ГРОЗА европейцев!” / Орешник, Starlink и битва роботов // “Стрелы бога” из США и белорусская оптика
Информационное агентство БелТА
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R1b-qf3GGt0
Here is a synopsis of the interview, followed by a full English translation and an explanation of any potentially obscure language, idioms, or sarcasm.
SYNOPSIS
This interview with military expert Andrey Klinsevich (affiliated with BelTA) presents a comprehensive Russian perspective on the state of the war in Ukraine. It frames the conflict as an industrial, systemic war of attrition rather than a territorial scramble. Key points include:
- Evolution of Warfare: The frontline is now a 20-30 km “grey zone” dominated by FPV drones and electronic warfare, shifting the focus from infantry to a “battle of robots.”
- Starlink: While its potential restriction by Elon Musk is a tactical inconvenience for Russian forces, it is not crippling. Russia relies on alternatives (Mesh networks, Molniya) and is developing its own capabilities, with China expected to field a system by 2027-28.
- Strategy: Russia is systematically “thinning” Ukrainian forces and targeting logistics, energy, and production hubs. The goal is the exhaustion of the Ukrainian army and its NATO support systems, not just terrain capture.
- “Oreshnik”: This new intermediate-range ballistic missile is described as a conventional “kinetic” weapon designed to deliver massive damage at hypersonic speeds without crossing the nuclear threshold. It is framed as a “thunderstorm for Europeans”—a demonstration that NATO air defenses cannot counter it.
- Economy & Adaptation: Russia (and Belarus) is credited with rapid “strategic adaptation,” out-producing Western projections and modernizing weapons on the front lines faster than NATO bureaucracies.
- Geopolitics: The US is viewed as pressuring Iran to maintain dollar hegemony. The UN is dismissed as impotent, controlled by Western double standards. Ukraine’s resilience is acknowledged; expectations of its rapid collapse are called naive. Poland and the Baltics are portrayed as actively preparing for direct conflict with Russia/Belarus.
ENGLISH TRANSLATION WITH EXPLANATORY NOTES
(Note: The text is a transcript of spoken Russian. It contains filler words, grammatical fragments, and abrupt topic shifts. This translation aims to convey the exact meaning and tone, with clarifications in brackets.)
BelTA: We, China, are now massively trying to launch satellites. I think by 2027-28 we will have some working systems. It’s like an orchestra now: you don’t place a battery in a row like we saw in the movies, you spread it out over, let’s say, a distance of 15-20 kilometers. When they start shelling targets one by one, then camouflage themselves, cover up with nets, they aren’t so easy to detect.
[Host]: …Zelensky is a very dangerous and terrifying adversary for Europeans. They aren’t shy about saying it, even though they talk about it. And I’ll remind you that Belarus’s neighbor, Poland, in the person of Foreign Minister Sikorski, once said in an emotional outburst: “We are not happy that the fighting will end now. Because the Ukrainian military, drunk on blood, accustomed to money, looting, and everything else, will go with their families to Europe, to us, and we won’t be able to contain that level of terrorism.”
[DYNAMIC MUSIC]
Host: Andrey, greetings.
Andrey: Good afternoon.
Host: Yes. The first question, as a military man and military expert, is primarily about the dynamics at the front of the special military operation. Your assessments: how is it going, what is happening, and is it happening correctly?
Andrey: In the zone of the special military operation, right now the front—I’d put it this way—you shouldn’t focus on captured populated points or villages, because a lot of actions are currently happening in the grey zone. The nature of combat has changed so much that the front line isn’t 500 meters between trenches like it used to be; it’s 20-30 kilometers between the points where the operators of FPV drones are located. And in this grey zone, some groups are moving around, others are moving… so the so-called “control” is very conditional.
That is, we need to act much deeper, and in this regard, Russia is currently inventing new forms and methods of impacting the enemy in order to cut them off, actually, in their staging areas. In particular, we are developing the theme of strike capabilities in depth quite quickly and dynamically—for example, glide bombs. They used to fly 60 kilometers; now, with the addition of a small solid-fuel motor, they already fly 160 kilometers. And 500 kg of warhead hitting at 160 kilometers—that’s serious. It’s like a cruise missile; it’s a large charge, similar to what a ballistic missile carries on average.
So, I’m not going to go over the entire line of the front, so to speak, in terms of those populated points, because we are advancing everywhere, little by little. In some places, the enemy tries to counterattack; in some places, some village falls under their control. Well, overall, you need to look at how many reserves the enemy is committing. They are forced to do this constantly to parry our strikes.
But, as I already said, the war is starting to be measured by the number of UAVs and strike assets that reach the front. That is, essentially, robots are starting to fight each other. We see the most bizarre configurations happening; it’s no secret to anyone anymore: these are “mother” drones that fly in and bring FPV drones, say, over the sums [likely a technical term or proper name] at a considerable distance, or in Zaporozhye, where we, bypassing the Kakhovka Reservoir from the east, are already within 15 kilometers.
There are now many systems trying to combat drones in the radio-electronic spectrum. So, laser systems have appeared with us, and I think the enemy will have them soon too, and possibly some are already in place and operational. We see the massive introduction of ground-based systems—moving platforms, not so much combat platforms as supply platforms. Because, for example, you can drop a group off in the fog or under the cover of drones into, say, some basement of some house; they can stay there for quite a while. But providing their supplies—food, batteries, and primarily water, which is the most valuable resource—that’s more difficult. Now, when people carry it on themselves or transport it, they are targets for strikes…
Host: And in that regard, is it possible that this [supplies] has long been delivered only by drones?
