Russian Federation. Vladimir Putin stated this last year, the year before last. So, it’s understandable that Belarus is testing its armed forces. Incidentally, let’s say this: many underestimate Belarus’s military potential, but it is much greater than the combined military potential of the Baltic states. So, that’s what the Baltic states are all about. Uh, and in this situation, Belarus has very serious airborne assault troops, special forces, and so on. I mean, it has all that. Belarus produces its own weapons, for example, its own Polonaises and so on. So. So, in this situation, Belarus shouldn’t be underestimated as a factor.

[Alexander]: You mentioned NATO. And what is NATO? Just during our broadcast, the news came in. So, Comrade Whitaker, the US representative, uh, yes, to NATO, the permanent representative, is saying that Trump is reconsidering everything related to NATO, including support for Ukraine right now. Trump himself also stated a little earlier this evening that, ah, he is absolutely considering the possibility of leaving NATO. I quote: “Absolutely without question.” But wouldn’t you consider it if you were me? And could Trump really withdraw the US from NATO? I analyzed it on Sky News today. Well, it’s something very interesting there. According to Article 13 of the NATO Treaty, any country wishing to withdraw may do so one year after submitting notice of denunciation. And the notice must be submitted to the US government, so it’s unclear how this will work. It turns out they’ll be asking for permission to leave themselves. Incidentally, US law stipulates that no president can decide to withdraw from the alliance without Congress. Is this empty talk and fear-mongering, or whatever, behind this rebellion against Trump, the closure of airspace, and all these demarches that European NATO members have staged against the main thing?

[Konstantin]: Well, look, formally Trump can’t withdraw the United States from NATO without Congress, but he absolutely can cease cooperation with NATO for a year or two, putting everything on hold. And then, for example, Vincent comes in and continues the same policy. For example, so far in NATO’s existence, in all 70 years, how many years now, uh, 77 years, yes, NATO has been in existence, uh, uh, yes, well, if I’m not mistaken, April 10th will be 77 years. So, in all this time, only one state has left the military-political bloc of NATO. From the military NATO bloc, while remaining political. That was France in 1966. Uh, in the 1990s, it returned. That was the only case. Now the United States is questioning the existence of NATO. Why? Incidentally, this same question was asked back in the 1990s, in the 2000s, by the United States itself. Back in his time, Bush Jr. proposed transforming NATO, transforming NATO from a defensive military-political alliance into an energy one. He had that idea. Then, when the events of 2008 began in Georgia, they decided that NATO, after all, should be preserved as a military-political alliance. Regarding the current situation, the United States, after Trump’s arrival, has very seriously raised the issue of NATO countries stopping using the United States as a donor. Yes, of course, it was very convenient throughout these seventy-odd years, when the United States simply supported, fed, and acted as an umbrella over European states. They said that if any European state were to become the target of aggression, the United States would immediately join in as a NATO member. The implication was, That all states, according to Article 5, would perceive an act of aggression against one of them as, well, collective, an act of aggression against the entire bloc. But everyone understood that this primarily concerned the United States. The United States spent the most money on NATO. And Trump, even during his first term, asked the question: “Should we really be feeding freeloaders?” To be fair. I’ll say this isn’t just Trump’s bluff, but at one time, if I’m not mistaken, there was a meeting in Mexico, if I’m not mistaken, Los Angeles, one of the NATO summits, at which the first conflict occurred between NATO states and European NATO states and the United States. This was during the Obama era. That was the first, you could say, conflict. Then Trump effectively began to exacerbate this conflict. And now the Europeans may find themselves in a situation where the United States says: “Now we’ll handle it ourselves, now we’ll handle it ourselves.” That’s it. And we’re simply washing our hands of it. Uh, and I understand that in the United States, many people, even Trump’s opponents, will view this position quite positively.

[Alexander]: Look, this whole thing with the attack on Ust-Luga, in the Leningrad region, is a real test right now. On the one hand, it’s kind of testing Russia, so it’ll snap and make a mess. On the other hand, they’re kind of showing, Trump, you’re not going anywhere. You can say whatever you want, but, well, it’s under your umbrella, so to speak, yes, so this is also a test for both Trump and Putin. And so, if you look at this situation and look into it, Russia isn’t responding, yes. Well, of course, they’re making statements, but what they’re saying is that in a military sense, the military will sort it out. On the other hand, many of those who criticize the Kremlin are saying, like, look at the weaklings, Koridzha, and so on, but here we have a completely different task, a military task. That is, we need to do more than just do something in response to the Baltic states. I’m considering both a ground operation and missile strikes, yes, but we also need to prepare and, for example, assess the enemy’s next move. Well, everyone understands perfectly well that setting the Baltic Sea on fire is, well, it will be difficult. It will be a very serious blow. This is a serious matter. We need to approach it very carefully and rationally, so as to know where to go. However, forgive me, but without the United States, this will be impossible. It turns out that someone is planning this without the United States, authorizing it with the Ukrainian side. Well, Trump has been betrayed again, it turns out. That’s understandable. This is British policy, the policy of Britain, which today does not coordinate its actions with the United States. Moreover, the United States and Great Britain have ceased to cooperate in many areas. For example, they do not cooperate today in the area of intelligence sharing within the framework of the so-called Five Eyes group. That’s the first point. Uh, last year, British experts were already talking about the so-called Northern War 2.0. According to this, they would like to close the Baltic to Russia. They would like to present the Baltic as an internal NATO sea, which is inaccessible to Russia, or as the passage of Russian ships through the Baltic under the control of NATO states. This is what is called in Britain, Northern War 2.0. This is precisely why Britain lobbied for Sweden and Finland to join NATO. This is precisely why a whole series of actions are now being provoked in the Baltic region. This is precisely why the Nord Stream pipelines were blown up. And this is precisely why, well, let’s be frank, these drones were launched, flying towards St. Petersburg and towards ports on the Baltic Sea. They, these drones, did not fly from the territory of Ukraine. They were launched. They did not fly over Belarus, they did not fly over Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and so on. For some reason, they fell in Finland, for example. They were launched from the waters of the Baltic Sea. They launched from the Baltic Sea. Clearly, Ukraine couldn’t do this without the approval of its NATO partners. Today, the Baltic states, as well as the Scandinavian countries, are under the influence of Great Britain. It is the UK that sets the tone for these countries’ foreign policies. And they are acting in this direction. Today, they are Britain’s closest allies. And from here, you can just, uh, just speculate about who benefits from this. Well, it’s clear, it’s already obvious that two plus two equals four. The only question is, you see, when is the Russian side really calculating that Zelenskyy will be bent, and he’s not bending over. But this is also thanks to Britain. At the end of this month, here we are now on the first, and there was also such an incident, relations between the US and Britain are very tense. It’s visible. It’s clearly visible even from Zelenskyy in the Middle East, who went. And the Americans didn’t like that. And this Starmer, in full swing, right? I mean, Trump likes to remember him, basically, Starmer. But there’s another thing. At the end of this month, Charles II is leaving for the US. It’s a visit of a few days, he’ll visit New York, then he’ll go on an outing to some territory of his own. Well, to an island, yes, some kind of in the American region, yes. So, basically, he’s going to see Trump. It’s America’s 250th anniversary. They spent six months preparing, they didn’t say anything, and then they said, “We won’t tell you the date, we won’t tell you the date.” And then the American country just went and wrote something like April 27-30. So, it turns out, I’m just logically thinking, there’ll be a whole month of turmoil. Well, until they come to some kind of agreement. Or, basically, we saw that Trump visited King Charles II. Well, and it’s been turmoil since then.