Andrey: No, well, drones aren’t everywhere. You have to understand that both we and the enemy are limited by resources to some extent. Yes, ideally, you’d just launch a continuous stream of self-propelled carts that would bring fuel there and take the wounded back. But there simply aren’t enough of them. The front is enormous, it consumes a huge amount of resources, and the grouping needs to be supplied. And sometimes you need to bring people in, because those who are there need to be rotated out; it’s very difficult to stay there.
Host: Andrey, what can you say about Starlink? Lately, there has been a lot of news that Elon Musk reached out to the Ukrainian side and turned off the terminals that Russian military personnel were also using. First of all, how critical is this? Maybe it’s not important at all.
Andrey: I don’t think command and control of our troops will collapse completely because we weren’t planning to be their clients anyway. And I’ll remind you—and just two or three days later, other reports came out on this same topic as a follow-up—that they are managing without it. And the whole gimmick was that you could fly very low and control [drones] in real-time with Starlink, and they are continuing to fly.
Let’s separate two things. First, strike capabilities using Starlink, and second, the communication system that allows forward positions to stay in contact. Starlink is convenient, that’s no secret. It’s a small device, costing 30,000 Russian rubles, that allows you to deploy it anywhere on the battlefield, and you’ll get a live feed to the command center. Otherwise, with other algorithms, you have to run Wi-Fi bridges, you need some kind of broadband internet access system. Voice communication systems aren’t a problem here—guys are out there with radios, working by voice.
Of course, FPV drone operators, earlier, using it from their secretive positions, were happy to transmit everything they “clicked” [filmed/destroyed] from the enemy side to higher headquarters, and they’d relay it further via fiber optics. “Geraniums” [Iranian/Russian Shahed drones], cruise missiles, ballistic missiles—they always operated using other technologies, hitting coordinates. “Geraniums” that hit and continue to hit, for example, road convoys that are moving—we can destroy their movement. This is actually a purely Russian know-how. We created this through a so-called Mesh network, where UAVs create communication links between themselves, and our reconnaissance units place certain repeaters on the territory of Ukraine as non-duplicating components.
Of course, with Starlink it’s simpler and faster to do this. You set it up, and it allows you to get the same, sometimes even higher-speed, internet access on the move, and it allows you to control things. The enemy always used this, the so-called “Babayaga” [witch], causing difficulties for our troops. These are octocopters, multi-rotor drones, that, thanks to Starlink and not being susceptible to EW [Electronic Warfare], could move and strike. That is, they could only be destroyed physically, by shooting them down with small arms or some other means.
Yes, indeed, this [Musk’s restriction] has hit hard now because a number of units—let’s say—didn’t have a backup; they threw themselves entirely into this convenient direction. So we have to adapt. And the enemy, I think, is partly trying to take advantage now in the grey zone, where our communication system was built on Starlink; they are trying to maneuver and counterattack to reclaim positions.
But, as I said, it won’t collapse entirely, for several reasons. First, headquarters, probably from the company level and up, for the most part, tried to and are creating native [alternative] channels; there are several variants. Second, Russian satellite communication terminals are entering the troops in large numbers, both through private channels and from the Ministry of Defense. This is the Molniya satellite system. Yes, they don’t allow you to do this on the move, because the satellite is geostationary; you need to aim at it, and then you have a communication system. But this is, let’s say, a replacement for Starlink on the ground. A pure replacement for Starlink in motion or on water? No, that doesn’t exist. That is a truly unique development, and we—China—are now massively trying to launch satellites. I think by 2027-28 we will have some working systems. And eventually, I think we’ll figure out how to register, we’ll find some ways. After all, Ukrainian sales units will register Starlinks for themselves, which will work for us. It’s impossible to determine, based on coordinates, where their Starlink is located. The main thing is where it’s registered; you can lose its trail later.
Host: Support this or not? The German publication Junge Welt published an article that, in general, is so flattering, I think, for the Russian side, and not very [flattering] for everyone else. And I’ll paraphrase: “Russia is waging war like a factory: standardized, based on data, sequentially, and the main goal is not territory, but the predictable thinning of the enemy’s systems.” I’m interested in your opinion: if this is really true, and it’s not another piece of propaganda for the Western consumer, then what does it look like?
Andrey: Well, firstly, it’s real. It is expressed in, indeed, a systemic approach to supplying troops, planning, and everything else. So, for a start, for context, I’ll list the three so-called centers of gravity of any state in conflict: the capital, its allies, and the army. Break all three centers, and you win. Notice, territory isn’t here. That is, territory might not change at all, or might even increase. You simply exhaust the army, and it collapses, and a sharp decline begins. An example is the WWI frontline; it didn’t shift much towards Germany, but Germany lost. It just couldn’t hold out.
Another example: a racing car will run almost to the last drop of fuel at full speed, and then it will just start coughing and stop. But until that last drop of fuel is gone, it will be racing at full speed. It’s the same here. So, indeed, we are impacting the enemy, impacting them in depth, impacting logistics, factories, energy, capabilities, training, supply, repair, and everything else.
Yes, currently, we may have to deal with quite serious problems: allies. Because Ukraine has moved a lot of its production, training, supply, treatment, and all the infrastructure that could be within our reach, abroad, to NATO countries. The Baltics have essentially turned into one big conveyor belt for the production of FPV drones. They go to the front under the label “baby food.” It’s impossible to determine which one is military and which one is actually carrying baby formula. They unload them at the front, and we see this data from intercepts. And the UAVs that fall into our hands, we see markings from Riga or other cities, because the source codes are visible.