[Konstantin]: Well, you see, British politics is actually multi-layered, because British politics isn’t just about visits by the king or visits by the president to the king. British politics is also a complex multi-party system, and, accordingly, there are political games there, around the government and parliament, the Conservatives, and so on. British politics is also about the very serious activity of the intelligence services, especially Mishesh. Let’s say the intelligence service, the British intelligence service, is the main resource, the primary resource that Britain has, thanks to which Britain is still Britain. If the British intelligence service is destroyed or its power undermined, then from that moment on, Britain can be considered to be turning into a mere player, and so on. But Britain, thanks to its networks, its network capabilities, its spy networks, especially in the Middle East, especially in Central Asia, especially in the Hindustan region, Indochina, it maintains its reputation as a major player. So. And Britain is about transnational corporations. Transnational corporations that surreptitiously influence the situation in the world. This is the money of the Rothschilds, this is the money of major, major stock market players, and so on. Therefore, British politics is a multilayered process; in this regard, it sometimes, like a visit by Charles II.

[Alexander]: Well, maybe just a visit.

[Konstantin]: Mm.

[Alexander]: Konstantin Petrovich, if we’re really going to talk about geopolitics, let’s get back to Ukraine. There are a lot of interesting statements and developments there, too. And what’s going on with Trump? He says he’s defeated Iran. Then he says everything’s going well, negotiations. Then he says Iran asked for negotiations. Iran says, “We didn’t ask for negotiations.” Then he says, “I don’t need this ormus for 300 years.” Fuck this ormus. Come on, Europeans, you want to avoid these problems, but the problems are starting now. And the scale of them is actually very, very serious. If the carnage in the Middle East isn’t stopped now. The carnage, I mean, of energy facilities and tankers and all that. That is, just today, a tanker was attacked again off the coast of Qatar. True, it seems nothing leaked, but still. So Europe won’t be able to fly. Well, that means kerosene, aviation fuel, and there’s a terrible shortage. Some flights have already been canceled, and various companies are already predicting, calculating, and looking at what will happen next. And then Trump says: “Buy aviation fuel from me, or gather your forces and send troops, and unblock the Strait of Armuz by force.” And everyone kind of threw up their hands and said: “Oh, that’s what Trump has said.” But a day passes, and Trump says: “We will bomb Iran until it unblocks the Strait of Armuz.” And today, Iran itself is responding that, in general, it will not give in. Khamenei writes, or at least they write on his page: “I firmly declare that a consistent The policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, following in the footsteps of Imam Hamei and the martyred leader, is to continue the resistance against the Zionist-American enemy.” Netanyahu is picking up Trump’s rhetoric that Iran no longer poses a threat to anyone. And what will they use air pistols against there? And the soldiers are shaking at their bases, meaning the strikes continue. That’s the picture. And it’s absolutely mosaic-like and incoherent. Can you assemble something more or less sensible from these puzzles? Where is this going?

[Konstantin]: There’s no need to do it, because Trump, all of him, all his statements, the entire history of Trump’s presidency, shows that Trump is essentially acting as a generator of random phrases, phrases that don’t explain Trump’s plans, strategic objectives, or actions. Therefore, one must judge solely by Trump’s actions, by actions in the United States. But under no circumstances by statements in the United States. Pay attention to Trump’s statement – This is, well, actually, not quite, let’s say, a worthy occupation, because they mean absolutely nothing. He can make several mutually exclusive statements in a day. Uh, and he simply demonstrates that it will be as he wishes. At his, uh, wish, he will not coordinate with anyone. At the same time, the institutions in the United States continue to act. They act regardless of what Trump says. They, uh, act, uh, according to their, uh, planned, uh, rules. That’s it. And Trump is simply creating a certain verbal informational curtain over the activities of these institutions. The fact that his message to the European leader, uh, regarding the Strait of Armuz, can be deciphered as follows. Yes, I created a problem. I created a problem for you. If you don’t like this problem, you can solve it. You can join in solving this problem. If you don’t like solving this problem by military means, you can buy oil, oil products, and so on from me. We have enough oil. The United States could actually reopen oil production at any moment. That’s it. And then, well, I’ll be the one setting the price. That’s Trump’s message to the Europeans. And the Europeans don’t like either of these options. Okay. Where is this all heading? It’s all heading toward Trump being able to say at any moment that we’ve won. Especially with Netanyahu’s statement, which essentially provoked Trump into war, into military action. Netanyahu’s attempt to act as the one who’s already decided that the job is done, uh, could also play a role in this situation. Look, Trump would very much, obviously, like to appear as the winner even before the king’s visit, and certainly before his visit to China, which he’s scheduled for mid-May. Trump certainly wouldn’t want Iran, the situation in Iran, to turn into a second Vietnam for the United States, or a second Afghanistan. Trump certainly wouldn’t want things to get to the point where, uh, let’s say, things could seriously hurt Trump himself and his position. The Republicans, so to speak, have seen a collapse in Trump’s standing today. And Trump is only saved by the fact that the situation in the Democratic Party is even worse. The Democratic Party, yes, everyone is saying that Trump’s ratings have plummeted to 36, a record 36. No one has ever demonstrated such an anti-record, but excuse me, neither Newson, nor Kamala Harris, nor anyone else in the Democratic Party can even come close to this level in their ratings.

[Alexander]: Well, what we have is what we have, but everyone understands that this is an unnecessary war, right? And of course, of course, and therefore its end could, in principle, lead to certain advantages. Plus, there will be Trump’s 80th birthday celebration in June, then there will be the 250th anniversary of the United States, and so on and so forth. Accordingly, Trump can still make a lot of gains in terms of PR, in terms of PR, including for the Republicans. The situation with, well, the standoff with Zelensky, how will it be resolved? Trump. He talked about money being laundered. Trump’s son is interviewed by a journalist on a podcast and says, “Guys, Witkof has screenshots of correspondence with the US, showing how it was all laundered, how it was all manipulated. There are specific people, specific people who are willing to testify in Ukraine. Well, here, of course, I think it’s a rip-off.” There will be a bucket of these if Trump’s America really needs them there. But let’s be honest, why hasn’t this happened yet? And is it heading in that direction? Because Trump doesn’t throw all his cards, all his trump cards, away at once. That’s why I think it’s the same thing: like in Ukraine, everyone knows that the Mindich tapes could be released at any moment. Well, uh, various documents related to the IS could also be released in the same way. What do you think, Zelenskyy? Well, he’s a figure there. They’re saying here that, well, there are rumors again that they’re going to go after Shefir. And the one who’s Zelenskyy’s former aide. Well, it’s entirely possible, again, but where is Shefir now and where will they go after him, because it’s entirely possible that he’s in the lands from which there are no extraditions. You know, they used to say that there are no extraditions from the Don, right? Now there are two more rivers from which there are no extraditions. The Danube, and that’s true. A pig won’t eat you, a dan won’t give you away. Ah, but good.

[Alexander]: Has the election issue been completely silenced? It’s been pushed down to the bottom. Postponed. Why postponed?

[Konstantin]: The latest sociological data provided to Zelenskyy shows that Zelenskyy’s election picture is bleak. Zelenskyy could beat several candidates, he wins if it goes to the second round, but he definitely won’t win in the first round. That’s especially true if there’s serious oversight from the international community, yes, especially the United States. Uh, and the modeling of the second round of elections shows that Zelenskyy is winning against only two, potentially two main candidates. That’s Petro Poroshenko and Beletsky. So. Uh, he’s losing to Zelenskyy, uh, excuse me, he’s losing to Zaluzhny, he’s losing to Budanov. So, in this situation, he’s losing to Budanov by eight points, and Zaluzhny by 12 points. Even under certain scenarios, he might make it, or he might not even make it to the second round. There might be a situation where Zaluzhny Budanov makes it to the second round.

[Alexander]: Yeah. How does this relate to me being transferred to the front again, right? There was an interview recently, the day before yesterday, with Syrsky. He’s absolutely utterly unbearable. And the mobilization department says, “I’m against these methods.” But he’d certainly look the draft dodgers in the eye. And Russia is so strong. I mean, we’re not just messing around like this right now; of course, they have the upper hand there. Why this interview at all? Is it a sign of what? The end of the war or not?

[Konstantin]: No, no. In this situation, when Syrsky starts, when the clouds start gathering over Syrsky, he starts giving interviews. This has happened several times already; remember, when Maryana Bezuglaya started demanding Syrsky’s resignation, and Syrsky suddenly started giving interviews left and right. As soon as the Sorosites started saying, “Let’s replace Syrsky with someone else,” they started using Fedorov as a battering ram. Syrsky immediately started giving interviews, too. Interestingly, Syrsky praised Russia, saying it’s a strong country, a strong army, and so on. Meanwhile, I read that in Russia, from time to time, people start saying, “Yes, the Ukrainians know how to fight, they’ve shown they’re a strong force, they can’t be left alone, are they all from the same barrel, or what?”

[Alexander]: Well, no, that’s actually how it works.

[Konstantin]: No, in fact, both armies have shown they’re ready to fight. And what’s most interesting is that in Europe, they’re increasingly saying that we can’t allow Ukraine and Russia to simply make peace in the next 10 years after the war, but to create some kind of military alliance, because then, excuse me, Europe will be in big trouble.

[Alexander]: Well, that’s if, of course, we launch drones and try to fight Europe.

[Konstantin]: Well, you see, everyone here seems to be saying that this is some kind of crazy idea, but when Korchinsky comes out and says, “Let’s take out loans like a dog blogs, and not pay them back, we’ll declare default.”

[Alexander]: Ha-ha-ha, how cool. Yeah. Well, you know, I haven’t commented on Korchinsky for a long time. There. Because for the sake of hype, you can, you know, come up with anything. There. Uh, uh, Korchinsky is a well-known performance artist and provocateur, intellectually and not only intellectually. So, it’s very interesting that fresh, let’s say, reports, or calculations, are coming from the front, Yes. Yes. In March, Russian troops seized 27% more territory than in February. They’re reporting 160 km. Ah, while the overall number of attacks remained virtually unchanged. The difference was about 2%, but their effectiveness increased. The report notes an increase in the number of attack aircraft, well, attack aircraft operations, which allowed for an increased pace of advance. The main burden of attacks continues to fall on the Pokrovskoe sector. 29% of assaults, another 20 on Konstantinovskoe, 19 on Gulyai-Polye. Combined, these three sectors account for, yes, two-thirds of the attacks. The greatest advance was recorded on the Gulyai-Polye sector, 24%. And others, let’s say, ah, well, like, these percentages. Ah, look how this doesn’t jibe with Zelenskyy, who spoke about it at the Bucha summit yesterday. 89,000 dead, nothing achieved. Avada is inappropriate when you look at the numbers. If you really look at the situation on the front, who is more inclined to be more accommodating?

[Konstantin]: The point is that Zelenskyy doesn’t acknowledge what’s happening. He’s demonstratively refusing to acknowledge it. In February, there was indeed a slowdown, but it was caused, as military experts say, by weather conditions, abnormally cold weather, and other factors that prevented progress. On top of that, there were fogs and other factors that prevented any significant advancement or any successes for either side. February was essentially a dead season. The offensive really began in March. Yes, indeed, in March, there was a regrouping of forces, the arrival of new personnel, new faces, new personnel on the Russian front line. And indeed, slow progress began. And as the forests turn green, as the Earth dries out after winter, this offensive could intensify. That’s it. But Zelenskyy doesn’t want to admit it. It’s clear that the numbers are being manipulated, that we have almost no losses. Russia has suffered the main losses, that we lost 30,000, Russia has lost a million there, yes, as he says, and every day they are losing some incredible number of people there. This is all purely a propaganda statement, one that shows how great we are, what potential we have.

[Alexander]: Konstantin Petrovich, well, the potential is something you can chew through, but it’s really a lot. Take Gordon alone. A short excerpt from his conversation with the director of Fire Point. That’s beautiful. These missiles, that’s Ukrainian ballistics. Lubyanka should simply be wiped off the face of the earth. The Ministry of Defense General Staff, the Moscow Oil Refinery, Almaz-Antey, what else is there? Some Khrunichi-designed star, arrow. You’re smiling, you know something. Yes, they’ll learn to intercept ballistic missiles someday, but that will be sometime. The first ones should go in like kids going to school. That is, well, look, it’s clear, there’s a fragment, and there’s a joyful Gordon saying: “We need to erase the Lubyanka, no one can shoot down those Russian ballistics there. Our first 850 km-range missiles will be in now, very soon. Here. Moreover, flamingos, everyone was having fun and laughing, but they piled up hazelnuts in a cabbage ravine. They just fired and piled up hazelnut parts there. Can you imagine this success? They talked about this too, right? It turns out it was him, what’s his name, Stillerman, well, basically, the director of Flamindic. Ah, and they’re showing all this there, showing it. Konstantin Petrovich, a violet beam, yes, a violet beam.

[Konstantin]: It’s the violet beam in this situation in its purest form. It’s the violet beam and, uh, it’s also an absolutely absolutely natural propaganda trick that is used in any situation. You know, at the beginning of 1945, information was spread in Germany about the existence of weapons V-3. The V-1 and V-2 were well-known. They started spreading the idea that Germany had created a certain weapon called the V-3, which we’re now really going to use. Even at the end of April 1945, Hitler believed he had the resources, under the command of General Wenck, to not only liberate Germany and not just liberate Berlin, but to take revenge and, accordingly, to cause a turning point, a radical turning point in the war. Hitler said this a few days before his suicide. Yes. So, as far as, yes, Here, Rus even drew a sketch. The Order of the Savior of the Fatherland for General Wenck, not knowing that Wenck was surrendering at that moment. Well, as for this situation that is currently developing to maintain morale, fighting spirit, to maintain certain patriotic sentiments, Dmitry Ilyevich Gordon is ready to spout any nonsense, pseudo-scientific or some semblance of truth or something else that cannot be verified. Yes, we destroyed the hazelnut groves, we struck the hazelnut groves. And is there evidence? No. What evidence? We just destroyed the hazelnut groves or that we are now going to strike Moscow. And for four years he has been presenting everything exactly like this. There you go. Uh, I don’t know. So, the other day they were saying that all of Budanov’s former advisers, of which Igordon was one, were taken away from them. And these, bros, who, yes, are on the island, so that everyone’s property is taken away by force. Everything is handed over to the force. On the island now, look, Epstein is popping up in many people’s minds now.