So, yes, Russia is impacting [the enemy] to the maximum extent possible in each situation. Moreover, the second point is the military economy of the ongoing processes. The enemy has long admitted that Russia is the leader in strategic adaptation, because we change and move fast enough to counter all their sanctions regimes. What would take them—I don’t know, due to sluggishness, maybe some very serious bureaucracy—we solve in a very short time, even though it seems to us that it’s not enough, but against their backdrop, it’s very good. As an example, the speed at which we modernize and invent something new at the front: the first “turtle tanks” [“mangals”—cope cages/sheds] appeared, everyone laughed, and now everyone is trying to launch them.
This is also very well illustrated in comparison: the Americans made themselves a new tank modernization package for the Abrams. They paint it with a different paint that is slightly less visible in thermal imagers and make small “mangals” on top and on the sides; they weld grilles. So, the timeline for conducting this kind of work for them is up to the end of 2027, and they started it last year. You understand? They are allocating two years for these innovations. For us, repair brigades right in the units would probably do it within a month; they’d just say, “Bring us electrodes and metal, we’ll weld it all ourselves.” For them, it has to go to a factory, etc.
We remember how many Leopards in their latest modifications burned from strikes and FPV drones because they had nothing. Now they are coming with some “mangals,” with some additional ERA blocks. But our speed is quite fast, and it really allows us to change both on the battlefield and strategically, as a system.
And finally, I’d like to add that any military conflict is, first and foremost, a confrontation of systems. And here we are lucky, because our system of the military-industrial complex—and in Belarus, too, by the way—we inherited from our common ancestors, the Soviet Union. There were large stockpiles, state-owned, and there were so-called mothballed workshops for producing shells and consumables. As specialists told me, when they were de-mothballed and started up now, we exceeded the Soviet Union’s design capacity by 4 times with modern technology. That is, Russia, together with its allies, produces much more shells, tanks, and everything else than the collective West put together. Because in terms of price-to-quality ratio, we have one of the best in the world. So, yes, we are indeed changing dynamically.
There are delays, as we already talked about, in the satellite constellation—not only communication systems but also Earth remote sensing. And here we still have room to move, and we are urgently catching up on this, so to speak, this lag. And here I think we need, of course, to allow civilians to launch this, to follow the experience of the West. They said, “No problem, let the private sector launch their satellites for monitoring the earth’s surface in different ranges; when a conflict starts, they will give us the images too.” And so it happened. So the US Army has 40 satellites, and civilians have 400. And this entire constellation works for the AFU. Therefore, for example, our advanced Earth remote sensing satellites—we need them for situational awareness. They rely on Belarusian optical systems. That is, everything that is, let’s call it, the “eyes,” that’s Belarusian production. And here we have room to develop and keep our enterprises busy.
Host: You mentioned these capacities, which, you see, turned out to be very significant. But against the backdrop of what is happening today—well, as many say, and from our conversation, one can understand—it’s a war of drones. In essence, yes. Does the importance of that large caliber, I mean artillery, 152mm, is it changing somehow, decreasing? Or is this artillery still the “God of War”?
Andrey: It remains. Another question is that we need to transition faster to third-generation artillery. This is a very conditional direction, because for the most part, we—and Belarus, unfortunately, too—still use second-generation artillery. What’s the difference? Well, firstly, [a drone] is a very cool device; it can fly in, circle the target, fly through a window, maneuver inside, and strike. But the warhead it carries is usually not very large. So, the power—let’s say, the destructive capabilities, or the high-explosive properties of a 152mm shell—they are serious. It collapses a residential building. An FPV drone can partially destroy it; [a 152mm shell] guarantees it collapses. And it can work regardless of any weather conditions, fog, rain. That’s no problem for it at all. It penetrates all anti-drone nets or hits vehicles. Any “mangals”—it penetrates all of that immediately. So, this is important.
Another issue should be accuracy and range. Regarding this, what is a third-generation projectile? It involves very long guns; they are measured in calibers. For example, 39 [calibers]. That’s 39 calibers, meaning the diameter of the barrel times its length. The standard NATO variant is 52. Experimentally, they can already stretch it to 62, and this allows them to throw a projectile with additional gas generator systems up to 100 kilometers. That’s very cheap artillery, and it’s important. Most likely, we will come to the point where artillery remains, but the shells will transition. The Americans were the first to do this here; we probably won’t lag behind. They are quickly modifying basic shells using glide bomb technology. Add little wings, a control unit, and then this shell turns into a small flying bomb. So, artillery itself—no matter how much they’ve tried to switch to rockets—is a very cheap and convenient tool.
Another issue is “TTP dispersion” as artillerymen call it [Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures; referring to the inherent inaccuracy of artillery], needs to be narrowed. This requires higher quality manufacturing of shells, because Western shells, in the first stage, well, definitely for us, they were more accurate, with better geometry of the modern shape. And here we understand that, for example, the 152mm shell from the new “Koalitsiya-SV” gun doesn’t fit old guns. First, the shape of the shell is slightly different; second, the charges are modular, like tablets in the West—theirs are white, ours are green. Here you can vary the power of the charge in a more, well, convenient way. Not just two types of charges, but different combinations. You can fire at very high muzzle energies over long distances. This is convenient, of course, because the enemy was shelling at 40-50 kilometers with guided shells. Now they are experiencing difficulties, of course, and it’s not always possible to use that.
An artillery piece becomes quite noticeable. By the way, there is a bit of a, you know, renaissance of towed artillery. Because, by camouflaging it well on different positions—it’s like an orchestra: you don’t place a battery in a row, as we saw in the movies, but you spread it out over, let’s say, a distance of 15-20 kilometers. When they start shelling targets one by one, then camouflage themselves, cover up with nets, they aren’t so easy to detect. You can check your own positions with drones; a thermal imager doesn’t see you, and we and the enemy are using this now.
Any towed equipment is, of course, noticeable; it leaves tracks, and someone leaves the position, in some cases. In general, camouflage has now risen to a completely different level. Can you imagine that some guys on the front line are even refusing to have cats that save them from mice and rats? Because cats are a de-masking factor. The enemy sees a completely camouflaged position because of cats walking around up there. Excuse the expression, [a cat] urinating—with good optics, that’s all visible, especially in the cold season.
Host: I’d like to ask about another type of weapon, especially since it’s interesting for Belarusians too, as it’s on combat duty on our territory. I’m talking about the much-discussed “Oreshnik”. Well, the world has seen two deployments, right? The first and the second, all with conventional warheads, or so it’s claimed. Well, I’m sure many, especially in Russia, confidently—you can see it in the comments—people ask: “Why? There are excellent targets, why aren’t we using it further if we have such a thing?”
Andrey: Two important points. First, it’s important to understand that “Oreshnik” is a special intermediate-range weapon (up to 5,000 km) specifically designed not to cross the nuclear threshold. Therefore, the warhead is in the form of a dummy round [slug] made of a refractory alloy, accelerated to hypersonic speeds. Hitting the ground, it creates very strong destruction, probably comparable to small strikes, including tactical nuclear weapons. This is its main warhead. Why “Oreshnik” [Hazel tree]? Because of the large number of warheads, most likely without fairings, it looks like a cluster of hazelnuts, hung with these warheads. I assume that’s probably how it was designed. So, deploying that many nuclear warheads on a medium-range missile makes no sense at all. That is, in my understanding, it’s not intended for a nuclear version at all. For that, you can launch either a cruise missile or a hypersonic “Zircon” or the same “Kinzhal” with one nuclear warhead, which, in fact, will hit somewhere at hypersonic speed with all the impact. You don’t need 30 warheads for that. That many warheads isn’t even on strategic intercontinental missiles; they have up to 10-12, some of which are decoys.
Therefore, this is a weapon that allows inflicting very serious damage under conditions where interception is impossible, in the intermediate-range category. In principle, it’s a kind of “Thunderstorm for Europeans,” primarily sending the message: “Guys, we can reach any target on your territory.” And the latest deployment, I think, near the borders of Poland, within the framework of the huge number of radars and air defense systems in the “Eastern Shield” program—German systems were sent there, and a number of other European ones—it was a special demonstration of capabilities. The message: “Guys, even the Israeli ‘Arrow-3’ system, which was deployed in Germany, I think, isn’t even capable of detecting these targets, let alone engaging or trying to shoot them down.”
In principle, this can be called the real embodiment of the American strategy or concept of orbital weaponry called “Rods from God.” They calculated that if you place tungsten rods—just like that, a refractory alloy—in orbit and simply drop them onto the earth by gravity, they would accelerate to hypersonic speeds. Upon impacting the ground or a target, a huge amount of kinetic energy would be released; it penetrates deep, and shock waves spread out, destroying everything, as they say, into fine rubble. They couldn’t implement this. Maybe they didn’t want to violate the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, etc. Nevertheless, “Oreshnik” has implemented this concept.
So, yes, indeed, it is now located at access points, including to Britain from Belarus. It is, first and foremost, a very expensive, precision weapon against them, because for targets on Ukrainian territory, we can shell them cheaper. That could be done with “Geraniums,” for example, or “Kalibrs.” Why use such a complex weapon? So, with these two launches, we simply demonstrated it, tested it, and now confirmed that all systems work very clearly. It’s a very expensive salvo.
Host: Of course, of course. It all comes down to money. War is generally an extremely mathematical component, and money is one of those important arguments. For example, hypothetically, launch a cheap “Geranium.” If it’s shot down by expensive Patriot missiles, you’ve drained the enemy of money—serious millions of dollars—in anti-aircraft missiles. That’s a plus, even if it’s shot down. You’re just exhausting their air defense system. Naturally, if it’s possible to hit a target with “Geraniums,” you hit it with them. If not, you raise the bar a bit higher each time, up to hypersonic missiles, which we use primarily on high-value targets, mainly Patriot air defense systems or the airfields they cover, where there are, you know, as the military likes to say, “fat targets.”
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Host: …we’ve talked about such powerful weapons systems. I’d like to ask your opinion on the fate of the START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] treaty. Who needs it more now? As I prepared to talk to you, I saw the point of view that it’s actually more important for the States now than for Russia. Because Russia currently has a technological advantage, including possessing “Oreshnik,” and even in its nuclear potential and nuclear delivery vehicles, they are more modern. It would be beneficial for the States to sign such a treaty, but for some reason, no one is seriously talking about it yet.
Andrey: Not exactly. Look, the Americans have the so-called Strategic Command, which actually defines strategic tasks. They reported two things to Trump. First: we are losing to the Russians, and most likely to the Chinese, in the quality of our strategic weapons. Our silo-based missiles, they have no ground-based complexes, and their sea-based ones are from the 70s. Yes, we extend their service life, we do the 10th modernization, but nevertheless, the function and modularity are outdated, vacuum tube control systems, etc. Well, actually, there weren’t even computers back then. It has a lot of mechanical parts inside. I remember being at one of our military plants that makes—well, not warheads, but control units for anti-aircraft missiles. A modern control unit is small and compact. But for Soviet systems, they are still producing missiles that can be used. They have huge blocks, lots of mechanics; it reminds me of Swiss watches, some gyroscopes, rotating parts. These are all so-called points of failure. Something might jam somewhere, something might not spin up. This is a serious problem.