[Alexander]: No, no, no. I mean, the island in Ukraine isn’t Epstein, it’s Ivashchik now. That’s it. What, who has nothing to do with Epstein. It needs to be clarified that the island is located on the Dnieper between two cities. In fact, it’s a peninsula, they just call it an island. The Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine is located there. That’s why the common people call it an island. There. Uh, so as not to confuse it with the Foreign Intelligence Service, which is called a forest. Yeah. There. And this isn’t a code word, it’s common people’s name. The island is a forest. That’s how it is on the island, yes, on the island, they’re taking everything from Budanov’s former advisers. They’re not needed. And now these advisers to Vashchenko, uh, some are saying they’ve already gone off to war, uh, they’ve already been mobilized. I won’t say whether it’s true or not, but that’s what they say. Uh, and as for Gordon, I think he’s gained a different position in some other departments. Yeah. So, what’s going on with Budanov? Wait. Budanov heads the presidential office. No, wait, this is a very, very important point right now. I want to point this out now. Especially Konstantin Petrovich, and Budanov tells us that he returned from America with something. Well, Umerov, admittedly, didn’t return to Turkey; he went there to, uh, negotiate exchanges, contacts. Well, Umerov is more needed in Turkey. Uh, let’s say, more so than in Ukraine. He’s the secretary of, uh, national security, yes, and defense. But Budanov says that, in principle, we’re going there, the process is ongoing, almost everything has been agreed upon there. Uitkov writes: “Fantastic.” A week goes by, Zelensky comes out and says, “We haven’t agreed on anything. America is demanding we give up Donbas.” Why is he setting us up like this? Okay, the Americans are understandable there. And Budanov, they all kept reporting how great our meeting was. I literally just a few minutes ago said that Budanov’s approval ratings are approximately 8% higher than Zelensky’s. And this is the reason, of course, Zelensky’s appointment of Budanov as head of his office. By appointing him, he wanted to eliminate Budanov as a potential competitor, a political rival. That was his primary motive. I don’t understand why Budanov did this. Especially to agree to be limited in his actions, because Budanov didn’t become Yermak. Budanov wasn’t given the opportunity to appoint a single one of his deputies. He wasn’t even given the opportunity to sit in Yermak’s office. He wasn’t given the opportunity to influence domestic policy. He can’t, let’s say, secure the appointment or dismissal of this or that governor, the head of the military administration, excuse me, and so on and so forth. His main task, besides document flow and the approval of documents, is negotiations. And even then, the approval of documents most often takes place without him, because he’s always away. Uh, but, uh, that’s the first point. Uh, as for, uh, Budanov himself, yes, I already said at the very beginning of the program what Budanov came with. Budanov came with the fact that the United States said that if you don’t agree to Russia’s conditions regarding the transfer of Donbas to Russia, then Russia will withdraw from the negotiation process and, accordingly, in a year you will lose Odesa, and Mykolaiv, and Dnipro, and Kharkiv. That’s it. That is, this was said to Budanov. Budanov conveyed this to Zelensky. This is what Budanov arrived. Plus, the Ukrainian side proposed another energy truce. So, you don’t attack our energy facilities, we don’t attack ours, or your other oil refineries, ports, and so on. That’s what he came back with. Zelenskyy’s statement shows that Zelenskyy rejected this ultimatum. You see, it just seems like the parallel might not be obvious. The news is coming. There’s been a lot of chatter about this on social media, but there’s already photographic evidence. Deepstate is publishing a story about how they burned a convoy. This skeleton, this rock, yes, a unit. And in the direction of Pokrovsk. It’s very interesting that the convoy, uh, was burned by the Russians, basically, on the approaches. They have information from Deepstate that they didn’t even reach Pokrovsk. And, well, in short, it’s a terrible, terrible story. This means the Russians are actively pushing into Grishina, adjacent to Pokrovsk, and are attempting to consolidate their position in the northern outskirts. The public also writes that the Russian army has complete dominance of FPV drones around Pokrovsk in this direction. The result: two infantry fighting vehicles and one Abrams tank were lost. This is specifically written by Deep State. Look, this is what is generally considered more or less verified information. Then I have a question: look, this is supposedly a 425th-generation skeleton, but they’re throwing it forward. Some kind of column. Let’s go. I mean, absolute chaos. And then Syrsky tells us how he wants mobilization to improve. Do you understand? It’s complete chaos. Chaos in approaches, chaos in understanding what you’re doing. If you’re defending yourself, where are you throwing this column? They’ll burn it down. It’s as clear as day. But they do it anyway. If you know the negotiations are unsuccessful, well, let’s bring in Budanov, Budanov, but what about Budanov, right? Well, I mean, Umerov, Sumerova, they’re like water on a duck’s back. So, you understand, absolutely all this force is being thrown not at war, not at any decisions, not at defense, not at any particular moments, not for the country, but at destroying these forces and reserves.

[Konstantin]: Of course, of course. Budanov is thrown into the negotiations with a dual purpose. If only Budanov, if the negotiations fail, everything is blamed on Budanov. An inexperienced negotiator, he botched everything, got nowhere, and so on. So. And Budanov is removed from office. If only Zelensky decides to give in to Donbas, and he does so at the last minute, everything is blamed on Budanov. You see, it was he who surrendered Donbas during the sentencing. And they could have not surrendered. Although Budanov acts exclusively within the framework of directives determined by the presidential office, determined personally by the president. So, uh, he can’t sign anything on his own or deliver anything on his own. He works exclusively within the framework of directives. But it’s very convenient to take a whipping boy like that. Make him one.

[Alexander]: Yeah, right. Mm, let’s say it’s a real disgrace, ah, in terms of approaches, because it seems like everyone should be united here. They keep telling us that we should rally around the idea of defending the homeland, but this homeland is simply being dismantled piece by piece for their own interests. Do you remember the words? I very often during this war recall the words of the Swedish playwright August Strindberg, who back in the 19th century said that if the state wants to take your life, it begins to call itself the fatherland.

[Konstantin]: Well, yes.

[Alexander]: And that means it’s important, uh, I want to discuss one more topic with you, yes, and then we’ll move on, we’ll summarize the survey results, we’ll move on to questions from the audience. There are many. Thank you, friends, for writing. Please, don’t forget to like this live broadcast. So, this topic of mobilization. It reached some kind of critical point in the last week, while we weren’t on air. It’s terrible, of course, I don’t want to repeat myself, but every day is something new. And they’re beating up the mall workers, beating up the mall workers, shooting, cutting, stabbing. Basically, everything’s happening. There’s chaos and chaos on the streets. And this chaos and chaos are being produced specifically by the authorities. Specifically, the authorities. Here’s a story from today, which went viral in Odessa. So everyone understands: a white car, it’s trying to leave. One van on one side, another van blocks its path and attention, rams it. And the mall worker hits this with a stick, well, He’s literally smashing. That’s not even a word for it. Right at this car with a bat. Of course, there’s no car involved, no pity, nothing, but it’s the shop workers doing this. They’re wearing masks. They can get on a work bus and drag you by the arms and legs. And so on. But the cynicism of this situation, Konstantin Petrovich, I’d like to directly assess with a whole series of questions those who represent the Ukrainian, yes, and, let’s say, the authorities, and the intelligentsia. Here’s Veslavsky, who came to Vlashchenko. Two key tasks are being achieved in the near future under the reform of the mobility system. First, there are going to be conflict situations. Then we can’t violate people’s rights, we can’t go beyond the boundaries of representatives of the UCSP, we can’t have a situation where they end their actions from notifications, there is a summons without body cameras. Because in the 24th century we adopted a law that requires all representatives of the TCCSP to be equipped with body cameras in order for such conflict situations to be seen in their entirety, and not to be taken out of context, as It happens quite often. And in another way, so that the mobilization was fair, so that it would not be considered to be a success, which is still an unfair act, if every village of Western Ukraine does not lose a thirsty person of positive century, and in the places of Kiev, Odessa, Kharkov and there in other places of great Ukraine, life proceeds peacefully and every day it seems that the war is on a full scale among rich young people, like potentially There’s no military connection, no. What?

[Konstantin]: Well, of course he is, forgive me, forgive me, an idiot. Just now we had Odessa, and he says: “There’s not a single village in Western Ukraine where, well, the villages were left without men. And in Odessa, Kharkiv, Kyiv, in the big cities, look how many men there are.” Like they’ve already cleaned everyone out there, but here they’re not bothering anyone. Here they’re not bothering anyone. And no one there, Vlashchenko, is waving their mane, everything is fine. The deputy, he said the right things before. This generally reminds me of this, well, I’m a journalist by training. We were taught propaganda, how to mold it. Well, mold it. That is, the teacher came straight in, took two different plasticines and molded it. Look at 20% here, this, and now come on, this. And you mold this. He molded this from above. Well, it was like a practical training, yes. Well, it’s like some kind of training, yes, they showed it to our students, that’s how it is. He says: “No, you can’t mock all this balaclava stuff, but like, and then he says that in Odessa, you see, all the men in Dnipro, Kharkiv, and so on feel at ease.” Ah, well, what’s most striking is the elite. Ella Lebanova came out, Ella Lebanova, a person who deals with demography. Mobilization is an absolutely normal process in the country, which isn’t just fighting, it’s fighting for its own survival. Liberation is an absolutely normal process, which continues in a country that is fighting for its existence. Let’s provoke first. Friend, would you like to fight for many years not to fight? Will you fight? I’m afraid so. I would like my grandson to fight for eight years. I wouldn’t want to. Will he fight? I’m afraid he will.