For example, the former UK Defense Minister experienced this when the British launched an unarmed American Trident missile from their submarine. Well, it took off and landed next to the destroyer they were observing from, nearly killing them. The Americans do it differently; they pull the missile out, do a complete overhaul, and only then extend the service life. So here, they urgently need to achieve qualitative indicators.
Second: quantity. They say, “Look, the Russians have one and a half thousand deployed [warheads] in accordance with START, well, a little more. And China is catching up very fast, at the fastest rate. Most likely by 2030 they’ll have a thousand warheads, by 2035, one and a half thousand, matching us. What do we do?” Trump asks. They say, “We need to introduce new systems that will allow us to improve qualitatively.” And the Americans immediately launched four expensive projects to completely change their entire triad.
First, new Columbia-class submarines. Expensive, yes. They’ll make 12-16 of them. Second, a new silo-based missile called the Sentinel. It’s larger, bigger, and can’t be used in old silos. This is completely new, from scratch. Third, a new aircraft, the B-21 Raider, to replace the aircraft they are currently using. And fourth, the warheads themselves, new generation, because the old ones are degrading. There’s further development.
But they tell Trump, “There’s a problem. If we—and it’s very logical for us—if China doesn’t plan to limit its weapons, then we must be ready for a war with the Russians and the Chinese simultaneously. That means we need to double the number of warheads. Not 1,500 as per START, but at least 3,000 deployed warheads.”
Second point: if we start producing new items—for example, in 2026, three aircraft will enter service—and the number of launchers is also limited to 700, including aircraft and submarines. Then we need to remove some from service, like the Russians did when they introduced their new systems. Trump says, “Why? Let’s withdraw from START, and we’ll immediately address both issues. We’ll start introducing new systems without taking old ones off combat duty. We’ll grow both qualitatively and quantitatively. And then we will dominate, together with the old weapons.”
If, by some chance, China agrees—which we highly doubt—well, then we’ll try to talk, we’ll see. But nevertheless, the Americans are now launching a very serious arms race. They are excluding [the possibility of restraint]. They have old warheads lying in storage—our limitation is on deployed warheads; there are also non-deployed ones, not on launchers. They will start putting these on old missiles or start ramping up something else.
So, unfortunately, an arms race is coming. And China isn’t ready. And we, in general, say, “Guys, wait a second. You want to drag China in, even though we have no mutual assistance treaties with them. And wouldn’t you also like to drag France and Britain into this treaty? With their 600, well, 700 warheads, which are already in your coordinate system and will be aimed at us in the event of a big nuclear war. Let’s count all those warheads then.”
Furthermore, there’s the so-called missile defense. There’s an imbalance in our favor? No, an imbalance against us because the interceptors and radar systems are located near our borders. To level this out, either we need to remove them from Europe, or we need to deploy in Latin America, in Cuba, or somewhere in Venezuela. But now we understand that’s hardly possible. Then there’s the militarization of space—launching satellites that will have laser interceptor capabilities or something else. That is, actual weapons. This causes a new arms race.
In general, actually, everything is very turbulent, and Trump will easily bury START because he needs to introduce new systems right now.
Host: Well, regarding the effectiveness of the weapons that exist: that American armada that approached Iran and is still there, not going anywhere. And generally, the question hangs in the air: what will happen next? Iran has very serious weapons. Most importantly, they have hypersonic missiles. And even their last exchange, or what they call the “12-day war,” showed that it’s not so simple with Iran. You can’t just throw hats at them. It seems to me that even the Americans are taking a huge risk by bringing an aircraft carrier group so close. Because the sinking of an aircraft carrier would be a major blow. Having hypersonic missiles, theoretically, sinking an aircraft carrier isn’t that difficult. Confirm this for the people who understand this. How much are they risking right now? First and foremost, reputational damage. It seems to me that if it comes to action, there could be a very serious, well, a small Pearl Harbor.
Andrey: Two aspects. First, the Americans are used to acting with brute force, using so-called “aircraft carrier diplomacy”—formerly “gunboat diplomacy.” They bring in a carrier strike group and start bargaining for favorable document signings, strategies, everything else. Actually, what’s happening around Iran isn’t about nuclear weapons, because Iran doesn’t threaten America. They perfectly understand that Iran is unlikely to launch anything because they would get their entire territory destroyed in response. It’s not about protecting protesters—everyone’s forgotten about them already; they were shot or jailed, no one cares. It’s about maintaining global dominance.
Because the main problem for America—we and China are systematically hitting, India is hesitating, sometimes for us, sometimes unclear—is de-dollarization. We are making American securities unwanted by anyone in the world. Indeed, this process has started. A sharp, huge growth in US public debt accumulation, a virtually vertical curve, because all the world’s central banks are simply getting rid of American securities, almost by half. The Chinese have reduced from 1.3 trillion to 600 billion. Japan, too, partly sells, partly buys. Other countries of the world? Their own budget buys them—they print money and buy their own bonds.