[Alexander]: Konstantin Petrovich, we have no one to fight back, legislatively or intellectually. And as for individuals, how can they cope with this disaster? Why is that?

[Konstantin]: I’m asking myself this question. Because, you know, even if sensible forces wanted to come forward with a platform, a statement, an ideological position, they have nowhere to speak. In Ukraine, not a single publication publishes them, their voice. Not a single publication in Ukraine will dare to take a sharp stance against the government. The war party has occupied everything, practically every platform. Those who advocate for peace today have no chance of making any statements, except for Telegram and YouTube. Here are two spaces where they can speak out, but they’re still being stifled there, they’re still trying to suppress their speech, they’re trying to restrict them somehow, impose certain sanctions, block them. So… Uh, I’m telling many oppositionists, if you don’t like what’s happening in Ukraine, unite and at least create a specific platform, a specific venue from which you can broadcast, so that people can hear an alternative position. Like… Dozhd TV channel.

[Alexander]: No, at least make one, at least make a website. Dozhd TV channel is, well, excuse me, it’s, uh, it’s an example of how not to act.

[Konstantin]: Why?

[Alexander]: Well, you’re saying this because the efficiency, excuse me, the efficiency of Dozhd is 0, 0.

[Konstantin]: No, really. Look, let’s look at it from this angle, from this perspective. Wait, there are many people who are upset with the Ukrainian government, who have fled, emigrated, there are some abroad, but there are some oligarchs there who created all this for them, and what kind of people are they, that’s a different question. There, the Vyros or those white people who fled, well, they compare things differently now, but wait, is there at least some infrastructure there? They, of course, are kind of funny there in this rain, well, but well, but nevertheless, you understand, well, at least something has been created there, and what has been created in Ukraine? And if, and if nothing has been created, I’ll just finish the thought, if nothing has been created, then it turns out, then everything is fine. And who fled? Cowards, pro-Russian traitors and scoundrels. So let’s unite, let’s gather. Zelensky is the best president.

[Alexander]: Yes. Yes, yes. See, what’s the problem with Rain? Rain regularly talks about how bad Putin is and how bad it is to live under Putin. There you go. But they still haven’t created a concept of Russia without Putin. What will Russia be like without Putin? Only in general terms. For everything good against everything bad. I even watched some of the programs there at first, trying to find the core of it. Yes, criticism, criticism, criticism, but criticism can’t just be sweeping; it has to offer some other proposal. But there wasn’t a specific concept, a conceptual vision of Russia’s future, well, excuse me, even if something did slip through, it was very vague. As for Ukraine, this is the big problem for all those who consider themselves part of the opposition: they’re also ready to talk about how bad Zelensky is. That’s it. But they don’t want to think about what Ukraine will be like without Zelensky, what Ukraine should be like without Zelensky. Incidentally, this is one of the main goals I set for myself, for my courses: to work together to achieve an understanding of what to do, what tomorrow should be like. These meanings that I’m talking about are precisely the meanings for Ukraine of tomorrow. That’s it. But I don’t want to engage in advertising right now. Self-promotion is especially important because I’m not Smipya, not a volbu. And it’s clear that collective wisdom is needed, essential in this regard. Yes, friends, let’s sum up our discussion today. And look, I’m just drawing parallels that suggest themselves. I understand that there’s no need to write here, that it’s clear that rain is slush somewhere. Well, I understand that, it was a good joke from Comedy, a good skit. But you see, like a distorted reflection of a large mirror, a small one in each other. That is, yes, we also have people coming out and saying, “Those who left don’t have the right to vote, those who are something else.” Well, they’re all talking nonsense here, right? Those who are against Zelenskyy, right? Because read the constitution. Issues of discrimination, on any basis, are fundamentally unacceptable according to the constitution. And also, if we’re talking about rain and Ukraine, then if we’re talking about the Russian position, the Ukrainian opposition, the main goal of the Russian opposition is to play along with the West, to play along with Western transnational corporations, globalists, and everyone else in their fight against Putin. The Ukrainian opposition’s goal is, or rather, not the Ukrainian opposition’s goal, but the West is preventing the Ukrainian opposition from speaking out against Zelensky. There, you can bite, criticize, and so on as much as you like. Here, the goal is in no way to harm Zelensky. Okay. So, let’s summarize our question today. They are as follows. So, who is putting more pressure on? Russia 6% on the US. That’s what Zelensky blurted out at the Bucha summit. The US 23% on Ukraine, the US 29% on Europe. Can you imagine, according to the audience, the US is putting more pressure on Europe than the US is on Ukraine. Well, and 42% that Ukraine is putting pressure on Europe. Money, money, give me money. Oil pipeline, friendship. We’ve already reached that point. Listen, I wouldn’t be surprised at all if the Ukrainians are wiretapping for a meeting with Lavrov, if it’s all this. Yeah, well, wait a minute. Why aren’t they letting the European Commission in? They’ve been on a business trip for a week, like they’re going to a university, because, well, they need to go and see how friendship works, and Ukraine isn’t showing its friendship to Europeans, its allies. What are they hiding, why are they hiding it? And Ukraine is squeezing them. Give them time, when will we join NATO, the EU? Give them more, give them money, give them a loan. Ursula, right before our broadcast, literally, look, they’re allocating 1.8 billion from Russian money. Well, not 90, of course, but they allocated a little something, threw in some money. Everything is fine. You know, regarding wiretaps, regarding wiretaps, Hungarian isn’t the most widely spoken language. It’s clear that they communicated in Hungarian. But if we’re talking about, uh, where are the largest number of specialists who can eavesdrop on the Hungarian language, then the question arises: it’s either Serbian Voivodeship itself, or Ukrainian Transcarpathia, or Romanian Transylvania. There you go. So the choice is limited: where can they eavesdrop on the conversations of, uh, the top officials of the Hungarian state? Oh, excuse me, please. Uh, dear viewers, uh, one more news item now, and then we’ll move on to your questions. Oh, so, so, so, so, so, so, so. Uh, so Zelenskyy, I had a good conversation with President Trump’s representatives Witkoff and Kushner. Senator Gramm and NATO Secretary General Rutta also joined the call. We agreed on ongoing contact between the teams to strengthen the document regarding security guarantees between Ukraine and the United States of America. This is precisely what could pave the way for a lasting end to the war. Thank you. What guarantees? Last week, he also said that if Ukraine isn’t given nuclear weapons, then there are no guarantees. That’s it. So, in this situation, it’s hard for me to even imagine what guarantees he was given. I just, you see, they’ve been putting us through this for months now. What a great conversation, what a good agreement we reached, we’re in constant contact, we’re partners, we’re having fantastic negotiations, a fantastic round. And then, one fine day, he comes out, blurts out, and says, “Oh, that’s it, they told us to give up Donbas, the negotiations are unsuccessful.” Those were his words, too. I’m quoting Zelenskyy just the other day, well, yesterday, I think, or even today, uh, in some interview. Ah, let’s move on to questions, dear viewers. Thank you very much for leaving them. Let’s start with the YouTube community. Ah, here we go. Ah, here’s a question. Let’s start with Alexander.

[Konstantin]: Konzi Petrovich, good evening. Many Ukrainian historians consider Danylo Halytskyi the founder of the first Ukrainian state. But his biography contains some rather interesting facts. 1240. Prince of Kyiv. He abandoned the city to the devastation of the Mongols and fled to Hungary to enlist the help of Western partners. Several years later, having assessed the forces, sides, and prospects, he went to the Golden Horde to look Batu in the eye, kneel, and negotiate peace even with the devil himself. The agreement with the devil himself worked, allowing Danylo to retain his power, his lands, and the majority of his population. Danylo Halytsky’s name is shrouded in glory. Chronicles have been written about him. The question is, why doesn’t Zelensky follow his example, instead of the loser Petliura? Because Zelensky doesn’t know history, first of all. That’s the first point. Secondly, we shouldn’t transfer the realities of the 10th century and its political traditions into the 21st century. That’s the second point. Well, to say that Danylo Galitsky, the founder of the first Ukrainian state, would probably be an exaggeration. He was, uh, still an appanage prince, who, according to some sources, received a crown from the Pope, uh, and became and was called king. Uh, but, uh, to say that he could be an ideal role model for the 21st century, well, you know, yes, he was an outstanding figure, a century for the 20th century, an outstanding figure. Just as his younger contemporary, Alexander Yaroslavovich Proznenevsky, was an outstanding figure. There were several other figures, one could also mention Mikhail of Chernigov. These are the three pillars around which the history of the first half and middle of the 10th century revolved. Uh, but in general, to say that non-critical activities should be carried over into the 21st century, well, well, it’s clear that this is not entirely correct from both a historical and political point of view. So, Nebenzya in The UN explained that Russians and Ukrainians are one people. In response, Melnyk recounted how, a thousand years ago, frogs croaked on the territory of Moscow. Afterward, a representative from Mongolia spoke and reminded his esteemed colleagues that for 200 years, both the Moscow frogs and the Kyiv princes paid tribute to the heirs of Genghis Khan. What do you think of this version of the meeting, Von? Yes, you know, regarding that common meme, started by Alexey Goncharenko back in the day, about frogs croaking on the site of Moscow, when Kyiv was already a huge, uh, capital, and so on. Well, you know, I think you could tell it to, say, residents of New York or Washington. They’d be understanding, too. Uh, so what’s all this? We shouldn’t boast about our antiquity, but rather about our capabilities, strength, and influence, which we see today. Andrey, where do geniuses like Plato, Dicartes, Tesla, Archimedes, and others come from? Can the legendary King Solomon be called a genius? Who among those living today would you call a genius, or are philosophers right in saying that thinking is dead? No, thinking is not dead. Geniuses are born. Geniuses who know how to concentrate their thoughts, who can generate new thoughts, new visions—they are, in principle, born in every century. Today, there are a large number of people who produce ideas. Another thing is that these ideas are always accepted by a minority. The majority simply lives outside of these ideas. Ideas are usually discussed in a very narrow circle, and then, after 100 or 50 years, grateful students begin to build a pedestal for their teacher and create a legend around them. So, you see, in 50 years, some people living today, who are thinkers, will also be exalted on pedestals. So. And they talk about how brilliant people lived at the beginning of the 21st century, but you see, at the end of the 21st century, there are none. Uh-huh. Ah, so that’s the question. Many, including Alexander and Konstantin, Nikolai writes, are talking about the end of the war and are waiting for it. But if we assume that some agreements are indeed signed in the near future, the fighting ceases, but Zelensky himself remains in power or is replaced by someone else, but his regime and ideology remain essentially unchanged. Will Ukraine realize the idea of military revenge against Russia? If so, then how long will it take? And will Ukraine be able to find military allies willing to take the battlefield during this time? With respect. Finding military allies willing to take the battlefield will be quite difficult. There will be a military rematch in any case, as we saw after the First World War, as we saw in other conflicts. There are always those who are not ready to accept defeat. They can form militant, terrorist, and other organizations that will work not only against Russia but also against the Ukrainian leadership, which will accuse them of collaborationism, compromise, and captulism. So all of this will happen, all of this will have to be endured. That’s it. And as for ending the conflict in certain stages, when there is no clear victory, then, excuse me, there will also be a large number of people in Russia who will be dissatisfied with this kind of outcome. There are a lot of them now who, after each of our programs, when we talk about peace, say: “What are you babbling about? What peace? Fight, fight, fight, until we take Uzhgorod, until we reach Chop, and so on.” Yes. So, the next question. Good evening, Konstantin Alexander Petro Konstantin Petrovich. Alexander Alexander Petrovich. And Ukraine does not give Russia the lists of those killed in Bucha, because it is not so clear-cut,” asks Alexey. Because it is not so clear-cut. Because Bucha should be a symbol, and not uh, uh, and in which there should be a lot of uh, unsaid. Bucha is a tragedy, on the one hand, and on the other hand, it is a myth. Today, the myth of Bucha benefits Ukraine, that is, and not dotting all the i’s and crossing all the t’s in the Bucha tragedy. Well, basically, here is a question from Yuri from Germany, you answered it too. The sides blame each other. There are many inconsistencies, such as the many victims hands were tied, many were lying along the roads, Strange poses, all sorts of oddities. And, Yuri writes from Germany. Well, you know, a lot, but I’m just like… But Maidan, it’s exactly the same. So they published this “Heavenly Hundred,” opened it, looked closely, focused on it, and someone died there, a Maidan supporter, a Maidan supporter, being run over by a tractor. Another one got drunk on the other side of town. A third one was given some kind of anesthetic for something, yes, and then he kind of died. So, well, this isn’t the “Heavenly Hundred” that everyone was running around with, remember? Well, you see, they needed a myth again. So, yes, there’s a tragedy, and then there’s a myth surrounding this tragedy. Why was the government that came after Maidan the first thing they did was destroy all the evidence related to the shooting of the so-called “Heavenly Court”? Elena, hello. Alexander Konstantin, please tell me, in your opinion, what resources is Europe going to use for the war? Will the Europeans fight themselves, or are they counting on refugees, of whom they have many? But the refugees sort of fled their own wars. Why should they fight for Europe? Why are Europeans counting on this? Usually, it’s citizens of a particular state who fight. Refugees are not citizens of, for example, Germany, France, Lithuania, Latvia, and so on. They are refugees, yes. There is a certain mechanism for creating foreign legions, like in France, but other countries don’t have this mechanism. Therefore, most likely, this process will simply be streamlined if, God forbid, the war is streamlined, an attempt to attract, let’s say, some refugees as mercenaries. Hello. Why isn’t the democratic factor being taken into account in ending the war? Doesn’t our government care about this? Or maybe this is intended to limit the population size to fit the new reality? Well, these demographic issues, issues related to limiting the number of people in a given territory, they smack, on the one hand, of certain experiments in Europe in the first half and mid-20th century, and on the other, of outright conspiracy theories. But somehow, you know, as time goes by, any conspiracy theory becomes almost unrealistic. We call conspiracy theories what we can’t prove with documents. Uh-huh. So, Konstantin Petrovich, Elena Morozova asks: “Is there a struggle for fossil resources?” Question. They’re already quietly talking about a water shortage. Water prices have risen sharply here. The struggle for fresh water is still ahead. With respect, from Germany. Back in the 1990s, the 1980s and 1990s, some Western experts were saying that in the first year of the 21st century, the issue of fresh water would become acute, and the issue of, well, a global confrontation over pressurized water resources. So. So, well, you see, some prophecies are starting to come true. Today, a user writes that the OCU announced ownership of the UOC-KP brand. And while ruling St. Volodymyr’s Cathedral as a second cathedral, deputies of the Volyn Regional State Administration are inspecting UOC-KP Sunday schools, uh, initiating inspections of the original Holy Ascension Church in Demeyevka, Kyiv, and preparing for the authorities’ illegal transfer to the OCU. As a historian, Konstantin Petrovich of the KP could draw historical parallels with the Bolsheviks and modern Ukrainian nationalists, but this also amounts to anti-church terrorism. And if I may, regarding Filaret’s legacy, everything is very sad, especially the disregard for his last will. You know, the OCU, regardless of my affiliation with any particular denomination, has been observing for the past eight years, uh, seven or eight years, how the OCU has been acting in a completely hostile manner, not only against the UOC-KP, but also against the UOC-KP. Questions of legality, ethics, and so on simply don’t arise for the hierarchs of the OCU. That’s it. And this concerns