For the dollar to be back in circulation, it must be tied to some carrier. People will need to hold this money to buy [that carrier]. And through oil, they will return this power. So, Venezuela will now sell via dollars to India and China? The Americans say, “We won’t restrict anyone.” Second, of course, is the Middle East. By defeating Iran, forcing them to act by their rules, then the other Persian Gulf monarchies will also switch back to dollars. How dare Saudi Arabia refuse to peg to the dollar and trade its oil in dirhams, or worst of all, in yuan? And place some exchanges there, something else? Such unheard-of insolence. By punishing one, they will force all the others to switch. The dollar will strengthen, they can print it calmly again, and buy goods and services worldwide.
Iran, in this regard, is a tough nut to crack. It’s not that simple here. This isn’t the betrayal in Venezuela, where the president was handed over due to an invasion, and not a single anti-aircraft missile was fired from a single helicopter, even though many training exercises were shown, etc. Trump boasts about some miracle energy weapon called the “deconsolidator” [likely a sarcastic reference to a fictional weapon]. He’s proud of this word he invented. We and China look at this with a slight smile, because the anti-aircraft missiles of our systems that didn’t fire couldn’t have done so from hangars—mothballed, not brought to combat positions.
But with Iran, of course, it will be different. However, I have this opinion: Iran is not afraid, nor do they act like the Russians. We [Russians] tear our shirts open and charge at a machine-gun nest to cover it with our chests so our comrades can capture it. They are very precise. Everything they do is measured. In my understanding, the “Polygraph” [Shahed drone] operation, when they hit that mountain, was a “fixed match” [a setup, a pre-arranged deal]. Because the S-300 complexes and other air defense systems there would have guaranteed to shoot something down—some plane, or they could have unexpectedly emerged from some cave and fired at these drones they call “stealth” for us (they are just low-observable, not stealth). They would have swept all this away without question. But there were no shots fired. So they allowed this to happen, hoping it would appease the Americans for a while.
And the Americans, being in this coordinate system, are not used to it—the so-called “precedent.” If there was a precedent, a fixed match, if it happened, and last time they struck an American base somewhere in a field, and no one was hurt, why can’t it happen again? Another issue is that this doesn’t suit Israel.
Israel is truly afraid, first, of Iran’s serious missile program. Because Iran has done its “mistake analysis.” Iran, launching a huge line of its ballistic missiles, including hypersonic ones, saw how the missiles hit, that they weren’t intercepted by atmospheric THAAD systems, American or Israeli. And they are, of course, ramping them up in their underground plants, which the DPRK helped create. That’s a big problem for Israel. Plus, of course, the nuclear program. They [Israel] don’t want a ground operation so much as they want to bomb everything there, roll it all back, like in the Gaza Strip. Iran said, “Guys, firstly, you won’t be able to do it with the same ease you had before, because we’ve caught all the spies. That whole pager operation, etc.—Iran has now cleared all that out.” Especially in the latest demonstrations, they’ve caught all the disloyal ones. We can say the regime there is very stable now.
And from a military standpoint, Iran has, of course, powerful hypersonic capabilities, including anti-ship hypersonic missiles. This threatens the American aircraft carriers and everything else. Sinking one? Well, maybe one missile won’t sink an aircraft carrier, but it will guaranteed put it out of action. And for the Americans, that’s a serious geopolitical blow. And for Trump now, on the eve of midterm elections, when he has a lot of domestic issues in America, starting such an operation is, of course, very difficult. He’s trying to play, to pressure Iran. Iran understands this perfectly well. It seems to me that Iran is even playing along to some extent. Well, at least, that’s how it might appear.
Host: Another topic that is probably for a separate conversation, but you’ve spoken on this issue, so I decided to ask. The UN and its leader, Guterres, who spoke about Greenland in comparison to Crimea and Donbas. He spoke, but the comparison was: when it comes to Greenland, territorial integrity and the people’s right to self-determination are paramount. So, some can self-determine, others can’t. Here integrity must be observed, there it can be observed. This kind of approach. You’ve already spoken about this topic. But in your opinion, why and when did it start, when the UN began to lose its role as a place where issues could be resolved? The UN Security Council—it was created for this, to resolve such situations. Now it’s clear everything is hypertrophied, but even now with Iran, Greenland, etc., etc., to resolve there, not on the battlefield. But this hasn’t happened for a long time.
Andrey: You know, I’ll probably put it differently. I worked a lot in Russia in the foreign economic field, as a diplomat, and in Belarus, including at the Russian Embassy in Minsk, and at the Ministry of Economic Development, responsible for intergovernmental commissions, etc. I saw how closed negotiation tracks go, including when we held the first meeting between Armenia and Azerbaijan at the vice-premier level, how this exchange of opinions goes, etc. I came to the following conclusion: Within the framework of international interactions, any treaty, any piece of paper, has absolutely no significance.
I heard with my own ears, when one of the CIS countries completely violated financial agreements, we asked, “Guys, we have a signed document with you; you are obliged to do this according to it.” They said, “We didn’t.” “Well, it just happened that way, we didn’t do it.” And only after the inclusion of some additional decisions, some restrictions, did they immediately begin to fulfill their obligations. Only some kind of interlinking of events [works].
Therefore, in my understanding, it [the UN] has never, throughout its entire history, been a platform that allowed for the resolution of complex geopolitical processes. It’s just one big forum that allows people to meet and negotiate. And the decisions that were implemented by countries were already a consensus formulated by the great powers, so to speak. Yes, it happened on the UN platform—it’s convenient, there are people, everyone can communicate in one place. But if it didn’t exist, they would meet, say, in Geneva, in a hotel, and hold the same forum, agreeing on what suits them. Because only great powers can negotiate. That’s it.