not so much Primate Epiphanius himself, who, excuse me, never became an authoritative spiritual father for his flock. Other people are in charge there, completely different people, some of whom came from other faiths. They treated Patriarch Filaret with a certain respect. They understood that they couldn’t touch the old man. That’s it. But, excuse me, I don’t think anyone waited for Filaret’s death to continue their corporate raiding activities as long as the representatives of the OCU. Almost like Pushkin, then, almost like Yevgeny Odegin awaited his uncle’s death. So, Konstantin Petrovich, here’s another interesting question. According to Lyudmila, “Zelensky, Pyshny, and Marchenko Budanov lent money to the Ukrainian state and bought the HVAC.” And Konstantin, tell me, do these senior officials work for our country, or does the country work for them? And besides, they all took advantage of winter support. Isn’t there a conflict of interest? Thank you, take care. But who would… But you know, in reality, investigations into these kinds of conflicts of interest only occur after a change of power. As long as people are in power, they are immune from investigations by law enforcement agencies. But as soon as power changes, as soon as someone else comes to power, they’ll immediately start investigating existing and non-existent issues. Remember how Yuriy Lutsenko was accused of somehow illegally registering an apartment for his, uh, driver, and so on, etc. There were many such instances. The current government provides more grounds for future persecution than previous forms. And Svetlana from the Cherkasy region writes: “It seems that Putin unexpectedly helped Zelenskyy ascend to the pinnacle of fame and stagnate there, and it can’t be undone. It’s a shame he got into trouble. What do you think? Putin’s role in Zelenskyy’s rise to power and how Russia helped Zelenskyy turn into a dictator, perhaps beyond Russia’s own wishes, should still be studied. Zelenskyy copied Putin in many ways, and Lukashenko copied him at one stage or another, and then decided, ‘Why am I any worse?’ Overall, I think Zelensky isn’t just the result of a certain amount of popular disillusionment with the Maidan and post-Maidan activities, but also the result of, let’s say, shortcomings or certain illusions among the powerful outside of Ukraine. Mm-hmm. Okay, so. So, here’s another question. Look, Yuri writes: “Why don’t we, fraternal nations, join Putin and Lukashenko in a joint appeal to the Ukrainian people with at least five to ten points about a post-peace Ukraine, a post-peace Ukraine?” Not about the TCC, but about the economic distribution of countries under common autonomous jurisdiction, joint security, social support, amnesty options, participation in the war, for example, suspended sentences issued in the event of hostility even after peace. In general, they should focus on the concerns and guarantees of childhood, the development of the younger generation, sports and recreation, educational excursion programs, and other things about life. It’s clear that post-war Ukraine won’t survive without support and guidance. The West won’t offer any development whatsoever. That’s why Putin and Lukashenko need to be given a sort of “walkie-talkie,” hope, and projected development within the three countries. Plus, I’m sure that such a message, regularly repeated, would accelerate the reset from anti-war to co-creation. What do you think about this? In the current circumstances, rationality is completely ineffective in Ukraine. Appeals to reason, logic, or common sense are simply ineffective. In the current circumstances, emotions, populism, and slogans are in effect. And Zelensky is exploiting this. What the reader, listener, or viewer offers can, in this situation, be considered rational. This is what works for a maximum of 10% of the population. Most people will simply ridicule it all, spit on it, basically say, well, yeah, who can you talk to there, yeah, what is this, and so on. That’s it. And Ukraine today is still a product of a postmodern, postmodern, uh, Ukrainian society. Common sense doesn’t work there today. Let’s take a look at the chat broadcast. Igor, hello, Konstantin Petrovich. Why isn’t a single city or street named after the Kyiv kings who defeated the Persians and Macedonians? They fought for our land. They are unworthy. Why is their memory forgotten? I already joked about this, that since they were all Iranian-speaking, and Iran is today considered an enemy of Ukraine, they will all also be classified as occupiers. How is this de-ironization? In fact, it’s Iranian-speaking. Northern Iranian dialects, which are now more characteristic of the Ossetian people and so on, and not of Persia or Iran specifically. There you go. But still, no, in fact, history is quite an interesting thing. We use history, uh, in its applied form, where what’s needed is not a real historical background, but a certain interpretation, a certain, let’s say, a certain rethinking of history in order to win it over to the side of politicians. And the closer history is, the more it is attracted to this. For these works. So, these are very interesting questions. Thank you, friends. We’re trying our best to answer them, but I invite everyone to Kostya Bondarenko’s channel. He periodically does this Q&A column, and therefore, well, it’s important, because, of course, it’s impossible to cover everything. But thank you very much for writing. Let’s add a couple more. Today, the news broke that Zelensky was nominated for the Peace Prize. Is this an April Fool’s joke, Roman asks. Most likely, an April Fool’s joke. But as for the nomination, dozens of people are nominated every year. Dozens of people. So. Um, in principle, why didn’t Zelenskyy appear there back in the day? In 2012, for example, Yulia Tymoshenko was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize. Yes. Yes. In 2012, she didn’t win. She was the second person in prison, but the peace prize went to the president of Liberia. So that’s it. Well, Yulia Tymoshenko was among the dominant figures in prison. Oh, yes, among the dominant figures. So, the Donbas Krevo-Rozh Republic was proclaimed one month earlier than the Ukrainian People’s Republic and then became part of the Ukrainian SSR. On what basis is Ukraine demanding anything? Plus the decommunization of gifts. Well, I didn’t understand about the gifts. Well, I understand. Well, basically, it’s clear. So, look, we take the Ukrainian People’s Republic as the foundation, well, as the state-forming, projecting history, Petliura, Onr, in short, you can treat all the participants differently. Krushevsky actually became a Soviet academician. Okay. Oh, but the truth is, the Donetsk-Krivoy Rog, the Donbas-Krivoy Rog Republic, it was like a month earlier, right? Well, in 1917, a large number of state entities were proclaimed on Ukrainian territory. A large number. The fact is that Moscow later decided that the Donetsk-Krivoy Rog Republic should not develop as a separate state organism, but that the United Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic needed to be strengthened. That was a definite decision. Ukraine, as Lenin believed, did not have a sufficient proletariat. Therefore, the Donbass proletariat could have strengthened proletarian sentiment, the proletarian base in the future Ukraine. And so on, this was the starting point. Uh, as for the other republics, you know, today practically no one remembers the Galician Soviet Socialist Republic of 1932. Yes. And what happened, by the way, right? And how many other such republics were there? That’s why, yes, thanks to, uh, the Kornilov brothers, uh, people know about the Donetsk-Krevo-Rozh Republic today. Especially thanks to Vladimir Kornilov, who wrote a well-known book about the Donetsk-Krevo-Rozh Republic. They know about it. How many more were there without… I don’t speak about Kornilov, I speak about… I studied history. Sorry. There you go. Yes. I just… Vladimir Kordilov… he actually published a monograph in Kharkov back in the day. But look, I know what Dani was like and what she was like, that is, because we learned about her in school, you know. By the way, that same Artem Sergeev, uh, he, being an ardent supporter of the Donetsk-Krivoy Rog Republic, literally a year later began talking about the need to support Ukrainian… There, those, those, those Ukrainian tammenias, because, uh, they’ve started a katsapism here. So, that’s it. Vlad is interested. Please ask Konstantin Petrovich what date will be on the ticket for the next Kiev-Moscow train. It’s clear you don’t know. Give us an approximate figure, and we’ll remember it and remind you later. I don’t know, I don’t know. But, you know, it’s not such a simple process, because reconciliation is one thing. For example, they proposed a truce. Then, accordingly, the ceasefire should be followed by the resumption of consular work between Russia and Ukraine, that is, diplomatic services. Next, Ukrzaleznytsia needs to begin negotiations with Russian Railways, and so on, in order to resume this service. But this resumption of rail service is possible only after intergovernmental negotiations on normalizing relations have taken place. Therefore, this is not such a simple or speedy process. What kind of sentence is this, a 50-year entry ban? Through Sheremetyevo. Why are they keeping quiet about this? This is a tragedy for people. Moreover, I have a friend who is a native of Donetsk, who lived in Donetsk, who is completely apolitical, absolutely apolitical, was banned from entering Donetsk and Russia until 2050 without any explanation simply because her brother, well, let’s say he takes a position there that is not to my liking, and, yes, he does not fight on the side of Ukraine. Well, yes, friends, thank you all very much for our conversation today, for today’s communication. And I thank everyone who wrote, who responded, who liked, who joined. Konstantin Petrovich, I thank you too. Not just for the fact that your back is not green, but for your time and thoughts.