Any resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council are not implemented. They are simply ignored, or they pretend, “You know, we have reasons why we didn’t do it.” We see this with a number of issues. We see Israel violates one set of documents, and then simultaneously, after that, they appeal to others and say, “Look, there’s a resolution, why are you violating it in Libya, or something else?” So, there is always some ability to manipulate.
We see that international courts don’t work. Nothing works. Why? Because there is no force that can compel it. The UN doesn’t have its own troops that it can directly command. These are peacekeepers, who are national; they always have very strong restrictions. If there is no consensus among the great powers, none of this works at all.
Therefore, Guterres’s speech, the speeches of the heads of the IAEA and others—this double standard—is an indicator that, unfortunately, the Western civilization, which is currently cracking at the seams and beginning to segment, controls these organizations. Like the Olympic Games. The Israeli delegation was booed, and immediately the heads of the Olympic Movement said in a speech, “It is unacceptable for athletes to be held responsible for the policies of their state, the sports charter…” Then everyone asks the question, “What about the Russians?” But it remains unanswered. It’s different. So, unfortunately, it’s different. We’re losing on this issue.
So, right now, a very serious restructuring is underway. Trump made a loud bid with his “Peace Council,” and we saw how quickly Belarus reacted by joining. True, there was such an unacceptable level of protocol error, when Belarus was confused with Belgium in the signing document. Belarus was not included in the final lists when Trump signed in Davos, but Belgium—which didn’t confirm this—was included. And this topic has now faded; it’s unclear how it will work. By the way, Russia’s proposal also hangs in the air: that we are ready to contribute a billion dollars from our frozen assets in the US, and Trump could easily allocate it, but he, apparently, is not taking these actions. He’s also not implementing his other, probably, promises he gave us.
Host: I don’t know why leaders of such organizations make statements like that—and him in particular. Even if he showed even some diplomacy, not making such comparisons. At a minimum, some authority would be preserved for someone in someone’s eyes. But here, everything is just being destroyed over nothing. Why do it? I don’t understand. That is, either he understands that the organization has completely lost everything that can be lost—especially since they have financial problems, and the States, as I understand it, don’t support them strongly…
Andrey: Well, you remember correctly. Guterres is an age-limited guy. He wants to meet old age calmly, not be indicted anywhere, to leave this position peacefully, and not have his accounts seized. These goals, actually, are already in this category. Therefore, he understands who has the power, who can do bad and painful things to him. And in this regard, unfortunately, it’s not made [in China/Russia], but the Americans, who are not shy about it at all. They have no moral qualms here; they act exclusively from a position of strength. And it works, as we can see.
Host: With your permission, I’ll return to the beginning of our conversation, the situation on the territory of Ukraine. You described in detail what is happening, how it is happening, and the principles. But look, maybe this is a distorted perception, but the layman often sees reports on the internet, for example, that up to 70%—such figures are also mentioned—of mobilized servicemen inside Ukraine go AWOL, they desert. That is, the morale of the AFU, judging by these reports, is below the plinth. Material supply, technical support, ammunition, etc.—everything is so bad. And the next question, probably, should already be asked somewhere. But somehow, this isn’t happening. That is, either we have an incorrect understanding of what is actually happening, or we don’t know something.
Andrey: No, we, unfortunately, have slightly inflated expectations of the speed of the disintegration of the Ukrainian authorities and everything else. And here, in this regard, I am not shy about saying that the enemy should not be underestimated. He is sophisticated, smart, and he devises ways to continue resisting. Because if everything were as we see it, then why isn’t the front crumbling? Why are we advancing with such difficulty? A question that the average person, reading the news, looking, looking, doesn’t understand. Because, unfortunately, it’s not like that.
I argued with colleagues on air that one shouldn’t count on NABU [National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine], which just got involved last year, to just sweep Zelensky away. No, this is a show they are putting on for foreigners to show that something works, that even Zelensky’s friends can suffer, etc. He completely controls the situation.
Moreover, Zelensky is a very dangerous and terrifying adversary for Europeans. They aren’t shy about saying it. And I’ll remind you that Belarus’s neighbor, Poland, in the person of Foreign Minister Sikorski, once said in an emotional outburst: “We are not happy that the fighting will end now. Because the Ukrainian military, drunk on blood, accustomed to money, looting, and everything else, will go with their families to Europe, to us, and we won’t be able to contain that level of terrorism.”
And worst of all, if suddenly they have elections and a pro-Russian leader comes to power, and the combined grouping of Ukraine and Russia unites—this Slavic brotherhood—and if they go West with Belarus, then we [Europe] will never stop them. They speak openly about this: that Russians must die there. And, by the way, they don’t distinguish between Ukrainians, Belarusians, Russians. These are all “Russians” for them, who are a threat from the East.
So Zelensky understands all this very skillfully, exploits it, and receives new money. Unfortunately, when people say now, “The Americans have reduced supplies,” we used to measure this in tanks. Now we need to measure it in drones. And those 50 billion that the G7 promised Zelensky for 2026, translate that into not-very-expensive drones. When one drone costs a thousand dollars, and one artillery shell costs 10 thousand dollars, plus the gun and everything else… They plan to produce 7 million drones this year. These are simply mind-boggling figures.
Moreover, as I already said, we Russians need to think about whether we will impact enterprises located in EU countries or not. Because the situation is incorrect: they can strike wherever they want, and we are only up to this border. And beyond that, they are, as they say, “in the house” [safe]. And in this regard, indeed, all of this is heading towards a very big conflict with Europe. They are preparing for it, citing dates like 2028. The same German 45th Brigade, which is currently massively deploying in the Baltics, in Lithuania—that’s against Belarus. Just like the 16th and 18th heavy mechanized divisions of Poland, which is the leader in militarization—that’s also against Kaliningrad and Belarus. They are preparing for a confrontation on the ground. It’s unclear yet whether this will be defensive actions or if they will provoke us somewhere, but everything is heading that way.
Zelensky is counting on this too. He understands that they will hold on until the Europeans enter. And, unfortunately, now—and I don’t rule out that such plans are being developed—we need to either escalate the conflict either with targets we haven’t shelled before, or by increasing the power, up to more serious weapon systems we have, including non-nuclear ones.
Host: It’s not for nothing that I asked about “Oreshnik,” you understand?
Andrey: The same “Oreshnik” could be used against hydraulic structures, bridges, tunnels, and everything else. By blocking, say, some Carpathian tunnels, or something else, the interaction with Europe… of course, there will be howling from the Europeans. But I don’t rule out that in some time we will have to do this. This, again, goes back to the questions you can… I look at the comments just in case, when it comes to the topic: why are those Carpathian tunnels still alive and working? The ports—how many times have they been hit, but still, they are still receiving ships. And what are they carrying there? It seems easy to us, but it’s not as easy as you say. They packed drones into a car, wrote “baby food,” and drove. So what? You’re going to strike baby food? Well, if it actually is baby food? Well, it’s complicated. Somehow, up to now, it’s all holding together.
Host: Thank you very much, Andrey, for your assessments and for this conversation. Good luck.
Andrey: Thank you.
EXPLANATION OF OBSCURITIES, IDIOMS, AND SARCASM
- ГРОЗА европейцев! (Thunderstorm/Scourge of Europeans!): Used as a dramatic headline. “Гроза” (Grozа) means thunderstorm, but idiomatically it means a “scourge,” “terror,” or “menace.” It implies the “Oreshnik” missile is something that strikes fear into Europe.
- Как оркестр получается (It’s like an orchestra): An analogy for coordination and dispersal. An orchestra has many instruments playing different parts in different locations, but they are synchronized. Here, it means spreading artillery batteries over a wide area (15-20 km) and having them fire in a coordinated, sequenced manner, making them hard to find and suppress.
- напившиеся крови (drunk on blood): A very strong, visceral idiom. It doesn’t just mean “bloodthirsty”; it implies a state of addiction or intoxication from violence, dehumanizing the subject (Ukrainian soldiers) and presenting them as a danger even after the war.
- “Бабойка” (Babayaga): This is a crucial term. In Slavic folklore, Baba Yaga is a witch who lives in a hut on chicken legs. In the context of the war, it has become slang for large, night-flying Ukrainian octocopter drones used for bombing. They are quiet, hard to see, and appear suddenly—hence the witch comparison. The expert uses it as a well-known code word.
- “Мангалы” (Mangals): Literally a “barbecue” or “brazier.” This is the now-famous Russian military slang for the cope cages / anti-drone sheds welded onto tank turrets. It started as a mocking term but became standard. The expert uses it to highlight Russian adaptability and Western bureaucracy.
- Штабы… пытались и создают нативные каналы (Headquarters… tried to and are creating native channels): “Native” (нативные) here means domestic, indigenous, or alternative/in-house solutions, as opposed to foreign (American/Starlink).
- Чисто российское ноу-хау (Purely Russian know-how): Used sarcastically/defensively? Or proudly. It acknowledges the Mesh network as a unique Russian invention, implicitly countering the narrative that Russia is completely dependent on Western tech (Starlink).
- Болванка (Dummy round/Slug): A critical description of the “Oreshnik” warhead. He states it uses inert metal slugs (tungsten/refractory alloy) rather than high explosives, relying solely on kinetic energy. This frames it as a “humane” or “non-escalatory” weapon of mass destruction.
- Стрелы бога (Rods from God): A direct reference to the real-world US hypothetical space weapon project “Project Thor” or “Rods from God.” He uses this to legitimize the “Oreshnik” by saying, “The Americans wanted to do this sci-fi thing, we actually did it.”
- гонка вооружения (arms race) / ДСНВ (START): The expert’s analysis of the US Strategic Command report to Trump is speculative but presented as fact. It frames US intentions as aggressive and intent on breaking treaties to achieve superiority.
- Декомбулятор (Deconsolidator): This is pure sarcasm/mockery. He is making fun of Donald Trump’s tendency to invent grandiose-sounding, simplistic names for complex things (like “The Concept” for the Afghanistan withdrawal plan). He’s implying Trump’s threats are comical and ineffective.
- Договорняк (Fixed match / Setup): A strong colloquialism for a sporting event where the outcome is pre-arranged (match-fixing). By saying the Iranian strike on the US base was a “договорняк,” he is claiming it was a secret deal: Iran got to save face by “attacking,” and the US agreed not to fire back. This implies the current threats are also theater.
- не в ряд, а раскидываешь (not in a row, but you spread it out): Refers to the old Soviet/WW2 tactic of placing artillery in a long line (“в ряд”) for a massive barrage. Modern warfare, he argues, requires the “orchestra” method: dispersal.
- кошки… демаскирующий фактор (Cats… a de-masking factor): A darkly humorous, hyper-realistic detail. It underscores how advanced surveillance has become. It’s not sarcasm, but a striking “obscure” fact that highlights the absurdity and intensity of modern camouflage.
- Славянское братство (Slavic brotherhood): The expert uses this as a threat from the European perspective, not as his own sentiment. He is saying Europeans are terrified of the historic, cultural, and military re-unification of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus against the West.