[Alexander]: Yes. Thank you very much. And I wish you all the best.

[Konstantin]: All the best, and a good mood, no matter what.

[Alexander]: Spring. I’m already longing for spring, yes, such a worthwhile one, somewhere crazy, well, in the good sense of the word. And we’ve survived March, well, a third of it is behind us, April, May are ahead. The key months of this spring. And many hopes for it. May all your dreams come true. F.

SYNOPSIS: Bondarenko Live Broadcast

Host: Alexander | Guest: Konstantin Petrovich Bondarenko

PART ONE: PRESSURE AND NEGOTIATIONS

Who is pressuring whom? — The central question. Bondarenko describes a “circular pressure” system:

• US pressures Zelensky to make a deal
• Europe pressures Zelensky to keep fighting
• US pressures Europe to handle Zelensky
• Russia pressures the US indirectly, signaling it can wait

Russia’s position — Demands Ukraine cede Donbas by June 1. If not, Russia will escalate claims to Kharkiv, Dnipro, Kherson, Mykolaiv, and Odesa. Russia is not bluffing, according to Bondarenko.

Zelensky’s counter-offer — Proposed mutual ceasefire on energy infrastructure attacks. Russia has not responded.

Easter ceasefire — Zelensky proposed it early for PR advantage. Bondarenko doubts it will last more than a day if it happens at all. Both sides are not ready for peace.

PART TWO: NATO AND THE BALTICS

Trump and NATO — Trump is threatening to leave NATO. Bondarenko notes he can’t formally withdraw without Congress, but he could freeze cooperation. Only France has ever left NATO (1966, returned 1990s).

Trump’s real message to Europe — “I created a problem (Iran/Strait of Hormuz). You can solve it militarily, or buy oil from me at my price.”

British role — UK is driving anti-Russia provocations in the Baltic (drone attacks, Nord Stream sabotage, pushing Sweden/Finland into NATO). UK intelligence networks keep Britain relevant as a global player.

Belarus — Lukashenko is preparing for war. Belarus has significant military capability (airborne troops, Polonaises missiles) and hosts Russian nuclear weapons. Any attack on Belarus is an attack on Russia.

PART THREE: FRONT LINES AND UKRAINIAN POLITICS

Military situation — Russian offensive accelerated in March (27% more territory seized than February). Main pressure on Pokrovsk, Kostyantynivka, and Hulyai-Polye sectors. Russian FPV drone dominance around Pokrovsk.

Zelensky’s propaganda — Claims low Ukrainian losses; Bondarenko calls this denial. Compares to German V-3 weapon myth in 1945.

Gordon’s claims — About Ukrainian ballistic missiles hitting Moscow are “violet beam” propaganda.

Elections — Postponed because Zelensky would lose. Polls show he would lose to Zaluzhny (by 12 points) and Budanov (by 8 points). He only beats Poroshenko and Beletsky.

Budanov — Appointed to head presidential office to neutralize him as a rival. He has no real power. US told him Ukraine must cede Donbas or lose Odesa, Mykolaiv, Dnipro, Kharkiv within a year. Zelensky rejected this.

Syrsky — Gives interviews when under threat of removal. Recently praised Russia’s strength.

PART FOUR: MOBILIZATION CHAOS

TCC (draft officers) violence — Beatings, car rammings, masked men dragging people off buses. Odessa incident went viral.

Veslavsky’s hypocrisy — Says Western Ukrainian villages are empty of men, but big cities (Kyiv, Odesa, Kharkiv) are fine. Bondarenko calls him an idiot.

Ella Lebanova — Says mobilization is normal for a country fighting for survival. When asked if she would fight, she dodged.

No opposition platform — Bondarenko argues no publication in Ukraine dares criticize the government. Opposition only exists on Telegram and YouTube, and those are being suppressed. Contrasts with Dozhd TV (Russian exile media) as ineffective.

PART FIVE: Q&A SESSION

1. Danylo Halytsky as role model for Zelensky?
Zelensky doesn’t know history. 13th-century politics don’t translate to 21st century. Halytsky was a prince who bowed to the Mongols to keep power — Zelensky refuses similar pragmatism.

2. Frogs in Moscow vs. ancient Kyiv (Nebenzya-Melnyk exchange)
Moscow’s later founding is irrelevant. Bondarenko: “Don’t boast about antiquity, boast about current capability.”

3. Are geniuses still born?
Yes, but ideas are accepted only by minorities. Thinkers today will be pedestalized 50 years from now.

4. Will Ukraine seek military revenge after a ceasefire?
Yes. Defeated factions always form militant groups. There will be terrorism against both Russia and any Ukrainian leadership seen as capitulating. Many in Russia would also be dissatisfied with an inconclusive peace.

5. Bucha lists — why won’t Ukraine release them?
Because Bucha is a myth, not just a tragedy. The ambiguity benefits Ukraine politically.

6. Will Europeans fight or use refugees as soldiers?
Refugees aren’t citizens. Foreign legions exist (France), but most countries lack that mechanism. Mercenaries are possible.

7. Fresh water wars?
Predicted since 1980s-90s. Water shortages are emerging; prices are rising.

8. OCU vs. UOC-KP (church conflict)
OCU is acting hostilely, ignoring legality and ethics. They waited for Patriarch Filaret to die before seizing property.

9. Zelensky, Pyshny, Marchenko, Budanov buying war bonds — conflict of interest?
Investigations only happen after power changes. Current officials are immune. The current government provides more grounds for future prosecution than previous ones.

10. Did Putin accidentally help Zelensky become a dictator?
Yes, this should be studied. Zelensky copied Putin; Lukashenko copied both. Zelensky is a result of post-Maidan disillusionment and foreign illusions.

11. Joint Putin-Lukashenko appeal to Ukraine with post-war guarantees?
Rational appeals don’t work in Ukraine right now. Emotions and slogans rule. Only 10% of the population would respond to such logic.

12. Why no streets named after ancient Kyivan kings (who defeated Persians and Macedonians)?
They were Iranian-speaking. Iran is now an enemy of Ukraine, so they’d be retroactively labeled occupiers.

13. Zelensky nominated for Nobel Peace Prize?
Likely an April Fool’s joke. Dozens are nominated every year (Yulia Tymoshenko was nominated in 2012).

14. Donbas-Krivoy Rog Republic proclaimed before Ukrainian People’s Republic — why does Ukraine ignore this?
Moscow decided to strengthen united Ukraine by absorbing the Donbas proletariat. Many short-lived republics existed in 1917; only this one is remembered thanks to historian Vladimir Kornilov.

15. When will Kyiv-Moscow train run again?
Not soon. Requires truce → consular services → railway negotiations → intergovernmental normalization.

16. 50-year entry ban to Russia for a Donetsk native?
Bondarenko knows such a case — a completely apolitical person banned until 2050 because her brother holds an anti-Ukraine position.

CLOSING

Bondarenko thanks viewers. Alexander notes spring has arrived — April and May will be decisive months. Hopes for positive outcomes.

Abrogard Comment

It is interesting that throughout this piece the people are generally ignored.
They would claim to be patriots, without a doubt, these two. But you cannot be a patriot if you don’t care for your ‘compatriots’, your fellow people.

So all ‘patriotic discussion’ should be in terms of the people.

But it is not, not here nor anywhere we look today. It is all in terms of ‘the State’. We are to assume that the welfare of the people is inherent in that somewhere. That somehow preserving the State preserves the People and their welfare.

I think a simple survey would show this to be untrue.